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Race-Conscious Admissions Policies in American
Institutions of Higher Education: How Students for
Fair Admissions v. Harvard could Impact the Practice
of Affirmative Action
Christine Kiracofe, Ed.D.*

INTRODUCTION
Attainment of a college education has long been part of the
American dream. As noted in a memo published by the Brookings
Institute, “Americans are brought up to believe that a college degree
is a ticket to a better life.”1 Research suggests that students from low
socioeconomic-status backgrounds who complete a college degree
are “[m]uch more likely to climb the economic ladder” than their
non-degreed peers.2 In addition to the financial benefits, college
completers tend to be healthier than those without a postsecondary
degree and generally report a greater overall sense of well-being.3
For centuries, families have encouraged their children to attain a col* Christine Kiracofe, Ed.D., Associate Professor and Director of the Ph.D. in Higher Education at Purdue University. Dr. Kiracofe can be reached via email at ckiracofe@purdue.edu.
1 Andrew P. Kelly, Does College Really Improve Social Mobility? BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
SOCIAL MOBILITY MEMO (2014),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/social-mobilitymemos/2014/02/11/does-college-really-improve-social-mobility/.
2 Id. It is important to note that attainment of a college degree does not have the same
impact on all students. As Kelly notes, “[O]ur system of postsecondary education does promote social mobility, but only for the small segment of low-income Americans who actually
finish a credential.”
3 See Jennifer Ma, Matea Pender, & Meredith Welch, Education Pays 2016: The Benefits
of Higher Education for Individuals and Society, COLLEGE BOARD: TRENDS IN HIGHER EDUCATION
SERIES (2016).
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lege degree so that they can climb the proverbial social ladder. However, before an individual can reap the myriad benefits of a college
degree, they must first navigate the waters of the college admissions
process.
White men have had the opportunity to attend college on U.S.
soil since before the Country’s inception, when Harvard University
was founded in 1636. In contrast, it would be more than 200 years
until white women had access to a college education at what was initially known as the “Harvard Annex” (later Radcliffe College) in
1879.4 The first Black man to graduate from college in the U.S. was
Alexander Lucius Twilight, who received a bachelor’s degree from
Middlebury College in Vermont in 1823.5 However, Twilight’s accomplishment at this early point in history was the exception rather
than the rule, especially for large, public, flagship universities. For
example, the University of Alabama did not admit its first black student until 1956;6 the first black Alabama graduate wouldn’t cross
the stage until nearly a decade later in 1965. Black students were not
admitted to the University of Florida until 1958.7 When James Meredith became the first black student to attend the University of Mississippi in 1962, there was widespread rioting that took the lives of
two individuals.8 And, it wasn’t until 1966 that the Citadel admitted
its first black student.9 While college attendance rates for black students have increased in recent years, a far lower percentage of black
students have access to higher education opportunities than their
white (and other race) peers. In 2007, the U.S. Census Bureau found

4 Colleen Walsh, Hard-earned gains for women at Harvard, THE HARVARD GAZETTE (Apr.
26, 2012), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2012/04/hard-earned-gains-for-womenat-harvard/. U.S. News and World Report credits Wesleyan College (Macon, Georgia) as the
first college to grant a woman a college degree in 1840. See U.S. News & World Report, Historic
Firsts
in
Women’s
Education
in
the
United
States
(Mar.
11,
2009),
https://www.usnews.com/education/articles/2009/03/11/historic-firsts-in-womenseducation-in-the-united-states.
5 Key Events in Black Higher Education: JBHE Chronology of Major Landmarks in the Progress of African Americans in Higher Education, J. BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC.,
https://www.jbhe.com/chronology/.
6 Id. (“After riots engulfed the campus, [Autherine Lucy] was expelled for ‘her own safety.’”).
7 George H. Starke, Jr., UF in 1958: I was the first black student., ORLANDO SENTINEL (Sep.
15, 2017), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/opinion/os-ed-first-black-student-at-uf-sharesstory-20170915-story.html.
8 Id.
9 Id.
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that “there are three times as many African Americans housed in
prisons as there are blacks who live in college dormitories.”10
Attorney Hobart Taylor, Jr., in 1961, was the first individual
to conceptualize the idea of “affirmative action” related to race in the
public sphere.11 Taylor worked with then-President John F. Kennedy
on Executive Order 10925, establishing the President’s committee on
equal employment opportunity.12 The phrase was used in the context of providing obligation for government contractors and mandated that:
[A government] contractor will not discriminate
against any employee or applicant for employment
because of race, creed, color, or national origin. The
contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that
applicants are employed, and that employees are
treated during employment, without regard to their
race, creed color, or national origin.13
While the phrase “affirmative action” was initially made in the context of government contractors, the scope and goals of affirmative
action were much larger than simply remedying contract discrimination. Manning Marable notes:
‘[A]ffirmative action’ per se was never a law, or even
a coherently developed set of governmental policies
designed to attack institutional racism and societal
discrimination. It was instead a series of presidential
executive orders, civil rights laws, and governmental
programs regarding the awarding of federal contracts
and licenses, as well as the enforcement of fair employment practices, with the goal of uprooting the
practices of bigotry.14

10 Key Events in Black Higher Education, supra note 5.
11 Id.
12 Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 C.F.R. § 1977 (1961).
13 Id. at Part III-A, §301(1).
14 THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE 3–4 (George E. Curry, ed. 1997).
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Colleges and Universities began implementing affirmative action, or
“race-conscious” admissions programs in the 1960s.15 For many
higher education institutions, affirmative action admissions policies
were the only way that black students could gain access to otherwise
completely segregated institutions. Unlike white college applicants
who might be from a long line of college graduates, black students
were often - and in some cases still are - the very first individual in
their family to apply to a postsecondary institution. Legacy students
(students whose parents, grandparents, or other relatives attended
the school the applicant is applying to) were almost exclusively
white. The benefits Colleges and Universities give to legacy students
have historically been unavailable to the vast majority of black students even when legacy “points” were given on a racially neutral basis.
Since inception, affirmative action programs have been characterized as everything from institutional ‘reverse’ racism, to necessary plans that seek to ameliorate decades of racism. Data from the
Pew Research Center indicates that a large majority of Americans
support affirmative action. When asked whether “[a]ffirmative action programs designed to increase the number of black and minority students on college campus are. . . good or bad,” 71% of respondents answered “good” in 2017.16 This is a significant increase in the
percentage of Americans responding favorably to affirmative action
programs. In comparison, when Americans were asked the same
question in 2003, just 60% of respondents indicated they had a positive opinion of affirmative action programs.17 This paper begins with
an overview of historic affirmative action case law in Section I. Section II provides an overview of the Fisher v. University of Texas Supreme Court decisions in 2013 and 2016, respectively. The impact
of the Fisher litigation on Texas’ “Top 10% Plan” at issue in both cases is reviewed in Section III. In Section IV, the Students for Fair Admissions case is discussed. Section V provides analysis of the caselaw
and the paper concludes with Section VI.

15 Dorothy F. Garrison-Wade & Chance W. Lewis, Affirmative Action: History and Analysis, 184 J. COLLEGE ADMISSION 23 (2004).
16 Pew Research Center, Growing share views affirmative action programs positively (Oct.
4,
2017),
http://www.people-press.org/2017/10/05/4-race-immigration-anddiscrimination/4_6-8/.
17 Id.
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I. HISTORIC AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASELAW
A.

Regents of the University of California v. Bakke18

In both 1973 and 1974, Allan Bakke, a white male, applied to
and was rejected by the University of California at Davis (Davis)
medical school. For both years Bakke applied, Davis admitted an entering class of 100 students filled via two parallel admissions programs: a regular admissions program (from which 84 seats would
be filled) and a special admissions program. The special admissions
program reserved 16 of the 100 total seats for students characterized as “’economically and/or educationally disadvantaged’ . . .
members of a ‘minority group.’”19 Applicants to the regular admissions program were required to have a GPA of no less than 2.5 on a
scale of 4.0. However, this GPA threshold was waived for special
admissions candidates. In both years that Bakke applied, “[s]pecial
applicants were admitted with significantly lower scores. . .” than his.
However, as a white applicant, Bakke was ineligible to compete for
the 16 special admissions seats.20 Bakke filed suit, alleging that the
special admissions program violated both the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth amendment and Title VI.21
The Supreme Court applied the strict scrutiny test, determining that the special admissions policy was not necessary in order to
promote a substantial state interest in a diverse student body. The
court explained “no matter how strong their qualifications, quantitative and extracurricular, including their own potential for contribution to educational diversity, [non-minority applicants] are never afforded the chance to compete with applicants from the preferred
[minority] groups for the special admissions seats.”22 The Court further observed that “at the same time, the preferred applicants have
the opportunity to compete for every seat in the class.”23 The major-

18 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
19 Id.
20 Id. at 266.
21 Bakke also argued that the special admissions program violated the California Constitution.
22 Id. at 319.
23 Id. at 320.
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ity decision24 held while race could permissibly be taken into consideration when making admissions decisions, reserving 16 seats for
minority students was unconstitutional.
B.

Harvard College Admissions Program

Justice Powell, in an appendix to the majority opinion in Bakke,
highlighted the admissions program then utilized by Harvard College
as an example of a constitutionally permissible race-conscious admissions program. He shared that the Harvard College admissions
committee takes into account more than scholarly qualifications,
noting that “[i]f scholarly excellence were the sole or even predominant criterion, Harvard College would lose a great deal of its vitality
and intellectual excellence and that the quality of the educational experience offered to all students would suffer.”25 Justice Powell, himself an alumnus of Harvard, continued:
The belief that diversity adds an essential ingredient
to the educational process has long been a tenet of
Harvard College admissions. Fifteen or twenty years
ago, however, diversity meant students from California, New York, and Massachusetts; city dwellers and
farm boys; violinist, painters and football players; biologists, historians and classicists; potential stockbrokers, academics and politicians. The result was
that very few ethnic or racial minorities attended
Harvard College. In recent years Harvard College has
expanded the concept of diversity to include students
from disadvantaged economic, racial and ethnic
groups. Harvard College now recruits not only Californians or Louisianans but also blacks and Chicanos
and other minority students. Contemporary conditions in the United States mean that if Harvard college is to continue to offer a first-rate education to its
students, minority representation in the undergradu-

24 This case resulted in six total decisions, leading to confusion as to whether Bakke was
binding or instead a plurality decision. However, as will be outlined later in the paper, High
Court decisions in college admissions cases following Bakke would affirm the Powell majority
opinion.
25 Id. at 321–22.
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ate body cannot be ignored by the Committee on
Admissions.26

Justice Powell articulated that Harvard College did not employ quotas, as was the case in Bakke. Instead, all applicants’ academic credentials were reviewed to determine whether or not individual students would be “’admissible’ and deemed capable” by the admissions
committee.27 Student diversity, including racial diversity, was considered only after a large pool of academically capable students was
identified. Powell noted that “a farm boy from Idaho can bring
something to Harvard College that a Bostonian cannot offer. Similarly, a black student can usually bring something that a white person
cannot offer. The quality of the educational experience of all the students in Harvard College depends in part on these differences in the
background and outlook that students bring with them.”28 The Harvard College admissions program would, by many courts considering
affirmative action cases, serve as the “gold standard” for how a university could ensure student diversity without running afoul of the
Constitution. Still, in the decades that followed, institutions struggled to determine how best to formulate affirmative action policies,
resulting in a small but significant body of caselaw.
C.

Hopwood v. Texas29

In 1992, Cheryl Hopwood, Kenneth Elliott, Douglas Carvell,
and David Rogers, all white applicants, were denied admission to the
University of Texas law school. At issue in Hopwood was the University’s use of race in making law school admissions decisions. The
University of Texas law school admissions criteria have changed significantly over the past six decades. In the early 1960s, any applicant
who had an undergraduate grade point average of 2.2 (out of 4) and
“had taken the LSAT” was admitted.30 Beginning in the mid-1960s,
when the number of applicants began to “significantly exceed the

26 Id. at 322–23.
27 Id. at 323.
28 Id.
29 Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
30 Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F.Supp. 551, 557 (W.D. Texas 1994).
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law school’s capacity,”31 admissions decisions began to be based on
students’ Texas Index (TI), a numerical score taking into account an
applicant’s undergraduate grade point average and their score on
the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT). Initially, the law school set
a baseline TI score for admission; any student earning a TI score
above the specified baseline was granted admission. The admissions
scheme was later modified so that a student’s TI score did not grant
them automatic admission, but instead qualified them for inclusion
in either a “presumptive admission” or “presumptive denial” category.32
Hopwood earned a TI of 199, a score which was within that
year’s “presumptive admission” group. However, after an additional
review of Hopwood’s application materials indicated that her undergraduate degree was not from an “academically competitive” institution, she was put into “the discretionary zone” of non-minority applicants: a group of applicants whose files needed to undergo
additional review before an admissions decision could be rendered.33 Elliott, Carvel, and Rogers each had a TI of 197 and, like
Hopwood, were also placed into the discretionary zone of nonminority applicants. Upon further review, none of the four applicants were ultimately admitted to the law school.34
At trial, petitioners demonstrated that minority applicants
with TI scores lower than the petitioners’ had been admitted, noting
that the black student with the highest TI during this admissions cycle was 199 – identical to Hopwood’s score. Thus, every black student admitted during the 1992 admission cycle had a TI score equal
to or lower than Hopwood. Petitioners argued that but for the university’s consideration of minority applicants (with lower TI presumptive “cut scores”) in a separate pool from non-minority applicants, they would have been admitted. The court was careful to
point out that admissions patterns made it clear that TI scores were
not the only factor considered when making admissions decisions,
stating “the Court agrees with the plaintiffs that the [data] shows a
significant disparity in TIs between the minority and nonminority
31 Id.
32 Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F.Supp. 551, 562 (W.D. Texas 1994).
33 Id. at 564.
34 The law school testified that Elliott had received an offer of admission “left [on] a
message on his answering machine, and instructed admissions personnel to continue to try to
reach him.” However, Elliott did not receive the message until after the semester began and
was, at that point, unable to change his plans in order to be able to attend. Id. at 566.
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pools. . . what the [data] does not prove, however, is that race or ethnic origin was the reason behind the denial of admission to the plaintiffs.”35 Nonetheless, the U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Texas found for the petitioners, ruling that the law school admissions formula violated the petitioning students’ equal protection
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment,36 opining that the admissions process “[f]ail[ed] to afford each individual applicant a comparison with the entire pool of applicants, not just those of the applicant’s own race . . .”37 The court characterized the admissions
process as differential in regards to an applicant’s race, observing
that:
Nonminority applicants receiving no votes [from the
admissions committee] were denied admission without any further consideration or any direct comparison to minority applicants . . . by March . . . 718 denial
letters had been sent to resident applicants, all to
nonminority applicants. . . The law school did not reject any minority applicants until later in the admissions process.38
The court’s decision fell short of holding affirmative action based on
race unconstitutional per se. Instead, the court order provided that
all four petitioners were entitled to reapply to the law school for the
1995-96 school year at no additional expense and ordered the university to pay damages in the amount of $1.00 each.39
The university appealed the decision to the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals. The appellate court summarized the legal question
before them, stating:
With the best of intentions, in order to increase the
enrollment of certain favored classes of minority students, the University of Texas School of Law . . . discriminates in favor of those applicants by giving sub35 Id. at 581.
36 Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F.Supp. 551 (W.D. Texas 1994).
37 Id. at 579.
38 Id. at 576.
39 Id. at 586.
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stantial racial preferences in its admissions program.
The beneficiaries of this system are blacks and Mexican Americans, to the detriment of whites and nonpreferred minorities. The question we decide today .
. . is whether the Fourteenth Amendment permits the
school to discriminate in this way.40
Applying strict scrutiny, and referencing the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Bakke, the court opined that “[t]he state’s interest in diversity [does not] constitute[] a compelling justification for governmental race-based discrimination.”41 The court held that race could
not be used as a factor in admissions decisions and stated that petitioners were entitled to “[r]eapply under an admissions system that
invokes none of these serious constitutional infirmaties.”42 Petitioners’ appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari was denied. The Fifth Circuit’s decision was a significant one for the state,
“[a]rguably end[ing] traditional affirmative action programs at Texas
state universities.”43
D.

The Top Ten Percent Plan

The year after the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Hopwood, state
legislators passed Texas House Bill 588, also known as the “Top Ten
Percent Plan.”44 The top ten percent plan was designed to level the
playing field, by “ensur[ing] that students at low-achieving high
schools, who tend to be disproportionately poor and minority, are
equally represented among those automatically granted admission”
to the state’s top tier public universities.45 In a Harvard Civil RightsCivil Liberties Law Review article published shortly after enactment
of the top ten percent plan, Holley and Spencer observed that:

40 Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 935 (5th Cir. 1996).
41 Id. at 945.
42 Id. at 962.
43 Danielle Holley & Delia Spencer, The Texas Ten Percent Plan, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
245, 249 (1999).
44 For a thorough overview of the law, see id.
45 Julie Berry Cullen, Mark C. Long & Randall Reback, Jockeying for Position: Strategic
High School Choice Under Texas’ Top Ten Percent Plan 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16663, 2011), http://www.nber.org/papers/w16663.
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The sponsoring legislators hoped that because it targeted high schools highly segregated by race and
class, the Ten Percent Plan would broaden the student applicant pool. . . By establishing an admissions
scheme that, in effect, equalized the status of all Texas high schools—conferring the same benefits on top
ten percenters from rural, suburban, and urban
schools—the Plan had the potential to increase the
number of students matriculating at state universities from these underrepresented regions and
schools.46

The Bill was signed into law by then-Texas Governor George W. Bush
on May 20, 1997. The bill specified that Texas colleges and universities:
[S]hall admit an applicant for admission to the institution as an undergraduate student if the applicant
graduated in one of the two school years preceding
the academic year for which the applicant is applying
for admission from a public or private high school in
this state accredited by a generally recognized accrediting organization with a grade point average in
the top 10 percent of the student's high school graduating class.47
Opponents of the bill expressed concern that the law could result in
academically unprepared students gaining admission to Texas’ flagship universities. Perhaps to allay these concerns, the bill contained
language specifying that after making top ten percent admissions decisions, the admitting institution was to review the applicant’s educational record “[t]o determine whether the applicant may require
additional preparation for college-level work or would benefit from
inclusion in a retention program.”48 The law also specified that the
admitting college or university could require students flagged in this
post-admission review to “[p]articipate in appropriate enrichment

46 Holley & Spencer, supra note 43, at 253.
47 Texas House Bill No. 588, Section 51.803(a) (1997).
48 Texas House Bill No. 588, Section 51.803(b) (1997).
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courses and orientation programs” the summer before they enrolled
in the institution.49
A National Bureau of Economic Research working paper reviewed the effect of the top ten percent plan on students’ high school
selection patterns.50 This research analyzed enrollment patterns of
students to determine if they “downgrade when choosing a high
school, when access to a benefit – guaranteed admission to flagship
universities - depends on relative position within one’s class.”51 The
study compared the high school choices of six different cohorts of 8th
graders: three of which selected their high school of choice before
the top ten percent plan, and three after the law’s passage. The data
suggest that “students with varied chances of placing in the top ten
percent at nearby high schools tended to ‘downgrade’ in peer quality
by attending high schools with lower initial top ten percent thresholds.”52 While students of all races engaged in trading down in an attempt to more easily secure automatic college admission, the impact
of the practice affects students differently by race. The research indicates that “both white and minority students who trade down are
relatively likely to displace minority students who otherwise would
have placed in the top ten percent of their class.”53 As discussed later in this paper, the top ten percent plan would remain a controversial admissions mechanism for years to come.
E.
1.

The University of Michigan Cases: Gratz v. Bollinger54& Grutter
v. Bollinger55
Gratz v. Bollinger

In 1995, Jennifer Gratz,56 a white female, applied for admission to
the College of Literature, Science, and the Arts at the University of

49 Id.
50 Cullen, Long & Reback, supra note 45.
51 Id. at 1.
52 Id. at 22.
53 Id. at 23.
54 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
55 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
56 Jennifer Gratz was the named plaintiff, although the case was filed as a class action on
behalf of a group of white applicants, all of whom had been denied admission to the University
of Michigan.
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Michigan as a first-year student.57 In 1995, undergraduate university admissions decisions were made via a point system whereby factors like student grades and standardized test scores were given a
point value. Applicants’ points were tallied and compared against
the minimum number of required points; out of 150 possible points,
roughly 100 were required for admission.58 Underrepresented minority applicants received an automatic 20 points, or roughly 20% of
the total minimum number of points necessary for admission.59
Gratz missed admission to the University by a narrow margin. A review of her application showed that she was “’well qualified [for admission]’” but was “’less competitive than the students who ha[d]
been admitted on first review.’”60 Gratz argued that the admission
plan’s use of race was unlawful, arguing that had she been a member
of an underrepresented minority group, her score would have been
high enough for admission.
Justice Rehnquist authored the Supreme Court’s majority
opinion, which outlined the Court’s holding that the University of
Michigan undergraduate admissions plan violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, as well as Title VI and §1981.
The Court opined that application of strict scrutiny was appropriate
in this case, as the differential treatment in question revolved around
race, a suspect classification. Applying the first prong of the strict
scrutiny test, the Court found that the University had a compelling
state interest in diversity, the stated goal of the admissions plan.
However, the plan failed on the second prong of the strict scrutiny
test, with the Court determining that the admissions plan was not
narrowly tailored to achieve this interest.61 Addressing the University’s argument that such an admissions plan was necessary given
the thousands of applications received each year, the Court stated
that “[T]he fact that the implementation of a program capable of
providing individualized consideration might present administrative

57 For a general overview of the case, See Christine Rienstra Kiracofe, Diversity as a
Compelling Interest: The Logical Application of Grutter v. Bollinger to K-12 Schools, 208 EDUC.
LAW REP. 691 (2006).
58 Colin S. Diver, From Equality to Diversity: The Detour from Brown to Grutter, 2004 U.
ILL. L. REV. 691, 693 (2004).
59 Id.
60 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 252 (2003) (citing App. to Pet. For Cert. 109a.).
61 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 269 (2003).
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challenges does not render constitutional an otherwise problematic
system.”62
2. Grutter v. Bollinger
On the same day that the Court issued its decision in Gratz, it
also ruled on a second case involving admissions at the University of
Michigan. In Grutter v. Bollinger,63 the Court considered the constitutionality of using race as a factor in admissions to the University’s
law school. The University of Michigan law school, regarded as one
of the best public law schools in the Nation, utilized a very different
admissions scheme than that employed by the undergraduate college of liberal arts and sciences in Gratz. Applicants to the law school
were assessed using holistic admissions criteria; individual test
scores or student characteristics, in contrast to Gratz, were not assigned point values. Instead, the law school considered a number of
different factors when making admissions decisions, including: Law
School Admission Test (LSAT) scores, grade point averages (GPA),
and “soft variables” such as an application essay, the difficulty of
courses taken as an undergraduate, the quality of the applicant’s undergraduate institution, and an assessment of how the applicant
could add to the overall diversity of the law school.64
Barbara Grutter, a white female, applied to the law school in
1996 with a 3.8 GPA and a 161 on the LSAT. She was briefly waitlisted, but her application was eventually rejected. Grutter filed suit, asserting that race was a predominant factor in the University’s law
school admissions decisions in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI, and §1981. The law school’s director of admissions
testified that race was considered as a factor in admissions decisions
“[t]o ensure that a critical mass of underrepresented minority students would be reached so as to realize the educational benefits of a
diverse student body.”65 Law school officials clarified that a “critical
mass” of underrepresented minority students did not refer to a specific percentage of students. The meaning of “critical mass” was
characterized by law school officials as being “[a] number that encourages underrepresented minority students to participate in the

62 Id. at 275.
63 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
64 Id. at 315.
65 Id. at 318 (citing App. To Pet. For Cert. at 207a).
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classroom and not feel isolated”66 and “[n]umbers such that underrepresented minority students do not feel isolated or like
spokespersons for their race.”67
The Court referenced Bakke in the majority decision, reiterating that “to be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program cannot use a quota system.”68 The Court held the admissions
criteria at the law school did not amount to a quota, stating “we are
satisfied that the Law School’s admissions program, like the Harvard
plan described by Justice Powell, does not operate as a quota.”69
Once again, the Harvard plan was highlighted by the Court as a Constitutional example of how a University could operate a diversityconscious admissions plan.
F.

Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action70

Soon after the Grutter and Gratz decisions, in 2006, Michigan
voters approved a ballot initiative known as the Michigan Civil
Rights Initiative, or Proposal 2, designed to end the practice of affirmative action in the state. As a result, Article 1 §26, Affirmative
action programs, was added to the state constitution. Section 26
mandates that:
The University of Michigan, Michigan State University, Wayne State University, and any other public college or university, community college, or school district shall not discriminate against, or grant
preferential treatment to, any individual or group on
the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national
origin in the operation of public employment, public
education, or public contracting.71

66 Id. (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. at 208a – 209a).
67 Id. at 319 (citing App. to Pet. for Cert.).
68 Id. at 334.
69 Id. at 335.
70 Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S.Ct. 1623 (2014).
71 Mich. Const. of 1963, art. I, §26 (2006).
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The amendment was a controversial one, passing into law by a vote
of just 58% to 42%.72 After its passage, litigation soon resulted. In a
case that would ultimately be decided by the U.S. Supreme Court,
several community organizations and individual Michigan residents
filed an equal protection challenge to the amendment in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Judge David Lawson
granted summary judgment for the State in Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action in 200873 and subsequently denied plaintiffs’ motion
to reconsider later that same year.74 On appeal to the Sixth Circuit,
the court reversed the trial court decision, instead entering summary
judgment for the appellants, the Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action.75 However, this decision was short lived; the following year, an
en banc 6th Circuit panel reversed.76 On behalf of the state, Michigan
Attorney General Bill Schuette appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme
Court, which granted certiorari in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action.77
The High Court was careful to frame the question before it,
clarifying that Schuette was not Grutter or Gratz revisited, stating
“this case is not about the constitutionality, or the merits, or raceconscious admissions policies in higher education.”78 Instead, the
Court characterized the issue before it as “[w]hether, and in what
manner, voters in the States may choose to prohibit the consideration of . . . racial preferences.”79 Perhaps reflecting the complexity of
the issue before the Court, the case (heard by 8 Justices, as Justice
Kagan did not take part) resulted in a plethora of decisions: Justice
Kennedy authored the majority opinion and was joined by Justices
Roberts and Alito. However, Justice Roberts also filed a concurring
opinion, as did Justice Breyer, and (separately) Justice Scalia (joined
by Justice Thomas). Justice Sotomayor filed a dissent which was
joined by Justice Ginsburg. Although there was disagreement as to
72 Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S.Ct. 1623, 1629 (2014).
73 Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the University of Michigan,
F.Supp.2d 924 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
74 Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the University of Michigan,
F.Supp.2d 948 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
75 Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the University of Michigan,
F.3d 607 (6th Cir. 2011).
76 Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the University of Michigan,
F.3d 466 (en banc 6th Cir. 2012).
77 Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S.Ct. 1623 (2014).
78 Id. at 1624.
79 Id.

539
592
652
701
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why §26 should be upheld,80 the Court’s majority held that “there is
no authority in the Constitution of the United States or in this Court’s
precedents for the Judiciary to set aside Michigan laws that commit
this policy determination to the voters”81 and deemed the Michigan
law Constitutional.
While the Schuette case was winding its way from Michigan
to the U.S. Supreme Court, the issue of race and college admissions
was simultaneously being considered in Texas, in Fisher v. University
of Texas.82 Like the Michigan litigation in Gratz, Grutter, and ultimately Schuette, the Texas case would occupy courts’ attention for
more than half of a decade and would result in two different U.S. Supreme Court decisions.
II. FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS83 (FISHER I)
Abigail Fisher applied for admission as an undergraduate
student to the University of Texas at Austin (UT) for the fall semester
of 2008, along with 29,500 other applicants.84 The vast majority of
applications during this admissions cycle were denied, including
Fisher’s. Out of the nearly 30,000 applicants that year, just 6,715
freshmen enrolled at the University that fall.85 After receiving notification that her application to UT was rejected, Fisher filed suit, arguing that had she been a racial minority she would have been admitted to the university. She alleged that UT’s admissions procedures
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and 2000d.86
The University of Texas’ undergraduate admissions criteria
has changed significantly over the years. Through 1996, UT em-

80 For example, whereas the Sixth Circuit had found §26 to be unconstitutional under
the “political-process doctrine” (derived from earlier High Court decisions in Washington v.
Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) and Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), Justices Scalia and Thomas believed the Michigan law was constitutional because it did not “reflect a racially discriminatory purpose.” Id. at 1626.
81 Id. at 1638.
82 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013) (Fisher I).
83 Id.
84 Fisher was later joined by a second plaintiff, Rachel Michaelewicz.
85 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 645 F.Supp.2d 587, 591 (W.D. Texas, 2009)

(citing Defs.’ Cross–Mot. For Summ. J. Tab 8, Aff.).
86 Id. at 590.
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ployed a “two-tiered affirmative action system.”87 As outlined in
Hopwood, the first tier of this system involved the tabulation of an
Academic Index (AI)88 for each applicant. An applicant’s AI was calculated by factoring in an applicant’s high school class rank and
standardized test scores. The second part of the system considered
an applicant’s race. UT officials believed that the second tier was
necessary because reliance on AI scores alone would result in “unacceptably low diversity levels.”89 However, the Supreme Court’s 1996
decision in Hopwood rendered the second tier of the university’s
admissions program unconstitutional. In response, the university
expanded “outreach programs” for minority applicants and replaced
the second tier of the original plan with a Personal Achievement Index (PAI), a “holistic metric of a candidate’s potential contribution to
the University.”90 PAI scores (from 1 to 6, with 6 being high) were
granted to students based on the quality of two required essays,
supplemental information such as letters of recommendation, writing samples, etc., and an evaluation of an applicant’s leadership experience, extracurriculars, community service, awards and honors,
or other “special circumstances.” Special circumstances could take
into account factors like socioeconomic status of either of the student’s family or their high school, whether or not the applicant came
from a single-parent family, home language, and/or an applicant’s
race.91 Under the racially neutral AI/PAI admissions system, the
percentage of black students entering UT as freshmen dropped significantly (from 4.1% of the freshman class in 1996 to 2.7% in
1997).92 The Top Ten Percent law, discussed above, along with several different scholarship programs were designed to address declining minority attendance at UT.
After the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Grutter v. Bollinger holding that universities had a compelling governmental interest in attaining a racially diverse student body, UT once again
modified its admission policies. In August 2003, the University of
Texas Board of Regents empowered all universities within the University of Texas system to individually determine if race and ethnici87 Id.
88 An applicant’s AI was computed to predict their “predicted freshman grade point average.”
89 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 645 F.Supp.2d 587, 591 (W.D. Texas, 2009).
90 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 133 S.Ct. 2411, 2416 (2013) (Fisher I).
91 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 136 S.Ct. 2198, 2206 (2016).
92 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 645 F.Supp.2d 587, 592 (W.D. Texas, 2009).
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ty (“among a broader array of qualifications and characteristics”93)
should be considered as part of the admissions process. In response
to this resolution, UT conducted an internal study which suggested
there was not a critical mass of minority students on campus. For
example, UT minority students participating in the study “reported
feeling isolated” in the classroom and “a majority of students at the
University stated there was insufficient diversity in the classroom.”94
In response to study data, UT once again revised its admissions policy to allow race to be considered as one part of an applicant’s PAI. It
was under this modified admissions scheme that Fisher’s application
was considered and subsequently rejected, as she did not graduate
in the top ten percent of her high school class.
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas underscored the Supreme Court’s holding in Grutter that universities
have a compelling interest in the diversity of their student body. The
district court rejected petitioners’ claims that the UT admissions system resulted in the creation of racial quotas, finding that the university’s use of race in the admissions process was narrowly tailored.95
The district court granted UT’s request for summary judgment.
Fisher subsequently appealed the decision to the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, which affirmed the lower court decision in 2011,96 stating that:
A university may decide to pursue the goal of a diverse student body, and it may do so to the extent
that it ties that goal to the educational benefits that
flow from diversity. The admissions procedures that
UT adopted, modeled after the plan approved by the
Supreme Court in Grutter, are narrowly tailored –
procedures in some respects superior to the Grutter
plan because the University does not keep a running
tally of under-represented minority representation
during the admissions process. We are satisfied that
the University’s decision to reintroduce race93 Id. at 593 (citing Pls.’ Mot. For Part. Summ. J. Ex. 19, Aff. Of Francie A. Frederick
(“Frederick Aff.”) Ex. A at 4–5).
94 Id. (citing Walker Dep. at 21:6–13).
95 Id. at 608.
96 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011).
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conscious admissions was adequately supported by
the “serious, good faith consideration” required by
Grutter. . . it is neither our role nor purpose to dance
from Grutter’s firm holding that diversity is an interest supporting compelling necessity. Nor are we inclined to do so.97
After unsuccessfully petitioning for an en banc review of the Fifth
Circuit decision, petitioners successfully persuaded the Supreme
Court to hear the case.98 The High Court ruled that the facts of the
case required the judicial application of strict scrutiny to appellant’s
Equal Protection claim. The Court opined that “rather than perform
this searching examination, however, the Court of Appeals held petitioner could challenge only ‘whether [the University’s] decision to
reintroduce race as a factor in admissions was made in good faith.’”99
As the Fifth Circuit had failed to fully apply strict scrutiny, the case
was remanded to determine whether or not the admissions criteria
used by the University of Texas were narrowly tailored to meet the
legitimate governmental interest of attaining a diverse student
body.100 On remand, the Fifth Circuit found for the University,101
and again the Appellate court denied an en banc rehearing of the
case.102 As a result, Fisher petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari for a second time in the case that has come to be known as Fisher
II.
B. Fisher v. University of Texas103 (Fisher II)
The High Court heard the petitioner’s case for the second
time in three years in Fisher II. Abigail Fisher once again argued that
UT’s “consideration of race as part of its holistic review process disadvantaged her and other Caucasian applicants, in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.”104 The Court observed that while the UT
admissions program was “a direct result of Grutter, it was not identi97 Id. at 247.
98 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 570 U.S. 297 (2013).
99 Id. at 313.
100 Id. at 315.
101 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 758 F.3d 633 (2014).
102 Fisher v. Texas, 771 F.3d 274 (Mem. 2014).
103 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 136 S.Ct. 2198 (2016) (Fisher II).
104 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 136 S.Ct. 2198, 2207 (2016) (Fisher II).
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cal to the policy this Court approved in that case.”105 Unlike the University of Michigan, UT fills as much as 75 percent of the incoming
student body through the Top Ten Percent plan.106 However, as
Fisher did not graduate in the top ten percent of her high school
class, her admissions decision was impacted by the AI/PAI admissions review reserved for the rest of the entering class.
Referencing its earlier decision in Fisher I, the Court underscored “three controlling principles relevant to assessing the constitutionality of a public university’s affirmative-action program.”107
First, the Court noted that race could only be considered as part of a
university’s admissions plan if it could withstand strict scrutiny.
This requires that a university demonstrate that a race-conscious
admissions plan is in furtherance of a legitimate governmental objective, and that the mechanism for achieving this objective is narrowly
tailored.
Second, judicial deference must be given to a University’s determination that a diverse student body yields educational benefits
only when a university gives “a reasoned” or “principled” explanation for this decision.108 Complete judicial deference is inappropriate, as would be diversity quotas.
Third, universities employing race-conscious admissions
plans bear the burden of showing that a “‘nonracial approach’ would
not promote their interest in the educational benefits of diversity
‘about as well and at tolerable administrative expense.’”109 However, universities are not responsible for considering all race-neutral
alternatives nor are they required to choose between “maintaining a
reputation for excellence” and “fulfilling a commitment to provide
educational opportunities to members of all racial groups.”110
The Court held that the UT admissions plan challenged by
Fisher met all three of these principles. The Court appeared to be
somewhat perplexed, however, by Fisher’s exclusive focus on the
AI/PAI admissions criteria reserved for non-Top Ten Percent plan
eligible applicants.
105 Id. at 2206.
106 By state statute, students admitted to UT under the Top Ten Percent plan cannot
comprise more than 75% of the entering class (Texas Senate Bill 175).
107 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 136 S.Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016) (Fisher II).
108 Id.
109 Id., 133 S.Ct., at 2419.
110 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 136 S.Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016).

21

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2020

21

BYU Education & Law Journal, Vol. 2020, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 1

BYU Education & Law Journal

[2020

Regarding Fisher’s decision not to directly challenge the Top
Ten Percent plan, the Court observed that:
The University’s program is sui generis. Unlike other
approaches to college admissions considered by this
Court, it combines holistic review with a percentage
plan. This approach gave rise to an unusual consequence in this case: the component of the University’s admissions policy that had the largest impact on
petitioner’s changes of admission was not the
school’s consideration of race under its holisticreview process but rather the Top Ten Percent Plan.
Because petitioner did not graduate in the top 10
percent of her high school class, she was categorically
ineligible for more than three-fourths of the slots in
the incoming freshman class. It seems quite plausible, then, to think that petitioner would have had a
better chance of being admitted to the University if
the school used race-conscious holistic review to select its entire incoming class, as was the case in Grutter.111
Justice Kennedy authored the decision for the 4-3 majority,112 affirming the lower court decision and holding that UT’s admissions
program was constitutional. The Court was careful to note that approval of the admissions plan in its current form did not necessarily
mean that the same plan could be used without refinement for decades to come. The Court called upon the University to “engage in
constant deliberation and continued reflection” in regards to how UT
navigates the issue of race-conscious admissions.113
III.THE TOP TEN PERCENT PLAN POST-FISHER
One year after the Supreme Court’s decision in Fisher II, the
Texas Tribune reported that the Texas Senate Higher Education
111 Id. at 2208–09.
112 At the time of the decision, the Court had 8 members as a result of Justice Scalia’s
death. Justice Kagan recused herself from the case, leaving just 7 Justices to participate in the
case.
113 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 136 S.Ct. 2198, 2214 (2016).
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Committee was considering elimination of the Top Ten Percent plan.
Although the law was ultimately left untouched, the considered elimination renewed discussions regarding the unintended consequences of the law. UT-Austin President Greg Fenves was quoted as saying
‘the top 10 percent rule is a blunt instrument,” referencing the recent
Supreme Court opinion in Fisher II.114 Although the Top Ten Percent
plan technically applied to all Texas state universities, the University
of Texas at Austin and Texas A & M were uniquely impacted as the
two most sought-after institutions by Top Ten Percent applicants.
At Texas’ most sought-after school, UT-Austin, the Top Ten
Percent plan is already a misnomer; in order to secure a spot at the
university under the plan students must, in practice, actually be
within the top 6 to 7 percent of their graduating class. This is because in 2009, the state legislature mandated that a maximum of 75
percent of UT-Austin’s student body could be comprised of automatic admissions granted to Top Ten Percent students.115 Without this
modification, it would be virtually impossible for any student who
didn’t qualify under the Top Ten Percent plan to gain admission, regardless of their academic credentials. For example, students who
applied to the University of Texas-Austin as freshmen for the fall
2019 semester had to be in the top six percent of their high school
classes in order to receive automatic admission. This is one percent
lower than the current “automatic cutoff” of seven percent.116
In 2017, roughly 75% (the maximum under state law) of all
freshman at the University of Texas-Austin were admitted under the
top ten percent plan.117 Of the top ten percent students, in 2016,
34% were White, 33% Hispanic, 21% Asian, and 7% Black.118 In
contrast, non-top ten percent students (students who ranked lower
114 Matthew Watkins, Texas Senators Mull; Eliminating Top 10 Percent Rule, The Texas
Tribune (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/04/05/texas-senators-mulleliminating-top-10-percent-rule/.
115 Id.
116 Matthew Watkins, UT-Austin Changes Automatic Admissions Threshold from 7 to 6
Percent, The Texas Tribune (Sep. 15, 2017), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/09/15/utaustin-raises-automatic-admissions-threshold-6-percent/.
117 Neena Satija, Has the Top 10 Percent Rule Impacted Diversity at UT-Austin? It’s Complicated. THE TEXAS TRIBUNE (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/04/11/utaustin-top-ten-percent-impact/.
118 Six percent of students were classified as either “other” or “non-U.S. Citizen.” See
Neena Satija, Race and UT-Austin Admissions: A Snapshot of the Past Five Years, THE TEXAS
TRIBUNE (Jun. 23, 2016), https://www.texastribune.org/2016/06/23/race-and-admissions-utaustin-last-five-years/.
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than the top 7% of their high school class or came from non-Texas
high schools) were significantly less diverse: 49% of these students
were White, 10% Hispanic, 23% Asian, and just 3% were Black.119
Thus, top ten percenters as a group are significantly more diverse
than their non-top ten percent counterparts: Black and Hispanic
students made up 54% of the total student population of the top ten
percent group. However, for traditionally admitted students, the
percentage of Black and Hispanic students dropped significantly to
just 33%.120 Put simply, as a tool to foster diversity in University of
Texas’ flagship schools, the Top Ten Percent plan works.
IV.POST-FISHER: STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS LITIGATION
Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA) is a non-profit organization comprised of 20,000 members121 “[w]ho believe that racial classifications and preferences in college admissions are unfair, unnecessary, and unconstitutional.”122 SFFA’s stated mission is to
“support and participate in litigation that will restore the original
principles of our nation’s civil rights movement:123 A student’s race
and ethnicity should not be factors that either harm or help that student to gain admission to a competitive university (emphasis in original).”124 To date, the organization has filed lawsuits against the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill,125 the University of TexasAustin,126 and Harvard. SFFA argues that “it is our belief that Har-

119 Id. Nine percent of non-top ten percent students were “non-U.S. Citizens” and five
percent were categorized as “Other.”
120 Id.
121 Students, parents, or other interested parties can join the organization by paying a
one-time membership fee of $10.
122
About,
STUDENTS
FOR
FAIR
ADMISSIONS
(last
accessed
[Date]),
https://studentsforfairadmissions.org/about/.
123 It is noteworthy to mention that Edward Blum, the director of the SFFA, also financially supported the Fisher lawsuit.
124 Id.
125 Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. University of North Carolina, 319 F.R.D. 490
(2017). Although the case has not yet reached trial, as of August 10, 2018, the University of
North Carolina had already spent $16.8 million dollars on the case. This figure includes more
than $12 million in legal fees and more than $4 million in data collection and analysis. See UNC
has spent $16.8 million on affirmative action lawsuit, The News & Observer (Aug. 10, 2018),
https://www.newsobserver.com/news/local/article216485240.html.
126 SFFA supported both of the Fisher cases.
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vard, UNC and most competitive universities are not in compliance
with the Supreme Court’s instructions [in Fisher].”127
Harvard, in particular, has a long history of involvement in
Supreme Court cases addressing the use of race in admissions decisions. The University filed amicus briefs in Bakke, Grutter, and Fisher. SFFA plaintiffs argue that the practice of discriminatory admissions decisions is not new, arguing that “[t]he Harvard Plan
[referenced in Bakke] was created for the specific purpose of discriminating against Jewish applicants.”128 The SFFA referenced statistical data suggesting Harvard’s current admissions plan discriminates against Asian-Americans, holding them to “[a] far higher
standard than other students . . . essentially forc[ing] them to compete against each other for admission.”129 For example, Harvard
sends recruitment letters to high school students throughout the U.S.
based on their performance on standardized tests. School policy dictates that “Asian-American males living in rural states” must score at
least 1370 on the PSAT to receive a recruitment letter whereas white
males need only score 1310.130
The SFFA filed litigation on behalf of “at least one [Asian
American] member” who applied to Harvard’s class of 2014 but was
denied admission.131 The organization argues that race was not being used as a “plus factor” at Harvard as was permitted in Grutter,
but instead as the determinative factor in admissions decisions. Petitioners asserted that Harvard could, and should, use non-racial
preferences to increase the diversity of the college’s student body,
such as focusing on socioeconomic (sometimes called “class based”)

127 Legal Issues, Students for Fair Admissions (last accessed [Date]),
https://studentsforfairadmissions.org/legal-issues/.
128 Complaint at 3, Peter v. Paul, 287 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 98-2389).
129 Id at 4.
130 Carrie Jung, Harvard Discrimination Trial Ends, But Lawsuit is Far From Over, NPR
(Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/11/02/660734399/harvard-discrimination-trialis-ending-but-lawsuit-is-far-from-over.
131 The rejected applicant’s academic credentials are outlined in the SFFA complaint:
the student graduated first in their class (out of 460 students) at a high school recognized as
being in the top 5% of U.S. high schools by U.S. News and World Report. The applicant was
named a National Scholar, National Merit Scholarship semifinalist, and an AP Scholar with distinction, having earned perfect scores on the ACT (36), SAT II Math (800), and the SAT II History (800) exams. Additionally, the applicant was a varsity athlete, school and community volunteer, and had participated in a Chinese-American exchange student program offered by the
United States Consulate General.
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diversity.132 They also highlight the fact that while Harvard might be
racially diverse, it is not diverse socioeconomically: A Harvard Crimson survey showed that almost a third of students in the 2014
freshman class (29%) came from families reporting an annual income of more than $250,000 and 14% of all freshmen reported family incomes of more than $500,000 annually. In contrast, just 20% of
Harvard freshman came from families earning less than $65,000 annually.133
In June 2015, the U.S. District Court for Massachusetts denied
SFFA’s motion to intervene after the organization argued that the
consideration of race and ethnicity in Harvard’s undergraduate admissions plan violated the equal protection clause and Title VI.134 In
this case, SFFA alleged that Harvard engaged in “prohibited ‘racial
balancing,’” and that the University’s admissions policies specifically
and negatively impacted Asian-American applicants.135 Petitioners
in SFFA’s case included both current Harvard students (asserting
that they “would like to see an increase in the number and diversity
of underrepresented minority groups admitted to Harvard”) and future Harvard applicants.136 Observing that none of the “future applicants” had gone so far as to begin the Harvard application process,
the court held that these students did not have a protectable interest
in the case. Regarding the current Harvard student-petitioners, the
court noted that although these students’ “interest is less speculative
and less contingent than the interest articulated by the Future Applicants, it is still not a significantly protectable interest.”137 Furthermore, the court articulated that the student-petitioners failed to
show that Harvard “may not adequately represent their interests.”138
Denying petitioners’ motion, the court found that allowing the students to participate as amici curiae in any further proceedings would
be appropriate. On appeal to the First Circuit later that same year,
the appellate court affirmed the district court’s holding that students

132 Complaint at 72–73, Peter v. Paul, 287 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 98-2389).
133 Id. at 76.
134 Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 308
F.R.D. 39, 43 (2015).
135 Id. at 44.
136 Id. at 49.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 49.
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failed to show that the University itself could not address students’
concerns.139
The timing of SFFA’s Harvard litigation is noteworthy. The
case was originally filed in 2014, under the Obama administration.
From 2011 to 2016, the Departments of Justice and Education issued
several guiding documents outlining how colleges and universities
could “[l]egally consider race and ethnicity in admissions decisions.”140 This guidance has been characterized by the SFFA as a
“[w]ink and a nod to racially discriminate.”141 However, under the
Trump administration, the DOJ has adopted a different position.
On June 15, 2018 SFFA filed a motion for summary judgment
in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts against
Harvard, arguing that the University’s admissions system continued
to violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.142 The complaint asserted
that “Harvard intentionally discriminates against Asian Americans . .
. engages in racial balancing . . . is not using race to achieve critical
mass . . . and neither gave serious, good faith consideration to nor
took advantage of workable race-neutral alternatives.”143 On August
30, 2018, a news release from the Department of Justice (DOJ) indicated that it had filed a statement of interest supporting SFFA’s continuing litigation against Harvard, in direct contrast to the office’s
position on affirmative action under the Obama administration.144
The DOJ statement, filed by then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions, argued that “Harvard has failed to show that it does not unlawfully discriminate against Asian Americans.”145 This is problematic, the DOJ
139 Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 807
F.3d 472 (1st Cir. 2015).
140 Scott Jaschik, Trump Administration Rescinds Guidance on Affirmative Action, INSIDE
HIGHER ED NEWS (Jul. 5, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/07/05/trumpadministration-rescinds-obama-guidance-race-and-admissions.
141 Harvard’s Education in Discrimination, Students for Fair Admissions (last accessed
[Date]), https://studentsforfairadmissions.org/harvards-education-in-discrimination/.
142 Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, at [page number], Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, [case citation] (No. 1.14-cv-14176ADB). Motion CITE PROPERLY available online at: http://samv91khoyt2i553a2t1s05iwpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Doc-412-Motion-for-SummaryJudgment.pdf
143 Id. at *2.
144 Department of Justice (News Release), Justice Department Files Statement of Interest
in Harvard Discrimination Case Defending Claim that Harvard Intentionally Discriminates on the
Basis of Race in Admissions, DOJ 18-1128 (D.O.J.) (2018), 2018 WL 4144583.
145 Id.
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argues, because Harvard receives millions of dollars of public funding each year and in doing so, agrees not to discriminate against applicants on the basis of race.146
The Harvard application review process is a complex and
lengthy one. Applications received by the university are reviewed in
geographical groups by a committee of approximately three to six
“first readers” and a “senior admissions officer.”147 Applicants are
assigned numerical ratings in up to fourteen different categories, including “overall, academic, extracurricular, athletic, personal, teacher recommendation (up to four possible), a school support recommendation, two staff interview ratings (overall and personal), and
two alumni interview ratings (overall and personal).”148 Ratings are
assigned on a scale from one (highest) to four (lowest) and plusses
or minuses can also be assigned. After each application has been reviewed by at least one reader (and sometimes also by the committee
chairperson) the application is presented to the subcommittee which
“decide[s] as a group what recommendation and level of support to
convey to the full admissions committee regarding admissions.”149
After each of the subcommittees make their decisions regarding
which applications to recommend, Harvard’s full admissions committee of roughly 40 individuals makes the final decisions on the applications.
In documents supporting the SFFA’s motion for summary
judgment, petitioners presented an analysis of six years of Harvard
admissions data by Duke University Professor Peter Arcidiacono.
Professor Arcidiacono’s analysis suggests Harvard’s admissions system significantly and negatively impacts Asian-American applicants.150 Arcidiacono noted:
Asian-American applicants are significantly stronger
than all other racial groups in academic performance.

146 Id.
147 Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 346
F.Supp.3d 174, 182 (D.Mass. 2018).
148 Id. at 182–83.
149 Id. at 184.
150 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Reasons in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment,
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, [case citation]
([docket number], [WL number], at 7. available online at: http://samv91khoyt2i553a2t1s05iwpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Doc-413-Memo-in-Support-ofMSJ.pdf
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They also perform very well in non-academic categories and have higher extracurricular scores than any
other racial group. Asian-American applicants (unsurprisingly, therefore) receive higher overall scores
from alumni interviewers than all other racial groups.
And they receive strong scores from teachers and
guidance counselors – scores that are nearly identical
to white applicants (and higher than AfricanAmerican and Hispanic applicants) . . . yet Harvard’s
admissions officials assign Asian Americans the lowest score of any racial group on the personal rating –
a “subjective” assessment of such traits as whether
the student has a ‘positive personality’ and ‘others
like to be around him or her,’ . . . is an ‘attractive person to be with,’ is ‘widely respected,’ is a ‘good person,’ and has good human qualities.’”151

The abnormally low personal rating scores are further compounded
by the fact that the scores given by admissions reviewers and alumni
interviewers (both of which assign applicants a personal rating
score) varied significantly by race. Asian-American applicants, as a
group, receive the lowest scores of any racial group when assessed
by Harvard admissions reviewers. In contrast, “alumni reviewers
(who actually meet the applicants) rate Asian-Americans, on average, at the top with respect to personal ratings – comparable to
white applicants and higher than African-American and Hispanic applicants.”152 Arcidiacono found that if students were admitted solely
on the basis of academics, “Asian-Americans would comprise over
50% of the admitted class” based on recent application trends.153
Harvard asserts that Dr. Arcidiacono’s analysis is “unreliable,” and highlights the fact that he excluded “ALDC” applicants (“recruited athletes, applicants whose parent or parents attended Harvard or Radcliffe as an undergraduate, applicants whose names
appeared on a ‘Dean’s interest’ or ‘Director’s interest’ list, and children of Harvard faculty and staff” ) from his analysis.154 The univer151 Id. at 7–8.
152 Id. at 8.
153 Id. at 9.
154 Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows or Harvard College, 2018
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sity argues that “Dr. Arcidiacono’s decision to exclude ALDC applicants, but not applicants who possess other characteristics that increase their likelihood of admission, is transparently directed toward finding a negative effect of Asian-American ethnicity.”155
SFFA plaintiffs also cited research conducted by Harvard’s
Office of Institutional Research (OIR), suggesting that Harvard’s admissions system disadvantages Asian-American students. OIR data
show that Asian-Americans were admitted at a lower rate than white
students for every year of the ten years included in the study, even
though white applicants’ scores were appreciably lower than AsianAmericans’ on every metric considered save the personal rating
score.156 Overall, the OIR study indicated that being Asian-American
significantly decreases an applicant’s chances of being admitted to
Harvard.157 In response to SFFA, Harvard attorneys noted that “the
OIR analyses neither inquired whether Harvard was discriminating
against Asian-American applicants nor reached any conclusion that
it was.”158
After both parties’ motions for summary judgment were denied on September 28, 2018,159 arguments in the case began in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts on October 15,
2018 before Judge Allison Burroughs, and lasted for three weeks. A
second set of arguments was made before Judge Burroughs in February 2019.160

WL 7891244 (D.Mass. 2018) (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit).
155 Id.
156 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Reasons in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment,
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, [case citation]
([date]) ([docket number]), [Westlaw citation], at 13. available online at:
http://samv91khoyt2i553a2t1s05i-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/06/Doc-413-Memo-in-Support-of-MSJ.pdf
157 Id.
158 Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows or Harvard College, 2018
WL 7891244 (D.Mass. 2018) (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit).
159 Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 346
F.Supp.3d 174 (D.Mass. 2018).
160 Delano R. Franklin & Samuel W. Zwickel, Harvard Admissions Trial Will Stretch into
2019 with New Hearings, Filings, The Harvard Crimson (Nov. 15, 2018),
https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2018/11/15/admissions-trial-new-hearing/.
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A.Decision

On September 30, 2019, the U.S. District Court for Massachusetts issued its opinion in Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard.161
The court found for Harvard on all four claims forwarded by SFFA at
trial: “Counts I (intentional discrimination), II (racial balancing), III
(failure to use race merely as a “plus” factor), and V (race-neutral alternatives).”162 The court underscored the importance of diversity
in the realm of education throughout its decision. A footnote in the
decision highlighted testimony in the case underscoring the value of
racial diversity in education:
On October 30, 2018, the Court heard testimony from
Dr. Ruth Simmons, the current President of Prairie
View A&M University. President Simmons was born
in a sharecropper’s shack on a plantation in
Grapeland, Texas. She attended primary and secondary school in a completely segregated environment in
Houston, and then Dillard University, an African
American institution supported by the Methodist
Church in New Orleans. President Simmons was selected to spend her junior year of college at Wellesley, where she studied alongside white students in
the United States for the first time. After graduating
from Dillard University, President Simmons traveled
to France, where she studied as a Fulbright Scholar.
She then returned to the United States and earned a
Ph.D. from Harvard’s Department of Romance Languages and Literatures. President Simmons held positions at Princeton University, Spelman College, and
Smith College before becoming President of Brown
University. She retired from Brown University after
eleven years and returned to Texas, where she
worked on nonprofit projects in the Houston area before being persuaded to come out of retirement to

161 Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Harvard, 397 F. Supp. 3d. 126 (D. Mass. 2019).
162 Id. at *5-6. The court had previously [what?] Counts IV and VI of petitioners’ claims:
“the failure to use race only the fill the last few places in the incoming freshman class and the
use of race as a factor in admissions.” Id. at *5.
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serve as the president of Prairie View A&M. President Simmons offered expert testimony on Harvard’s
interest in diversity. Her testimony and her life story,
perhaps the most cogent and compelling testimony
presented at this trial, demonstrate the extraordinary
benefits that diversity in education can achieve, for
students and institutions alike.163
The court opined that “evidence at trial was clear that a heterogeneous student body promotes a more robust academic environment
with a greater depth and breadth of learning, encourages learning
outside the classroom, and creates a richer sense of community.”164
The decision highlighted Harvard’s “[m]ultifaceted outreach efforts”
to attract “[e]xceptionally strong and diverse applicant pools.”165
These efforts include: securing recruiting data from the ACT and the
College Board, in-person recruiting done by admissions officers, recruiting conducted by a formal committee of Harvard alumni on behalf of the University,166 the Harvard Financial Aid Initiative (HFAI),
which recruits lower-income and first generation college students,167 and through the Undergraduate Minority Recruitment Program (UMRP).
Despite the university’s recruiting efforts, the racial makeup
of Harvard’s applicant pool is very different from the U.S. population
at large. For example, while almost one third of the U.S. population
identify as either African-American and/or Hispanic, this is true of
just one in five Harvard applicants. Further, nearly a quarter of all
applicants to Harvard each year identify as Asian-American, when
less than 5-6% of the U.S. population identifies as such.168 Despite
Asian-Americans’ overrepresentation in the general applicant pool,
the court observed Asian-American students are less likely than applicants who identify as African-American, Hispanic, or White to be
recruited as so-called “ALDCs”169 – “athletes, legacies, on the dean’s
163 Id. at *6.
164 Id. at *7.
165 Id. at *9.
166 Harvard’s alumni committee, known as the “schools committee,” has more than
10,000 members, and allows the University to recruit students from a wide range of geographic locations. Id. at *10.
167 Id. at 11.
168 Id.
169 Members of this small group of applicants are admitted at very high rates, making
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or director’s interest list, or children of faculty and staff.”170 ALDCs
figured prominently in this case, as this group was omitted from several of the statistical analyses forwarded by SFFA. At trial, Harvard
suggested that SFFA’s data was skewed by this omission in a way
that made it appear that Asian-Americans were unduly burdened by
Harvard’s admissions program. In addition, admissions officers employed by the university – including those of Asian-American descent
– testified that they did not believe there was any racial bias against
students based on race in Harvard’s admissions procedures. One
senior Asian-American admissions officer testified “I would never be
part of a process that would discriminate against anybody, let alone
people that looked like me, like my family, like my friends, like my
daughter . . . I’m not here to say it’s perfect, but I know that we don’t
discriminate against anyone.”171
The court provided extensive analysis of the various statistical models provided by both petitioners and the University. For example, the court evaluated the logistic regression models provided at
trial, examining the relationship between an applicant’s race and
school support ratings,172 personal ratings,173 academic, extracurricular and “overall” ratings,174 amongst other factors. Ultimately
the court concluded that “[t]he statistical evidence shows that Harvard has not imposed racial quotas or otherwise engaged in impermissible racial balancing.”175 Similarly, the court held that the University successfully demonstrated that there were “[n]o workable
and available race-neutral alternatives” that would achieve the desired goal of a diverse student body “[w]hile still perpetuating its
standards for academic and other measures of excellence.”176
In its legal analysis, the court relied primarily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Fisher II, highlighting the earlier case’s
“[t]hree controlling principles:” 1.) Race cannot be considered in col-

up nearly a third of admitted students. Id. at 52. The court highlighted the fact that statistical
analyses conducted by SFFA experts (and Harvard itself) vary dramatically based on whether
ALDCs are included in the analysis pool or not.
170 Id. at 16.
171 Id. at 30, citing [Oct. 24 Tr. 175:11–22].
172 Id. at 67.
173 Id. at 68.
174 Id. at 73.
175 Id. at 83.
176 Id. at 92.
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lege admissions unless the process is able to pass strict scrutiny; 2.)
The educational benefits of a diverse student body is an “academic
judgment” entitled to judicial deference, assuming racial quotas are
not employed; and 3.) A university bears the burden (in the words of
the court, “no deference is owed”) of “[p]roving a nonracial approach
would not promote its interest in the educational benefits of diversity about as well and at tolerable administrative expense.”177
Regarding strict scrutiny’s first prong, the court reiterated
that a racially diverse student body has repeatedly been held by the
U.S. Supreme Court to be a compelling governmental interest.178
Likening the university’s quest for racial diversity to that of the University of Texas’ in Fisher II, the court characterized Harvard’s interest in diversity as neither “elusory or amorphous . . .” and “sufficiently measurable to permit judicial scrutiny of the policies adopted to
reach [this goal].”179 The court also found that Harvard’s admissions
process was narrowly tailored. Just as the Harvard plan was held up
by the Grutter court as an example of a narrowly tailored, raceconscious admissions system, the court in SFFA highlighted similarities between Harvard’s current admissions program and the one
used by the University of Michigan’s law school, found constitutional
in Grutter. Noting the similarities between the admissions procedures in these two cases, the court characterized Harvard’s system
as “[e]ngag[ing] in a highly individualized, holistic review of each
applicant’s file, giving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment.”180 After finding that Harvard’s admissions process was narrowly tailored,
the court then considered whether the process “[u]nduly burdens
Asian-American applicants.”181 Finding no undue burden, the court
opined that while “[Harvard’s] admissions process may be imperfect,
the statistical disparities between applicants from different racial
groups on which SFFA’s case rests are not the result of any racial animus or conscious prejudice. . .” and found that the program was

177 Id. at 101.
178 Although Harvard University is not a public institution, because Harvard College
(the undergraduate school) receives federal funds and uses race as an admissions factor, the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies.
179 Id. at 106, citing Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2211.
180 Id. at 108, citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337-38.
181 Id. at 109.
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“[n]arrowly tailored to achieve a diverse class and the benefits that
flow therefrom.”182
B.

Analysis

The District Court of Massachusetts will not be the last court
to hear this case; both sides have already indicated their intent to
appeal.183 The significance of the case cannot be overstated. As one
news outlet reported at the beginning of the trial in October,
“[e]xperts already anticipate it will become a landmark case, affecting diversity in higher education and affirmative action policies
across the country.”184 Many believe that SFFA will ultimately be
headed to the U.S. Supreme Court, and potentially supersede Fisher
as the controlling case regarding the use of affirmative action in
higher education.
C.

SFFA is a better “test case” than Fisher

Whereas Abigail Fisher had good grades and test scores, in
the words of one news report on the case, “Fisher did not particularly stand out. Court records show her grade point average (3.59) and
SAT scores (1180 out of 1600) were good but not great for the highly
selective flagship university.”185 Additionally, her claims of racebased discrimination were muddied by the fact that, of the 47 students with test scores and grades lower than Fisher that were admitted to UT, 42 were white.186 Thus, SFFA’s Harvard case, should it
reach the Supreme Court, will provide the Court a better affirmative
action test case.
SFFA is also a better test case on the issue of affirmative action than Fisher because Harvard’s undergraduate admissions program has long been held as the gold standard of admissions programs by the Court. For example, in Bakke, Justice Powell, in the
182 Id. at 112.
183 Jung, supra note 130.
184 Katie Reilly, A Lawsuit by Asian-American Students Against Harvard Could End Affirmative Action as We Know It, TIME (Oct. 16, 2018), http://time.com/5425147/harvardaffirmative-action-trial-asian-american-students/.
185 Nikole Hannah-Jones, What Abigail Fisher’s Affirmative Action Case was Really About,
PROPUBLICA (Jun. 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/a-colorblind-constitutionwhat-abigail-fishers-affirmative-action-case-is-r.
186 Id.
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majority opinion, highlighted Harvard’s admissions plan as a model
that “take[s] race into account in achieving the educational diversity
valued by the first Amendment . . . [without] assign[ing] a fixed number of places to a minority group.”187
Years later, in Grutter, the Harvard admissions system was
referred to as the “plan approved by Justice Powell,”188 and once
again used as the measuring stick by which the University of Michigan Law school’s admissions program was assessed. For example,
the majority decision in Grutter has multiple references that affirm
the validity of the Harvard plan. The phrase “like the Harvard plan”
is used four times in the decision to highlight the fact that the University of Michigan law school admissions plan passes constitutional
muster because it is so similar to the Court-approved Harvard
plan.189 Likewise, in Gratz, the Court found that the University of
Michigan undergraduate admissions plan was unconstitutional in
large part because it did not meet the Harvard standard. For example, highlighting one of its concerns about the undergraduate admissions plan under consideration at the University of Michigan, the
Court noted “[t]he [admissions] system does not offer applicants the
individualized selection process described in Harvard’s example.”190
Interestingly enough, the Harvard admissions plan is only
referenced once in Fisher I and not at all in Fisher II. The sole reference to the Harvard plan in Fisher I occurs in Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion, where she writes “The University of Texas at Austin
. . . is candid about what it is endeavoring to do: It seeks to achieve
student-body diversity through an admissions policy patterned after
the Harvard plan referenced as exemplary in Justice Powell’s opinion
in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke.”191

187 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316 (1978).
188 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 309 (2003).
189 See, e.g. [SOURCE NAME-- is this Id?] “Like the Harvard plan, the Law School’s admissions policy ‘is flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity . . .’” at 337.
Or, “like the Harvard plan . . . the Law school’s race-conscious admissions program adequately
ensures that all factors that may contribute to student body diversity are meaningfully considered alongside race in admissions decisions” Id.
190 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 273 (2003).
191 Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 334 (2013).
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V.SUPREME COURT MEMBERSHIP FOR MAJOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASES
Supreme Court membership will play a significant role in the
outcome of the case. University of Chicago law professor Justin Driver has stated that “the current composition [of the High Court]
strongly suggests that affirmative action’s days are numbered.”192 Of
the nine Justices who participated in the Gratz and Grutter decisions
(Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, O’Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, Souter, Stevens, and Thomas), just four were still on the bench at the time of
Fisher II:193 (Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, and Thomas). Of this group,
just three Justices remain: Breyer, Ginsburg, and Thomas. Justice
Thomas has voted consistently on affirmative action cases – joining
the majority opinion in Gratz (overturning the University of Michigan’s undergraduate admissions plan that gave admission points to
underrepresented minority students), dissenting in Grutter (affirming the holistic application review process and use of race as a plus
factor used by the University of Michigan law school), and dissenting
in Fisher II (upholding the University of Texas’ system of admissions). Thomas’ dissent in Fisher II references language from his earlier concurrence in Fisher I, stating “I write separately to reaffirm
that ‘a State’s use of race in higher education admissions decisions is
categorically prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.’”194
In contrast, Justice Breyer has been part of the majority holding in all three cases: Gratz, Grutter, and Fisher II. In addition to his
voting record, Justice Breyer has spoken publicly about the importance of affirmative action. On a visit to his alma mater Stanford
in 2004, Breyer indicated that Grutter was the “most important case
I’ve participated in since I was appointed to the Supreme Court.” 195
He characterized the University of Michigan law school’s admissions
plan as giving minority students “[t]he opportunities that everybody
else has so that you can be treated equally.”196 However, the Stanford Report noted that “he followed up [the previous] remark with
192 Reilly, supra note 184.
193 As Fisher II vacated and remanded Fisher I, only the second Fisher case is analyzed
here.
194 Fisher II (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 133
S.Ct. 2411, 2422 (2013)).
195 Ray Delgado, Breyer Says Affirmative-Action Case was His ‘Most Important,’ Stanford Report (May 5, 2004), https://news.stanford.edu/news/2004/may5/breyer-55.html.
196 Id.
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the admonition that he doesn’t believe that all affirmative action efforts are right.”197 While Justice Breyer’s comments suggest that he
is open to ruling against a university affirmative action policy, it is
important to note that the specific policy that will be in question
should SFFA proceed to the Supreme Court – the so called ‘Harvard
plan’ – was highlighted in Grutter as a model of a constitutionally acceptable affirmative action plan.
The third Justice to take part in all three highlighted cases is
Justice Ginsburg. In Gratz, Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, and
she joined the majority opinions in both Grutter and Fisher II. A dissenting opinion to Gratz signed by Justices Souter and Ginsburg
notes that “although the freshman admissions system here is subject
to argument on the merits, I think it is closer to what Grutter approves than to what Bakke condemns, and should not be held unconstitutional on the current record.”198
In addition to these three Justices, Justices Sotomayor, Alito,
and Roberts all took part in the most recent affirmative action case
before the court:199 Fisher II. Justice Sotomayor joined the majority
opinion which upheld affirmative action as part of admissions at the
University of Texas, and has spoken publicly200 in support of affirmative action policies. For example, she credits such a policy for enabling her “[r]ise from the Bronx housing projects to her admissions
to Princeton and Yale Law School.”201 In contrast, Justice Alito authored a lengthy dissent202 to the majority decision in Fisher II,
which was joined by Justices Roberts and Thomas. The dissent criticized the University of Texas as historically pushing the envelope
with affirmative-action, “[e]mploy[ing] race and ethnicity in the most
aggressive manner permitted under controlling precedent.”203 The

197 Id.
198 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 293 (2003).
199 Justice Kagan did not take part in Fisher II, having recused herself because she had
done previous work on this case in her role as Solicitor General.
200 Robert Barnes, Justice Sonia Sotomayor Defends Affirmative Action, Washington
Post (Jun. 22, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/justice-sonia-sotomayordefends-affirmative-action/2014/06/22/cfdbe774-fa22-11e3-8176-f2c941cf35f1_story.html.
201 Id.
202 Justice Alito’s dissent was 50 pages in length – notably more than twice as long as
the 20 page majority opinion. See Abby Jackson, The Supreme Court Just Ruled in Favor of Affirmative Action in College Admissions, Business Insider (Jun. 23, 2016),
https://www.businessinsider.com/supreme-court-ruling-on-fisher-v-texas-2016-6.
203 Fisher II at 2217.
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dissent opined that the university’s consideration of race as a factor
in admissions “cannot satisfy strict scrutiny,”204 further stating that:
UT says that the program furthers its interest in the
educational benefits of diversity, but it has failed to
define that interest with any clarity or to demonstrate that its program is narrowly tailored to achieve
that or any other particular interest. By accepting
UT’s rationales as sufficient to meet its burden, the
majority licenses UT’s perverse assumptions about
different groups of minority students – the precise
assumptions strict scrutiny is supposed to stamp
out.205
The final two Justices on the current court – Justices Gorsuch and
Kavanaugh, were both appointed after Fisher II. As a lower court
judge, Justice Gorsuch did not rule substantively on an affirmative
action case. However, he has been characterized as likely “[t]o be a
reliable conservative vote [against affirmative action] and someone
who is going to forcibly and eloquently put forward conservative positions on the court.”206 Like Gorsuch, the newest member of the
Court, Justice Kavanaugh, also did not decide any affirmative action
cases during his time as part of the D.C. Circuit court. However, an
amicus brief co-authored by Kavanaugh during his time as an attorney at Kirkland & Ellis may shed some light on his legal views on issues related to affirmative action. In the brief for Rice v. Cayetano,207
Kavanaugh argued against the state of Hawaii’s direction that only
native Hawaiians should be permitted to vote for members of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs.208 The brief likened the Hawaiian re204 Id. at 2221.
205 Id.
206 Nina Totenberg, Judge Gorsuch’s Writings Signal He Would Be a Conservative on
Social
Issues,
Nat’l
Public
Radio
(Mar.
16,
2017),
https://www.npr.org/2017/03/16/519501771/judge-gorsuchs-writings-signal-he-would-bea-conservative-on-social-issues (quoting Richard Hasen, Professor of Law and Political Science
at the University of California, Irvine)
207 Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000).
208 See Lorenzo Arvanitis & Serena Cho, Kavanaugh Poses a Potential Threat for Affirmative
Action,
Experts
Say,
Yale
Daily
News
(Oct.
15,
2018),
https://yaledailynews.com/blog/2018/10/15/kavanaugh-poses-a-potential-threat-foraffirmative-action-experts-say/.
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striction to that in Plessy v. Ferguson, stating that “the dangers of allowing a state’s cultural justifications to supersede the limitations of
the Equal Protection Clause are quite evident: One need only change
the state from Hawaii to Louisiana and the year from 1999 to
1896.”209 While the brief did not specifically address affirmative action, nor does it necessarily represent the personal opinions of its
author, Theodore Shaw, a law professor at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill hypothesizes that Justice Kavanaugh is unlikely to support affirmative action programs. Shaw wrote “the confirmation of Kavanaugh is a cause of deep concern among those who
have worked so hard to keep opportunity open to individuals from
historically underrepresented groups.”210
One Justice that has not taken part in either of the major
higher education affirmative action cases before the Supreme Court
during her tenure is Justice Kagan, having recused herself from participating in both Fisher I and Fisher II. Her recusal stems from the
fact that while Fisher was pending before the Fifth Circuit, Kagan
served as Solicitor General and her office filed an amicus brief on the
case.211 As discussed previously, the Department of Justice under
President Trump filed an amicus brief in support of the petitioners in
SFFA, something in which Justice Kagan did not take part, having already spent 8 years on the bench at the time of the DOJ’s SFFA brief.
However, Justice Kagan does have a long professional history with
Harvard University that could be a consideration in whether or not
she would decide to recuse herself from SFFA should it reach the
High Court. Justice Kagan, like many other Supreme Court Justices, is
an alum of Harvard’s Law School. This fact in and of itself would not
be likely to raise questions of a possible recusal. However, Kagan also served as Dean of her alma mater from 2003 until 2009, when she
was nominated by then-President Obama as Solicitor General. Further, and perhaps most significantly (in regards to the issue of any
potential recusal) in 2007 Kagan was a finalist for the role of Harvard University President. When Drew Gilpin Faust was named to
the role instead of Kagan, the New York Times reported that “several
209 Brief of Amici Curiae Center for Equal Opportunity, New York Civil Rights Coalition,
Carl Cohen, and Abigail Thernstrom in Support of Petitioner, at 24, Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S.
495 (2000) ([docket number]), 1999 WL 345639.
210 See Arvanitis & Cho, supra note 208.
211 Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students: Justice Kagan’s Recusals, SCOTUS Blog
(Oct. 9, 2012), https://www.scotusblog.com/2012/10/scotus-for-law-students-sponsored-bybloomberg-law-justice-kagans-recusals/.
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hundred [law students] turned up in ‘I [heart] EK t-shirts.”212 The
student newspaper reported that “Kagan teared up at the sight” and
quoted her as saying “sometimes you win by losing . . . all of you have
made me feel like a real winner today.”213 Certainly, had Kagan gotten the job as University President there would be little question that
a recusal would be in order. However, it is likely that her attenuated
relationship to Harvard College – whose admissions policies are under attack, and not those of the law school – likely means that she
will take part in SFFA should it reach the Supreme Court.
VI.CONCLUSION
The percentage of Americans pursuing a college degree has
increased precipitously in recent years. The National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) reports that at the turn of the century in
2000, 13.2 million students were enrolled in “degree-granting postsecondary institutions.”214 By 2017, this figure had increased by
27%, to 16.8 million students. NCES projects that this figure will increase by an additional 3% by 2028.215 A number of factors are converging that make the issue of diversity and affirmative action policies as important as ever. The Nation as a whole is becoming
increasingly more racially and ethnically diverse and the percentage
of students of color applying to college have similarly increased. For
example, in 2000 just 22% of Hispanic individuals enrolled in college.216 By 2017, this figure increased to 36%. For Black students,
enrollment increased from 31% in 2000 to 36% in 2017 and Asian
student enrollment increased from 56% (2000) to 65%.217 When
this data is compared to White student college attendance (which
went from 39% in 2000 to just 41% in 2017)218 it is clear that Amer212 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, At Harvard, Kagan Aimed Sights Higher, N.Y. Times (May 25,
2010),
https://web.archive.org/web/20100607025827/http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/26/us/
politics/26kagan.html.
213 Id.
214 The Condition of Education: Undergraduate Enrollment, Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Stat.
(2019), https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_cha.asp.
215 Id.
216 College
Enrollment
Rates,
Nat’l
Ctr. for
Educ.
Stat. (2019),
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/pdf/coe_cpb.pdf.
217 Id.
218 Id.
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ican colleges and universities are as racially and ethnically diverse
now as they have ever been.
SFFA may provide the Supreme Court with a new opportunity to weigh in on the constitutionality of affirmative action programs
like the one used at Harvard College. It is impossible to predict with
any certainty how the Justices will vote should SFFA end up before
the Supreme Court. Still, considering the past history of individual
Justices’ voting records and their public statements about affirmative
action, it seems entirely possible – perhaps even likely - that the days
of race conscious admissions policies at institutions of higher education may be numbered.
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Being a Good College Student: The History of Good
Moral Character Rules in State Financial Aid
Programs, 1850 to Now
Bradley Custer, Ph.D.

INTRODUCTION
Federal and state governments regulate the character of
their residents as a condition of immigration, employment, social
services, and beyond.1 At the state level, “good moral character”
rules have been analyzed in depth for decades, mostly as they pertain to admission to the bar and other licensed professions.2 Character requirements also affect the ability of college students to get
state-funded financial aid, but these policies have received no scholarly analysis. According to this study’s findings, there have been at
least 50 state financial aid grant programs with character rules,
which begs the question: what does it mean to be a “good” college
student? This paper offers an original study of the character requirements of state financial aid programs, including analysis of how
character requirements were and still are interpreted and enforced.
New insights are offered on the meaning of good moral character in
this higher education law context that contribute to the wider literature on the use of good moral character requirements.
This paper begins with a two-part literature review, first on
the history of state financial aid programs and second on the use of
good moral character requirements in American law. Then, the
methods and results of this original study are presented. Three historic state case studies are discussed in depth to explain how good
moral character requirements were interpreted in the past. Also explained is how the few remaining good moral character rules are
currently enforced. Finally, a rationale is made for eliminating all
good moral character requirements from state financial aid programs.
1 Deborah L. Rhode, Virtue and the Law: The Good Moral Character Requirement in Occupational Licensing, Bar Regulation, and Immigration Proceedings, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
1027 (2018).
2 See id.; Bruce E. May, The Character Component of Occupational Licensing Laws: A
Continuing Barrier to the Ex-Felon's Employment Opportunities, 71 N. D. L. REV. 187 (1995).
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I. THE HISTORY OF STATE FINANCIAL AID
A brief history of how state governments have funded college
scholarships provides needed context for the forthcoming study of
their eligibility requirements. Though much has been written about
the history of federal financial aid programs,3 a comprehensive history of state-funded financial aid programs has not been written –
something that the field of higher education needs. Writers typically
describe the history of state financial aid dating back only to the mid20th century, when states began implementing broad-scale needbased grant programs that are the predecessors of today’s programs.4 However, some states offered scholarships to their residents
at least one hundred years before then.5 To illustrate, I conducted a
review of state statutes 1800-1950 by searching for the term “scholarship” in the HeinOnline State Session Laws Library, yielding 2,170
results.6 In this section, I first outline my findings from the database
search. Then, I summarize trends in state financial aid programs
from 1950 to present with evidence from the higher education research literature.
A. Early State Scholarship Programs, 1800-1950
Some of the earliest references to scholarships in state statutes are actually privately-endowed scholarships. States and institutions solicited donors by offering full-tuition scholarships to them
and their dependents, like at the Virginia Military Institute in 1848,7
Ohio’s St. Clairsville Collegiate Seminary in 1855,8 and Kentucky’s

3 See Matthew B. Fuller, A History of Financial Aid to Students, 44 J. OF STUDENT

FINANCIAL AID 42 (2014); Elizabeth A. Duffy & Idana Goldberg, The Development of Need-Based
Aid, in CRAFTING A CLASS: COLLEGE ADMISSIONS AND FINANCIAL AID, 1955-1994 at 169 (1998).
4 See Donald E. Heller, The Policy Shift in State Financial Aid Programs, in HIGHER
EDUCATION: HANDBOOK OF THEORY AND RESEARCH 221 (John C. Smart ed., 2002).
5 See infra this section.
6 The HeinOnline State Session Laws Library is an online database containing over 12.7
million pages of state session laws for all 50 states and more with coverage going back to each
state’s inception. The word “scholarship” has several meanings. For example, a “certificate of
scholarship” is an old name for a college diploma, and being of “requisite scholarship” or the
“highest scholarship” means a person is properly trained and well educated. Thus, a majority
of the search results for “scholarship” did not pertain to a financial aid program as it is being
used here.
7 1848 Va. Acts 18.
8 1837 Ohio Laws 55.
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Frankfort Female University in 1867.9 In these cases, and others like
them, state statutes authorized such donations and established rules
for the scholarships.
State funds were also directly appropriated to scholarships
by the mid-1800s. After the federal Morrill Act granted land to public
universities in 1862,10 the authorizing statutes for the Illinois Industrial University in 186711 and Arkansas Industrial University in
186812 created full-tuition scholarships for children of veterans plus
one honorary scholarship per county. Likewise, when Cornell University13 and the Pennsylvania Museum and School for Industrial
Arts14 were founded in 1887, a full scholarship for one student per
county was created. The “competitive scholarship” for students attending a state’s flagship university also became relatively common.
A fixed number of full-tuition scholarships were appropriated to
students who succeeded on competitive exams, sometimes to students with financial need only. For example, in 1870, California began offering just five competitive scholarships to students with the
inability “to provide his own maintenance at the University [of California].”15 Other states tied the number of available competitive
scholarships to the number of counties or congressional districts,
like the University of South Carolina State Scholarship of 1874,16 the
University of Oregon scholarships of 1876,17 the Massachusetts Institute of Technology scholarship of 1887,18 and the University of Illinois State Scholarship of 1895.19 Like still today, scholarships were
commonly created to recruit new teachers, like the 1853 Massachusetts State Scholarship,20 the 1876 Vermont scholarship for students

9 1867 Ky. Local & Private Acts, 295.
10 Morrill Act, Act of July 2, 1862, Pub. L. No. 37-130, at 503, which established land
grant colleges.
11 Now the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; Ill. Pub. L., 25th Gen. Assemb., 1st
Sess., Act of March 8, 1867, at 123.
12 Now the University of Arkansas; 1868 Ark. Acts 327.
13 1887 N.Y. Laws 366.
14 Now the University of the Arts; 1887 Pa. Laws 380.
15 1870 Cal. Stat. 546.
16 1874 S.C. Acts, Spec. & Reg. Sess., 555.
17 1876 Or. Laws 52.
18 1889 Mass. Private & Special Stat. 1287.
19 1985 Ill. Laws 325.
20 1853 Mass. Acts 473.
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attending normal schools,21 the 1892 scholarship for students from
Frederick County to attend the Maryland Normal School,22 and the
1899 Utah Normal School scholarship.23
After the turn of the 20th century, more states implemented
the types of programs previously described, but new scholarship opportunities were created for targeted populations, including veterans, African-Americans, students with disabilities, and nurses. In the
wake of World War I, new scholarships were created for military
veterans and their dependents that were later expanded to include
World War II veterans, like those in New York and Illinois in 1919
and Kentucky and South Carolina in 1920.24 Another group that increasingly got financial aid was African-American students, like Oklahoma’s 1921 scholarships for African-American students to study
agriculture.25 Maryland in 1935, Tennessee in 1937, and Texas in
1939, among others, created scholarships for students to attend universities in other states because their own universities did not admit
African-Americans in certain programs, typically graduate and professional programs.26 Then, students with disabilities were awarded
scholarships, including Tennessee’s 1949 scholarship for blind students and Pennsylvania’s 1949 Blind or Deaf Higher Education Beneficiary Grant.27 Finally, a persistent post-war shortage of nurses
spurred the implementation of nursing scholarships, like those in
Florida, North Dakota, and Rhode Island in 1955.28
B. Modern State Financial Aid Programs, 1950 to Present
At mid-20th century, the United States population, its economy, and its higher education systems were rapidly expanding. State
governments wanted more residents to go to college and recognized
that price was a significant barrier. The introduction to Pennsylvania’s 1966 State Scholarship Program eloquently summarized what

21 1876 Vt. Acts & Resolves 117.
22 1892 Md. Laws 833.
23 1899 Utah Laws 121.
24 1919 N.Y. Laws 1602; 1919 Ill. Laws 922; 1920 Ky. Acts 281; 1920 S.C. Acts 973.
25 1921 Okla. Sess. Laws 222.
26 1935 Md. Laws 1203; Tenn. Acts., Act of May 21, 1937, ch. 256, at 1048; L. of Tex., 46th
Leg., R.S., Act of Sept. 1, 1939, ch. 8, at 359.
27 Tenn. Acts 1949, ch. 208; 24 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §13-1381 (West 2019).
28 1955 Fla. Laws 572; 1955 N.D. Laws, ch. 283; 1955 R.I. Acts & Resolves 548.
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many states were experiencing and why legislators created scholarship programs:
Although the enrollments of the postsecondary institutions of higher learning of this Commonwealth and throughout the nation continue to increase at a rapid pace, and although larger numbers
of the Commonwealth's children graduate from both
the public and nonpublic secondary schools each
year, there continues to be a tragic underdevelopment of the Commonwealth's human talent because
of the inability of many needy students to finance a
postsecondary educational program. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania can achieve its full economic
and social potential only if every individual has the
opportunity to contribute to the full extent of his capabilities and only when the financial barriers to his
economic, social and educational goals are removed.
It is therefore the policy of the Legislature and the
purpose of this act to establish a broad-scale State
scholarship program designed to guarantee that the
most able students from all sectors of the Commonwealth, the most needy students and students with
the capability to successfully complete postsecondary
educational programs, and deserving postsecondary
students are given the opportunity to continue their
program of self-improvement in an institution of
higher learning of their choice.29
Around this time, states commissioned studies of their higher education institutions, the postsecondary educational needs of their residents, and financial aid programs, like those of California in 1947,30
Louisiana in 1948,31 and Illinois in 1957.32 In the 1950s and 1960s, in
part due to these commissioned studies, some of the country’s largest state need-based programs were created, including what are now

29 Pa. Act of Jan. 25, Pub. L. 1546, No. 541, § 1 (1966).
30 Stat. Cal., 1947, ch. 47, at 542. See A Report of a Survey of the Needs of California in
ARCHIVE
OF
CALIFORNIA
(1948),
Higher
Education,
ONLINE
https://oac.cdlib.org/view?docId=hb2p3004kd&brand=oac4&chunk.id=meta.
31 1948 La. Acts. 1078.
32 ILL. HIGHER EDUC. COMM’N, ILL. LOOKS TO THE FUTURE IN HIGHER EDUC. (1957),
https://www.hathitrust.org/.
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the California Cal Grants, Illinois Monetary Award Program, Indiana
Frank O’Bannon Grants, New Jersey Tuition Aid Grant, and Pennsylvania State Grant. Before Congress created the federal Pell Grant
program in 1972,33 these and other state grant programs were critical sources of financial aid to needy college students.
In the early 1990s, the broad-based merit scholarship entered the state financial aid policy scene in Arkansas and Georgia,
quickly spreading throughout the Southeast and beyond.34 Unlike the
need-based scholarships of the preceding decades, these programs
were characterized by their academic requirements, and in many
cases, by their funding from state lottery proceeds. Innovative at the
time, at least 14 states implemented broad-based merit-aid programs by 2004.35 Many scholars have since studied and critiqued
these programs, none more so than the Georgia HOPE Scholarship.36
In recent years, the new state financial aid fad is the so-called
“promise” or “free college” program, which typically incentivizes
middle and high school students to attend in-state colleges by promising them scholarships.37 A recent study identified 150 such statefunded programs, though many are not recent inventions.38 New
promise programs, like Tennessee Promise and New York’s Excelsior
Scholarship, are making headlines as evidence of their effectiveness
becomes available and as politicians latch on to the free college
movement.39 Financial aid scholars and state policy experts are care33 Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235.
34 Donald E. Heller, State Merit Scholarship Programs: An Introduction, in WHO SHOULD
WE HELP? THE NEGATIVE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF MERIT SCHOLARSHIPS 15 (Donald E. Heller & Patricia Marin eds., 2002).
35 William K. Ingle & Jason R. Ratliff, Then and Now: An Analysis of Broad-based Merit
aid Initial Eligibility Policies After Twenty Years, 3 KY. J. OF HIGHER EDUC. POL’Y & PRAC. 1 (2015).
36 Critics of the Georgia HOPE Scholarship primarily point to its funding, the lottery.
Lower income people tend to play the lottery. Lottery proceeds then fund merit-based scholarships for students with the highest academic achievements, who typically come from middle
and higher-income families and better-resourced schools; therein lies the problem. See ERIK C.
NESS, MERIT AID AND THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION (2008); STATE MERIT SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAMS AND
RACIAL INEQUALITY (Donald E. Heller & Patricia Marin eds., 2004); WHO SHOULD WE HELP? THE
NEGATIVE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF MERIT SCHOLARSHIPS (Donald E. Heller & Patricia Marin eds.,
2002).
37 Laura W. Perna & Elaine W. Leigh, Understanding the Promise: A Typology of State
and Local College Promise Programs, 47 EDUC. RESEARCHER 155 (2018).
38 Id.; e.g., Indiana’s 1990 21st Century Scholars, Arkansas’ 1991 Academic Challenge
Scholarship, Florida’s 1997 Bright Futures, and 1998 Kentucky Educational Excellence Scholarship.
39 Tom Hilliard, Excelsior Scholarship Serving Very Few New York Students. CENTER FOR
AN URBAN FUTURE

(Aug. 2018), https://nycfuture.org/research/excelsior-scholarship; Poutre &
Voight, The State of Free College: Tennessee Promise and New York’s Excelsior Scholarship, INST.
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fully watching the free college movement to see if promise programs
will revolutionize higher education finance.
As of the 2016-2017 academic year, the National Association
of State Student Grant and Aid Programs estimated that states spent
$12.8 billion on financial aid directly to students through over 600
different programs, including grants, loans, conditional grants, loan
forgiveness, tuition waivers, and others.40 With college costs on the
rise and the proportion of direct state appropriations to public colleges on the decline,41 state financial aid to students will remain an
important funding source of higher education.
For much of the history of American higher education, state
governments have funded scholarships for college students. Program trends evolved from competitive scholarships, to financial
need-based grants, to merit-aid scholarships, to the newest promise
programs. Throughout this history of state financial aid, as will be
demonstrated in this paper, state legislators put an important caveat
on some of their scholarship applicants: to be of “good moral character.” For context, I next delve into the history of good moral character requirements.
II. GOOD MORAL CHARACTER
The use of good moral character rules in American law is
ubiquitous. For example, a search for the phrase “good moral character” in HeinOnline yields over 17,000 entries dating back to 1782,
and that is not including all the variations of character rules, including “good character,” “high moral character,” or simply “character.”
Because much as already been written about good moral character
requirements, this brief review points readers to seminal articles on
the topic and establishes a foundation for this study of good moral
character requirements in state financial aid programs.42
The study of good moral character rules has focused on at
least three subjects: immigration law, occupational licensing, and the
HIGHER EDUC. POL’Y, (Sept. 2018), http://www.ihep.org/research/publications/state-freecollege-tennessee-promise-and-new-yorks-excelsior-scholarship.
FOR

40 NAT. ASSOCIATION OF STATE STUDENT GRANT AND AID PROGRAMS, 48TH ANNUAL SURVEY
REPORT ON STATE-SPONSORED STUDENT FINANCIAL AID: 2016-2017 A CADEMIC YEAR (2017),
https://www.nassgapsurvey.com/survey_reports.aspx.
41 STATE HIGHER EDUC. EXECUTIVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, STATE OF HIGHER EDUCATION
FINANCE:
FY
2017
(2018),
http://www.sheeo.org/sites/default/files/projectfiles/SHEEO_SHEF_FY2017_FINAL.pdf.
42 See infra this section.
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state bar.43 Of the three, the good moral character requirements in
immigration law are now the best defined. Since the 1790 Naturalization Act, persons seeking to become citizens of the US had to prove
their “good character,” but “for over 150 years, Congress offered no
guidance whatsoever on what constituted good moral character in
the naturalization context.”44 It was not until the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 that Congress delineated a list of crimes that
would disqualify a person from satisfying the good moral character
requirement, which was greatly expanded in the 1980s and 1990s.45
Today, hundreds of criminal charges and non-criminal behaviors
from before and after the five-year statutory review period are permanent or temporary bans on naturalization, including being a “habitual drunkard,” practicing polygamy, being involved in prostitution, and even having convictions that were expunged or pardoned.46
With few legal mechanisms for relief, immigrants with such experiences hesitate to apply for citizenship and are vulnerable to removal.47
State governments also regulate the character of working
professionals. As many occupations were professionalized in the late
19th and early 20th centuries, states exerted control by implementing
licensure systems, including good moral character requirements.48
Rationales for character requirements include professional gatekeeping (keeping undesirables out), protecting the status and reputation of the profession, protecting the public from bad practitioners,
and symbolic reasons.49 Legislators, regulatory agencies, and courts
have struggled – if not refused – to define good moral character.
Criminal convictions are the most common bar, but evidence of other
qualities and behaviors that courts may consider range from honesty
to integrity, fiscal responsibility, mental or emotional instability,
substance abuse, and failure to pay child support.50 Some courts,
however, have established that a person’s misconduct under ques43 Rhode, supra note 1.
44 Kevin Lapp, Reforming the Good Moral Character Requirement for US Citizenship, 87
IND. L. J. 1571, 1572 (2012).
45 Id.
46 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(2)(iv) (1993).
47 Lapp, supra note 44.
48 Rhode, supra note 1.
49 Id.
50 Larry Craddock, Good Moral Character as a Licensing Standard, 28 J. NAT. ASSOC.
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY. 449 (2008).
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tion must be reasonably related to the occupation in order to be denied a license.51 Nonetheless, such requirements are serious employment barriers to the millions of Americans with criminal records.52
No application of good moral character rules among the professions has been more scrutinized than that of admission to the
bar.53 Character requirements have been a fixture of the Western law
profession for centuries, but in the United States, they were of little
importance until the late 19th century.54 In the first decades of the
20th century, the law profession began to formalize its entry standards, and character reviews became more systematic after the 1930s
as national and state bar associations garnered prominence.55 Since
then, courts have avoided defining good moral character and have
upheld bar denials for a host of “inconsistent and idiosyncratic” reasons,56 including adultery, public homosexual acts and other sexual
conduct,57 racist beliefs,58 failure to pay back student loans,59 failure
to pay child support or other financial debt,60 lack of candor on the
application, and a wide range of criminal conduct.61 Though denials
overall are relatively infrequent, there seems to have been a stark increase in the number of bar admission denials based on character in
51 Id.
52 Rhode, supra note 1; May, supra note 2.
53 See Tarra Simmons, Transcending the Stigma of a Criminal Record: A Proposal to Reform State Bar Character and Fitness Evaluations. 128 YALE L. J. FORUM 759 (2019); Keith
Swisher, The Troubling Rise of the Legal Profession's Good Moral Character, 82 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 1037 (2008); Theresa Keeley, Good Moral Character: Already an Unconstitutionally Vague
Concept and Now Putting Bar Applicants in a Post-9/11 World on an Elevated Threat Level, 6
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 844 (2004); Marcus Ratcliff, The Good Character Requirement: A Proposal for
a Uniform National Standard, 36 TULSA L. J. 487 (2000); Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a
Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491 (1985);; John R. Starrs, Considerations on Determination of Good Moral Character, 18 U. DETROIT L. J. 195 (1955); George W. Wickersham, The Moral
Character of Candidates for the Bar, 9 A.B.A.J. 617 (1923).
54 Rhode, supra note 53.
55 Id.
56 Rhode, supra note 53; Rhode, supra note 1.
57 Barbara Blackford, Good Moral Character and Homosexuality, 5 J. LEGAL PROF. 139

(1980).
58 Jason O. Billy, Confronting Racists at the Bar: Matthew Hale, Moral Character, and
Regulating the Marketplace of Ideas, 22 HARV. BLACKLETTER L. J. 25 (2006).
59 Tyler R. Martinez, The Effects of Student Loan Debt on State Bar Admission – Recalibrating the Good Moral Character Requirement, 14 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 37 (2011).
60 Aaron M. Clemens, Facing the Klieg Lights: Understanding the Good Moral Character
Examination for Bar Applicants, 40 AKRON L. REV. 255 (2007).
61 Rhode, supra note 53.
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recent decades.62 Perhaps recent newsworthy cases of formerlyincarcerated people defying the odds by being admitted to the bar
are a hopeful foreshadowing of fairer, more merciful character reviews in the modern era.63
Many legal scholars have called for the elimination or reform
of good moral character requirements for a variety of reasons. As a
matter of philosophy and psychology, character remains a contested
issue; a person’s actions are situation-dependent, and making character assessments based on limited information (perhaps a single
bad act) is flawed.64 Similarly, one study found that the personal history information reviewed during character reviews is a poor predictor of future misconduct among lawyers.65 Thus, if the purpose of reviewing character prior to occupational licensure is to protect safety,
some argue that a better strategy would be to discipline more consistently the practicing professionals who commit work-related offenses.66 Historically, character reviews were used to keep out political radicals, women, and ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities,
which may still occur today.67 Similarly, the fear of impending character reviews may dissuade people from seeking mental health support or exercising their free speech rights.68 For people formerly involved in the criminal justice system, denying employment because
of character rules is a perpetual punishment; doing so often ignores
evidence of rehabilitation or how old or unrelated one’s crime is to
an occupation, is often racially discriminatory, and is counterproductive to reducing criminal recidivism.69 Pragmatically, the process or
reviewing character itself is taxing and expensive for applicants and
agency reviewers alike,70 and there is known to be a great deal of
subjectivity and administrative error in making character determi-

62 Rhode, supra note 53; Swisher, supra note 53.
63 Simmons, supra note 53; Susan Svrluga, He Robbed Banks and Went to Prison. His
Time There Put Him on Track for a New Job: Georgetown Law Professor, THE WASHINGTON POST,
Apr. 21, 2017.
64 Rhode, supra note 1.
65 Leslie C. Levin, Christine Zozula & Peter Siegelman, The Questionable Character of the
Bar's Character and Fitness Inquiry, 40 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 51 (2015).
66 Rhode, supra note 53; Rhode, supra note 1.
67 Rhode, supra note 53.
68 Keeley, supra note 53; Rhode, supra note 53; Levin, Zozula & Siegelman, supra note

66.
69 Rhode, supra note 1; May, supra note 2.
70 Lapp, supra note 44; Levin, Zozula & Siegelman, supra note 66.
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nations.71 For these reasons and more, scholars and advocates in the
United States have called for reform of moral character reviews in
immigration law, occupational licensing, and bar admissions.
The character of people in the United States has been regulated by governments beyond these three areas. Applicants for state financial aid programs for college have been, and continue to be, subject to character reviews, but legal scholars have not examined this
subject with the same dedication as the others. How many state financial aid programs have character requirements? What does it
mean to be of good moral character as a scholarship applicant? How
have state officials and courts interpreted good moral character requirements in state financial aid programs? The following study was
guided by these questions.
II. THE STUDY
Though scholarship programs and good moral character rules
are both nearly as old as the American states themselves, there has
never been an analysis of their convergence in state higher education law. The purpose of this study is first to identify historical and
current state financial aid programs that contain character requirements and second to analyze how state governments interpreted and
enforced character requirements on scholarship applicants.
A. Methods
I analyzed the content of current state statutes for all 524
grants, conditional grants, and tuition waiver programs identified in
the 2017 National Association of State Student Grant and Aid Programs (NASSGAP) inventory.72 This process identified all the currently-funded scholarship programs with active character requirements.73 Next, I used HeinOnline’s session laws and historic state
statutes databases to find the original session law for each of the 524
programs, which I also analyzed for content. This process further
identified all the currently-active programs that formerly had charac-

71 Lapp, supra note 44.
72 See supra note 40. A grant is a non-repayable scholarship. A conditional grant or loan
is a non-repayable scholarship that becomes a repayable loan if the student does not comply
with the conditions of the program, typically post-graduation in-state work requirements. A
tuition waiver is where colleges do not charge a student for tuition at all, which may or may
not be reimbursed by the state.
73 See infra Table 3.
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ter rules earlier in their history.74 Then, I analyzed 2,170 HeinOnline
search results for “scholarship” between 1800-1950 to identify programs with character rules that are no longer active and thus were
not included in the NASSGAP program database.75 Finally, through a
process analogous to “snowball sampling,” I sometimes found relevant programs in the databases while in the process of searching for
another. These iterative steps add confidence that most programs
with character rules (current or old) were identified.
With the programs identified, I then sought to understand
the meaning of the character rules. I collected statutes, regulations,
court cases, attorney general opinions, government agency reports,
research articles, news reports, and other documents from online
databases, library archives, and state agencies. Because some programs with character rules are still active, I contacted state higher
education agency officials to get official statements on how they currently interpret the existing character rules. At times, when I did not
receive an initial response to my requests for records or explanations, I invoked open records laws to compel a timely response.

A. Limitations
Despite my due diligence, I do not claim to have identified
every program that ever contained a good moral character rule. My
systematic review of HeinOnline records was thorough, but it is possible that some eligible programs were not recorded in the database.
In addition, some programs may contain character rules not in statutes but within state administrative codes or agency regulations,
which I did not systemically review.76 Due to the complexity of the
state financial aid landscape, I did not review state loan programs,
loan forgiveness or repayment programs, savings or prepaid tuition
programs, dual enrollment programs, or work study programs.77
There is much still for higher education historians to learn about
state financial aid programs; perhaps this paper will inspire new inquiries into the topic.
74 See infra Table 2.
75 See infra Table 1.
76 See exception Table 2, Tennessee Student Assistance Award.
77 I point readers to a few examples of state loan programs that contain character rules,
including eight of New Mexico’s loan forgiveness programs: Allied Loan for Service, Health Professions Loan for Service, Health Professions Loan Repayment, Medical Loan for Service, Nurse
Educator Loan for Service, Nursing Loan for Service, Teacher Loan for Service, Western Interstate Commission on Higher Education (WICHE) Loan for Service Programs.
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B. Results

In total, 50 state grant programs with character requirements across 19 states were identified. Table 1 displays the 32 programs that are defunct, meaning they were repealed, reformulated
into new programs, or are no longer funded. Table 2 displays the
seven programs that are still active but whose character rules have
been deleted; states still award these scholarships, but applicants are
no longer reviewed for character. Finally, Table 3 displays the 11
programs that are still active and that still contain character requirements.
Most character rules were original to the authorizing statute,
except in the few cases where noted when character rules were later
added to a program through statutory amendments. The tables display the exact phrases in statute that pertain to a scholarship applicant’s character. There are as many as nine variations of character
rules, though “good moral character” is most common.
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III. BEING A GOOD STUDENT: THE MEANING OF GOOD MORAL
CHARACTER
Most state financial aid programs with character rules are
relics of the past.78 Historically, how did state policymakers, government officials, and university administrators interpret and enforce the character rules in these programs? Programs from Illinois,
Pennsylvania, and Michigan are discussed next as “case studies” because they are insightful for their unique historical circumstances.

A.Illinois
In 1955, Illinois Governor William Stratton created the Illinois Higher Education Commission (IHEC) to study the condition of
higher education in Illinois.79 In 1957, IHEC issued its report, which
included a proposal for a new need- and merit-based scholarship
that would support the training of more Illinois residents.80 The legislature adopted the proposal as the State Scholarship Act of 1957.81
IHEC proposed specific eligibility requirements for the scholarship,
including a “good moral character” requirement. IHEC’s only explanation for the requirement was rather uninformative: “For obvious
reasons, good moral character should be a condition of eligibility.”82
Further, nothing in the report indicated where this “obvious” rule
came from, but a historian of Illinois’ scholarship programs pointed
to one explanation. According to a report of the Illinois State Scholarship Commission, “the IHEC patterned the [State Scholarship Program] after a recently created California program.”83 Indeed, California legislators created the Competitive Scholarship in 1955.84
Applicants had to demonstrate financial need and “high moral char-

78 See Tables 1 & 2.
79 See supra note 32.
80 Id.
81 1957 Ill. Laws 855-861. By 1971, the State Scholarship was defunded, but still today,
the most academically strong students from across Illinois are designated as State Scholars by
the Illinois Student Assistance Commission.
82 See supra note 32, at 158.
83 Paul R. Eber, The ISSC’s Statutory Evolution: Scholarship and Grant Programs 19571982, IL. HIGHER EDUC. STUDENT ASSISTANCE COMM’N, at 27 (1982) (on file with author).
84 1955 Cal. Stat. ch. 1846.
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acter, good citizenship, and dedication to American ideals.”85 If IHEC
did model the State Scholarship off the California Competitive Scholarship, perhaps this is from where the good moral character requirement came.
Regardless of where it came from, the good moral character
requirement was “historically troubling for the [Illinois State Scholarship Commission]” to implement.86 An agency rule adopted prior
to 1973 defined good moral character as:
A student’s personal record of conduct, determined by the
high school to be in keeping with school and community standards.
High schools which withhold their recommendations of students for
reasons of ‘moral character’ shall have the responsibility of explaining their positions, as necessary, to parties having a proper and valid
interest in this information.87
In practice, high school principals determined who had good
moral character. Officials from the scholarship commission had to
clarify parameters for character occasionally, like in the 1960s when
they decided that premarital pregnancy should not disqualify a student on moral grounds.88 According to meeting minutes, commission
officials debated the legal standard of good moral character at least
six times between 1957 and 1973, and the rule was recommended to
be abolished several times between 1972 and 1975.89 It was estimated that six to ten students each year were denied scholarships
for moral reasons, though “no systematic study has been done of the
reasons high schools have withheld moral character certifications to
otherwise qualified State Scholar applicants.”90
In 1967, legislators created what is now called the Monetary
Award Program (MAP), a need-based grant with no initial academic
qualifications.91 They included the character rule in the MAP program, too, which shortly thereafter subsumed and replaced the State
Scholarship. The good moral character requirement continued to be
challenging to interpret after the creation of the MAP grant, especially when it came to the question of whether incarcerated students
should be disqualified on moral grounds. In 1971, the Illinois State
85 Id. at § 21702(e).
86 Eber, supra note 84, at 22.
87 Id at 23.
88 Id at 22.
89 Id at 23.
90 Id.
91 1967 Ill. Laws 2644, 2646.
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Scholarship Commission Executive Director, Joseph Boyd, asked the
Illinois Attorney General to issue an opinion on the matter. Mr. Boyd
asked:
Is there a legal definition of good moral character? Does a
person assigned by the courts to any institution of correction automatically disqualify himself for an award as long as he is serving out
his/her sentence? This matter has become an issue since a considerable number of public and private institutions in Illinois are now offering credit courses to those persons in Illinois institutions of correction.92
In March 1972, the Illinois Attorney General William Scott
responded with a 12-page, unpublished opinion.93 On the first question, the attorney general stated there was no consistent legal definition of good moral character and that each case needed to be decided
on the facts: “It is the applicant’s actual conduct that is at issue, not
the reputation of the applicant.”94 His best advice was that officials
“must objectively determine whether an applicant is of good moral
character by determining whether he measures up to the generally
accepted moral standards currently prevalent within the State of Illinois.”95
On the second question, the attorney general opined: “the
fact than an applicant for a scholarship is incarcerated in a correctional institution does not automatically disqualify him for a scholarship.” Though a person who commits a felony was, at the time, not of
good moral character, he suggested, other factors must be weighed
when evaluating the character of a person after the fact, such as evidence of rehabilitation.
According to the ISSC historian, the opinion was not particularly helpful to the agency, and it is not clear how officials handled
the good moral character requirement in its wake.96 However, when
ISSC issued its first program regulations in the new 1986 Illinois
Administrative Code, a person was said to be of good moral character “if the applicant will benefit from postsecondary instruction and
is allowed to enroll at an approved postsecondary institution.”97 This
92 1972 Ill. Att’y Gen. Op. 434 (NP) at 1-2.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 5.
95 Id. at 6.
96 Eber, supra note 84, at 31.
97 23 Ill. Admin. Code pt. 1700.20 (1986).
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definition left open the possibility that incarcerated students enrolled in prison higher education programs could receive state
grants, which indeed happened so frequently that it caught the attention of state legislators. After a lively debate on the merits of funding
scholarships for incarcerated students, legislators eliminated their
eligibility through statutory amendment in 1989.98 Then, they eliminated the good moral character rule from the MAP statute in 1992
amidst a broad reorganization of the Higher Education Assistance
Act.99 Nonetheless, the 1986 definition of good moral character remains today in the definitions section of the Illinois Student Assistance Commission regulations that apply to all grant programs.100
However, there is no good moral character requirement listed in the
regulations’ section on general applicant eligibility requirements,
nor is it listed on the commission’s official website,101 which seems
to indicate that the good moral character rule no longer applies to
grant applicants in Illinois.102

B.Pennsylvania
In 1966, the Pennsylvania legislature created the State Scholarship Program to be administered by the recently created Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Authority (PHEAA). An original
statutory rule stated that scholarship applicants “shall satisfactorily
meet the qualifications of ‘financial need,’ character and academic
promise, as well as academic achievement, as established by the
agency,”103 which remains in statute today.104 In 1969, the legislature
left the character rule in place but added requirements related to
criminal history:
(a) The agency may deny all forms of financial assistance to
any student:

98 1989 Ill. Laws 6809, 6820.
99 1992 Ill. Laws 2128, 2137.
100 Formerly the Illinois State Scholarship Commission; 23 Ill. Admin. Code pt. 2700.20

(2018).
101 Illinois Student Assistance Commission, Monetary Award Program, Eligibility
(2019),
https://www.isac.org/students/during-college/types-of-financialaid/grants/monetary-award-program/#Eligibility.
102 23 Ill. Admin. Code pt. 2700.40 (2018).
103 Emphasis added; Pa. Act of Jan. 25, P.L. 1546, No. 541 (1966).
104 24 Pa. Stat. § 5154 (a)(5).
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(1) Who is convicted by any court of record of a criminal offense which was committed after the effective date of
this act which, under the laws of the United States or Pennsylvania, would constitute a misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude or a felony; or
(2) Who has been expelled, dismissed or denied enrollment by an approved institution of higher learning for refusal to obey, after the effective date of this act, a lawful regulation or order of any institution of higher education, which
refusal, in the opinion of the institution, contributed to a disruption of the activities, administration or classes of such institution; or
(3) Who has been convicted in any court of record of
any offense committed in the course of disturbing, interfering with or preventing, or in an attempt to disturb, interfere
with or prevent the orderly conduct of the activities, administration or classes of an institution of higher education.105

Punishing college students for campus unrest saw brief popularity in
the late 1960s, spurred on by Congress’ decision in the 1968 Higher
Education Amendments to block students convicted of similar disruptive behaviors from receiving federal financial aid.106 By 1971, at
least eleven states passed laws to prohibit scholarship eligibility to
students convicted of similar offenses (Keeney, 1971),107 but these
rules did not last long,108 including in Pennsylvania.
In Corporation of Haverford College v. Reeher (1971), students
and colleges sued PHEAA over the new rules.109 A majority of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
struck down the “misdemeanor involving moral turpitude” rule as
unconstitutionally vague and struck down the two rules pertaining
to students who were disciplined or convicted for campus disruptions as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.110 The court left in
105 Pa. Act of Dec. 18, 1969 (P.L. 171, No. 169) § 2.
106 Higher Education Amendments of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-575, § 504, 82 Stat. 1062.
107 Gregory D. Keeney, Aid to Education, Student Unrest, and Cutoff Legislation: An
Overview, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 1003 (1971).
108 The campus disruption rules were repealed from the Higher Education Act in 1980;
Education Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-374, 94 Stat. 1367.
109 Corporation of Haverford College v. Reeher, 329 F. Supp. 1196 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
110 The legislature never corrected the statute, so the unconstitutional provisions remain. See 24 Pa. Stat. § 5158.2.
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tact the state’s ability to deny state financial aid to felons. The plaintiffs did not ask the court to rule on the constitutionality of the
“character” requirement, though a dissenting judge commented on it.
Judge John William Ditter Jr., citing language from the 1966 statute,111 argued that the state should be allowed to deny aid to people
convicted of the prescribed crimes for fiscal reasons under the authority of the statutory character rule:
PHEAA must dispense millions of dollars of taxpayer's money and choose which among thousands of
applicants are "deserving" and which are most likely
to help the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania "achieve
its full economic and social potential" because they
are persons of "character". Viewed as a part of a legislative plan to allocate state money, the subsections in
question do not offend the requirements of due process.112
After winning another lawsuit in which PHEAA’s ability to withhold
aid from scholarship applicants who had pending felony charges was
upheld,113 PHEAA issued new regulations to correct the unconstitutional provisions. Relying on the character rule, it created new restrictions for people convicted of felonies and other specified crimes:
In order to be eligible for financial assistance a student applicant or recipient shall have and maintain
satisfactory character. A student applicant or recipient who is convicted of any of the following offenses
may be deemed to lack satisfactory character and be
denied any or all forms of financial assistance by the
Agency:
(1) A criminal offense which under the laws of the
United States or Pennsylvania constitutes a felony.
(2) Adultery. (3) Arson of personal property. (4) Assault and battery. (5) Pointing deadly weapons. (6)
Bribery. (7) Fornication and bastardy. (8) Prostitution and assignation. (9) Bigamy. (10 Blackmail. (11)
111 See supra p. 6; Pa. Act of Jan. 25, 1966 (P.L. 1546, No. 541) § 1.
112 Reeher, 329 F. Supp. at [PINCITE NEEDED].
113 Corporation of Haverford College v. Reeher, 53 F.R.D. 374 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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Abandoning an infant. (12) Corrupting the morals of
children. (13) Neglect to maintain child. (14) Use of
drugs. (15) Extortion. (16) False pretense. (17)
Fraud. (18) Desecrating flag of United States or Pennsylvania. (19) Forcible entry and detainer. (20) Indecent assault. (21) Libel. (22) Perjury. (23) Driving
under the influence of liquor or drugs or permitting
same.114

With the “misdemeanor involving moral turpitude” rule struck
down, PHEAA relied on the statutory character rule to delineate
these crimes as eligibility requirements. Dissatisfied with the new
regulations, convicted students returned to the same federal court to
sue PHEAA again.
In Carbonaro v. Reeher (1975), students who were convicted
of felonies and who lost aid eligibility under PHEAA’s new satisfactory character regulations sued PHEAA on the grounds that discriminating against people with felony convictions violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection under the law.115 The
court analyzed the extent to which denying financial aid to felons
had a legitimate state purpose. The state made a fiscal argument
with which the court agreed, much like Ditter’s dissent in Corporation of Haverford College v. Reeher (1971): “The state contends that
the classification is reasonable because the state has only finite resources and wishes to maximize the potential gain from the available
funds by providing assistance only to those students with ‘satisfactory character.’”116 The court returned to the original language of the
1966 statute, which states that only “deserving” students should be
given the aid and that students must “satisfactorily meet the qualifications of ‘financial need,’ character and academic promise.” Character, according to the court, was distinct from the other academic and
financial requirements, and a felony conviction may be indicative of
unsatisfactory character. The state, the court concluded, was justified in requiring felons to prove their satisfactory character to
PHEAA:

114 Emphasis added; 2 Pa. B. 506 (March 25, 1972).
115 Carbonaro v. Reeher, 392 F. Supp. 753, 755 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
116 Id. at 757.
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To reiterate, we hold that the statutory and administrative program whereby Pennsylvania places the
burden on former felons to prove that they are of satisfactory character in order to receive state financial
assistance for postsecondary education does not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The felon classification bears a rational
relationship to the legitimate state purpose of assuring that only responsible citizens receive state aid.117
PHEAA prevailed in this case, but the agency grew weary of defending itself in court. Seeking the most stable legal footing possible to
avoid future litigation, PHEAA made regulatory changes by loosening
its requirements on convicted students. In the months after the 1975
lawsuit, PHEAA began approving all applicants with misdemeanors
and first-degree felonies for aid “based on (1) the experience of [the
Administrative Review Committee] approving such cases [on appeal]
and (2) a question as to whether courts would uphold our denial of
aid based on a misdemeanor conviction.”118 In 1978, PHEAA eliminated the character test in the loan program so that any felon denied
grant aid could at least get a loan.119
In the 1980s, PHEAA further narrowed how it defined unsatisfactory character. In 1980, the Administrative Review Committee
began automatically reviewing any felon applicants that initial staff
could not agree on, and in 1985, staff were permitted to approve
nearly all felons so long as they paid for their first term of college out
pocket, which apparently was a demonstration of deservingness for
future aid.120 By 1988, data showed that almost all students with felony convictions were eventually approved for aid after exhausting
their appeal options.121 From then on, including still today, PHEAA
assumes “that once an applicant is released from incarceration, he
will be presumed to be of satisfactory character and eligible for aid.
Therefore, only currently incarcerated applicants are now denied
grant aid under the satisfactory character provision of the law.”122 It
117 Id. at 760.
118 Gary D. Smith, BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SATISFACTORY CHARACTER/CRIME POLICY, PA. HIGHER
EDUC. ASSISTANCE AUTHORITY, at 2 (1990) (on file with author).
119 8 Pa. B. 3085 (November 11, 1985).
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
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took nearly twenty years, but Pennsylvania finally came to an interpretation of good character that it could maintain and justify, which
remains in force today.

C.Michigan
By 1979, the state of Michigan administered four grant programs for college students. That year, the auditor general conducted
an audit of the four programs, finding many inconsistencies in their
eligibility requirements.123 One such inconsistency was that two of
the programs – the 1964 Competitive Scholarship and the 1966 Tuition Grant program – contained “good moral character” rules but the
other two did not. State legislators authored bills to correct the inconsistencies.124 In the first drafts of Senate Bills 1275 and 1276 introduced on September 23, 1980, the legislators proposed to strike
the good moral character rules from both scholarship programs, but
two weeks later, they added a rule making incarcerated students ineligible for the Competitive Scholarship in Bill 1276. According to a
senate analysis summary from November 10, 1980, this amendment
was thought to “sharpen the original intent of the ‘good moral character’ provision.”125 For consistency, they then added the incarceration rule to Bill 1275 to replace the character rule in the Tuition
Grant program, which senate analyses again suggested would sharpen the original intent of the character rule.126 When Senate Bills 1275
and 1276 passed in 1981, the character rules were indeed replaced
with prohibitions on aid to incarcerated students,127 as remains the
case today.128 Thus, legislators apparently believed that incarcerated
people were not of good moral character and were therefore undeserving of scholarships for college. Today, only the incarceration re-

123 STATE OF MICH. OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GEN., AUDIT REPORT: STUDENT FIN. ASSISTANCE
SERVS., ET AL., DEP’T OF EDUC. (1979) (on file with author).
124 Mich. 1980 SB 1275 (Michigan Tuition Grants); Mich. 1980 SB 1276 (Michigan Competitive Scholarship); Mich. 1980 SB 1277 (Differential Grants Program); Mich. 1980 SB 1278
(Legislative Merit Awards Program).
125 MICH. S. ANALYSIS SECTION, S.B. 1275, 1276, 1277, & 1278: FIRST ANALYSIS, at 3 (Nov. 10,
1980) (on file with author).
126 MICH. S. ANALYSIS SECTION, S.B. 1275, 1276, 1277, & 1278: SECOND ANALYSIS, at 3 (Dec.
22, 1980) (on file with author).
127 Mich. 1981 P.A. 500 § 4; Mich. 1981 P.A. 503 § 3.
128 Mich. Compiled Laws 390.974 (2017); MCL 390.993 (2017).
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quirements remain in both programs, freeing state officials from
having to define good moral character.

D.Active Programs
The three state case studies presented above demonstrate
how state lawmakers, government officials, and courts interpreted
good moral character rules in financial aid programs between the
1960s and 1980s. But Table 3 shows that there are at least 11 active
programs that still contain character rules, suggesting that student
applicants must continue to meet character requirements. How do
officials currently interpret and enforce the character rules in these
programs? This section discusses the six states shown in Table 3.
In Pennsylvania, the original “character” rule from 1966 remains in statute, and a state regulation still stipulates “a student applicant or recipient shall have and maintain satisfactory character.”129 As described above, court decisions and regulatory actions of
the 1970s and 1980s yielded what is still today the interpretation of
satisfactory character for the Pennsylvania State Grant.130 Though
there is no statute or regulation that says so, the only condition that
triggers the satisfactory character clause is incarceration, even
though other conditions are still listed as possibilities in the Pennsylvania Code.131 In the eyes of the Pennsylvania Higher Education
Assistance Authority, to be of unsatisfactory character is to be incarcerated. This interpretation is made clear in the 2017 Pennsylvania
State Grant Program Policy Manual in a section titled “Satisfactory
Character,” which states: “State Grant eligibility is not impacted by a
felony conviction unless the student is also currently incarcerated.
All incarcerated students are ineligible for State Grant awards.”132 As
Pennsylvania added new scholarship programs over the years,
PHEAA tied their eligibility requirements to that of the State Grant,
rendering incarcerated students in Pennsylvania ineligible for all
state-funded grant programs.
There is one remaining Illinois scholarship statute that still
contains a character rule. The present-day University of Illinois Children of Veterans Tuition Waiver has its roots in one of the oldest
129 22 Pa. Code § 121.6(a).
130 See discussion supra Part IV.B.
131 22 Pa. Code § 121.6(a)(1-3).
132 PA HIGHER EDUC. ASSISTANCE AUTHORITY, PA STATE GRANT PROGRAM POL’Y MANUAL, at 23
(2017), https://www.pheaa.org/documents/grants/ph/2017-18-policy-manual.pdf.
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scholarship programs in the study sample: the 1867 Illinois Industrial University scholarship: “for the benefit of the descendants of the
soldiers and seamen who served in the armies and navies of the
United States during the late rebellion.”133 Though amended many
times, the program is still active, and the state administers this program directly through the University of Illinois, rather than through
the state’s financial aid agency. However, the University of Illinois
application for the program conspicuously omits any mention of the
character requirement, despite an otherwise detailed accounting of
the eligibility requirements.134 It seems the old character rule is
simply ignored in practice, and an official from the University of Illinois did not respond to my request for more information about how
they evaluate character.
Virginia funds three programs that contain character rules.
The Virginia State Board of Health administers four scholarships for
undergraduate and graduate students under the 1950 Nurse Scholarship program. Regarding character, the Board checks all applicants’ nursing licenses for disciplinary issues, and on the application
forms, college nursing faculty must attest to a scholarship applicant’s
character.135 Officials from Virginia Tech did not respond to my
emails about how they administer the 1970 Soil Scientist Scholarship. Each institution in Virginia administers the 1936 “unfunded
scholarship,” and I did not attempt to learn from each institution
how they define character.
Similarly, three entities administer scholarship programs in
Alabama with character rules. The Alabama Board of Nursing administers the 1977 Graduate Nursing Scholarship, but a Board official
reported that there is no single definition of “good character” for the
purpose of the scholarship.136 Instead, several sections of the administrative code outline the standards of practice, conduct, and accountability that would be referenced when selecting scholarship
applicants.137 Officials from the Alabama Optometric Association and
the Alabama Board of Dental Scholarship Awards did not respond to
133 1867 Ill. Pub. L. 123.
134
See
application
form,
available
content/uploads/2018/11/1920_COV_App.pdf.

at

https://osfa.illinois.edu/wp-

135
See
application
forms,
VA
DEPT.
OF
HEALTH,
available
at
http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/health-equity/forms-and-applications/; Personal Communication, Mar. 21, 2019 (notes on file with author).
136 Personal Communication, Feb. 20, 2019 (e-mail on file with author).
137 Ala. Admin. Code Rules 610-X-6; 610-X-6-.03; 610-X-8; 610-X-8-.03.
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my requests for information about the scholarship programs that
they administer.
In South Carolina, two grant programs still have character
rules, which are administered by separate state agencies. An official
from the South Carolina Higher Education Tuition Grants Commission informed me that they do not interpret or define the “good moral character” requirement in the 1970 Tuition Grant program, nor
would they deny an applicant based on moral reasons, alone.138 Any
denials would be based on other existing requirements. An official
from the South Carolina Commission on Higher Education did not respond to my email about the 1996 Need-based Grant program.
Finally, regarding the 1971 Oklahoma Tuition Grant Program, an official from the Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education was not able to clarify the state’s position on enforcing the “high
moral character” requirement.139 Since higher education institutions
share responsibility for eligibility requirement enforcement, it is
possible that a student may be denied eligibility under the character
rule following an incident of campus misconduct, the official suggested. What is more likely is that the 1995 amendment to the Tuition Grant program statute that made incarcerated students ineligible for aid rendered the character rule itself moot.140
V. ELIMINATING CHARACTER REQUIREMENTS
Good moral character rules in state financial aid programs
are mostly relics of the past. Of the 50 programs identified with such
rules since 1850, just 11 (22%) are active today with their character
rules still intact. In the historical cases of Pennsylvania, Illinois, and
Michigan, the character rules were eventually converted into bans on
financial aid to incarcerated students, which may represent contemporary beliefs about what it meant to be of good moral character. In
the six states where financial aid programs still contain character
rules, the rules are largely ignored, as best illustrated by the requirement being left off the Illinois Children of Veterans Tuition
Waiver application. In others, explicit eligibility requirements pertaining to criminal history, financial standing (e.g., not being in default on loans or owing child support), or other misconduct are enforced in lieu of any behavior that otherwise might be representative
138 Personal Communication, Apr. 12, 2018 (e-mail on file with author).
139 Personal Communication, Mar. 23, 2018 (e-mail on file with author).
140 1995 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 247.
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of unsatisfactory character. In other words, character rules are
meaningless or redundant as applied in most of today’s state financial aid programs.
At least six states have stripped their current financial aid
programs of old character rules.141 There are good reasons for policymakers to continue this trend by deleting the last remaining good
character rules from financial aid program statutes and regulations.
First, despite one court’s assertion that it is in the state’s interest to
award scholarships only to deserving applicants with satisfactory
character,142 character requirements contradict the policy goals of
modern state financial aid programs. The broad need-based programs are intended to make college affordable so that all residents
can gain new knowledge and skills, get higher paying jobs, and bolster the American economy.143 Thus, denying any academicallyqualified state resident the benefits of college scholarships because
of character or criminal history works against the public interests of
a well-educated society. Access to and completion of higher education is more dependent now than ever on the ability to pay for college,144 and denying aid to applicants based on character is an arcane
way to save the state a small amount of money. Any state resident
who has been admitted to a recognized college should be considered
to meet the baseline qualifications for a grant.145
Second, the inconsistency of program rules is cumbersome.
Of the six states that still have character requirements, only Pennsylvania’s character statute applies to all programs. In the other states,
it is a fluke of history that just one or two programs still have character requirements. For example, Virginia currently funds 38 grants,
conditional grants or loans, and tuition waiver programs to undergraduate, graduate, and professional students, just three of which
have character requirements.146 Like Michigan did in 1981, states
should eliminate their remaining character requirements for the
sake of simplicity and consistency across programs.

141 See supra Table 2.
142 Carbonaro v. Reeher, 392 F. Supp. 753, 759 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
143 Supra notes 25 & 27.
144 See SARA GOLDRICK-RAB, PAYING THE PRICE: COLLEGE COSTS, FINANCIAL AID, AND THE
BETRAYAL OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (2016).
145 For example, see Illinois’ definition of good moral character: 23 Ill. Admin. Code pt.
2700.20 (2018).
146 See supra note 40.
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Third, the rules themselves are burdensome to administer.
State officials, program administrators, and college financial aid officers would not have to field questions from students, parents, and
the rare researcher about the meaning of good moral character if
they deleted them. Perhaps the reason that six state officials – even
after making open records requests in some cases – did not respond
to my request for clarification on the character rules is evidence they
did not have an answer or were too busy. Either way, governmental
efficiency would be improved ever so slightly by striking these burdensome rules.
Fourth, though likely infrequent, there still may be colleges
or state agencies that deny eligibility to students for ill-defined reasons of unsatisfactory character. This is especially possible where
individual institutions make character determinations for scholarship programs based on their knowledge of an applicant’s prior behavior (e.g., criminal convictions or discipline at previous educational institutions) or an applicant’s behavior on campus (e.g., academic
or behavioral misconduct violations). Eliminating character requirements may restore scholarship eligibility to some students.
Finally, confusion around what constitutes good moral character may be a deterrent to qualified applicants. In a U.S. Department
of Education survey of college students who did not apply for federal
financial aid, 18.9% said the forms were too much work and 60.7%
thought they would be ineligible, though over half of them were in
fact eligible for a Pell Grant.147 Combine that with evidence that formerly-convicted students were deterred from applying to college
when they knew they faced criminal history questions on the application.148 It stands to reason that an otherwise qualified student with
a criminal conviction, for example, may be deterred from applying
for a state scholarship with a nebulous character requirement out of
stigma, fear of rejection, or confusion over the requirement. Eliminating character rules helps to ensure that students will not be deterred from applying because of confusing requirements.
For these reasons, the current practice of ignoring or haphazardly enforcing good moral character rules is unsatisfactory.
State policymakers should delete the few remaining good moral
character requirements from financial aid programs.

147 Mark Kantrowitz, Reasons Why Students Do Not File the FAFSA, STUDENT FINANCIAL
AID POL’Y ANALYSIS, (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.finaid.org/educators/studentaidpolicy.phtml.
148 Center for Community Alternatives, Boxed Out: Criminal History Screening and College Application Attrition (2015), http://www.communityalternatives.org/fb/boxed-out.html.
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VI. CONCLUSION
For nearly a century, legal scholars have lamented good moral character rules in immigration law, occupational licensing, and bar
admissions; yet during that period and prior, good moral character
rules also existed in state financial aid programs for college students.
For the first time, this paper offered an accounting of state scholarship programs with good moral character rules and an analysis of
what they mean and how they are enforced. Most of the 50 identified
programs with character rules are now defunct, but applicants for at
least 11 programs in six states still must contend with character requirements, to varying degrees. I join the chorus of other scholars in
advocating that good moral character requirements should be deleted.
The identification of character requirements in financial aid
programs raises the question as to what other previouslyunidentified subjects are affected by good moral character rules, especially within education law. For example, in my review of historical state statutes, I found laws that listed good character as a requirement for admission to college, not just for scholarships. Today,
most colleges require students to disclose criminal history on college
applications,149 but do any still evaluate character? Law schools, for
example, certainly ask applicants “character and fitness” questions,
ranging from criminal history, educational discipline, military discipline, substance abuse history, to involvement in civil litigation.150
Future research might pursue a review of good moral character requirements in college admissions policies and in other higher education laws.

149 See Bradley D. Custer, College Admission Policies for Ex-Offender Students: A Literature Review, 67 J. CORRECTIONAL EDUC. 35 (2016); Douglas N. Evans, Jason Szkola & Victor St.
John, Going Back to College? Criminal Stigma in Higher Education Admissions in Northeastern
US, CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2019) (advance online publication); Robert Stewart & Christopher
Uggen, Criminal Records and College Admissions: A National Experimental Audit (Sept. 10,
2018) (unpublished working paper).
150 John S. Dzienkowski, Character and Fitness Inquiries in Law School Admissions, 45
S. TEX. L. REV. 921 (2004).
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Administering Medical Marijuana at School in
Colorado: A Legal Analysis
Spencer C. Weiler Ph.D.*, Philip Westbrook, Ed.D.†

INTRODUCTION
The topic of this legal analysis is the administration of medical marijuana to students attending Colorado K-12 public schools.
Colorado has been a pioneer in legalizing the use of marijuana.1 Beginning in the year 2000, Colorado voters approved Amendment 20
legalizing the use of marijuana for medical purposes.2 This law specifically allows minors to receive a prescription for medical marijuana under certain conditions. An unintended consequence of this law
is that minors meeting its requirements are requesting, along with
their caregivers and physicians, to have marijuana-based medication3 administered to them at schools. The purpose of this legal analysis is to explore issues related to students prescribed marijuanabased medical products which require administration during school
hours. The analysis will include a summary of relevant federal and
state statutes, case laws, and legal discussion of issues educators,
policymakers,
and
legal
scholars
should
consider.

* Spencer Weiler is an Associate Professor at Brigham Young University.
† Pilip Westbrook is an Adjunct Professor at The George Washington University.
1 Colorado was the fifth state to legalize the use of marijuana for medical purposes
and one of the first two states to legalize the drug recreationally. See Legal Medical Marijuana
States and DC, PROCON.ORG (2019), https://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/legal-medicalmarijuana-states-and-dc/#Colorado.
2 COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14.
3 For the purpose of this legal analysis, “marijuana-based medication” refers to nonsmokable products for therapeutic purposes.
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John Dewey referred to education as, “a fostering, a nurturing, a cultivating process.”4 A vast majority of educators work tirelessly to ensure that their efforts to properly educate all children
meet the ideal established by Dewey over 100 years ago. For most
students, the current public school system works. However, in order
for students to be successful at school, their individual needs must
be met - and these individual needs are proving to be more complex
than in years past.5 An example of the complexities associated with
public education in the 21st century is found in the 33 states that
have legalized the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes for
adults.6 Of these 33 states, 17 allow the prescription of marijuanabased medical products to minors.7 There are students attending
public schools in Colorado who rely on marijuana-based products for
therapeutic uses and, after having met the legal requirements in the
state, these students, along with their parents and physicians, are
requesting permission to have these marijuana-based products administered at school.8
I.OVERVIEW OF MARIJUANA-BASED MEDICAL PRODUCTS
Marijuana is a type of cannabis plant that contains approximately 540 chemical substances, with the two most notable compounds being tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) and cannabidiol (CBD).9
THC is the compound that causes the psychoactive effect of being
“high” most associated with the recreational use of marijuana. Recreational marijuana has primarily been smoked, but THC can also be
extracted from marijuana and used in the form of oils, edibles, cap4 John Dewey, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 10 (1916).
5 Colorado Department of Education, Medication Administration Guidelines in the
School
and
Child
Care
Settings
4
(2019),
https://www.cde.state.co.us/healthandwellness/medicationadministrationguidelinesaugust2
019pdf.
6 See Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC, supra note 1.
7 Tom Kelly, When Medical Marijuana Meets School Drug Policy, What Can States Do?,
EDNOTE (2019), https://ednote.ecs.org/when-medical-marijuana-meets-school-drug-policywhat-can-states-do/; see also State Medical Marijuana Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES
(2019),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuanalaws.aspx.
8 Crystal King, Student Access to Medical Marijuana in the School System, 48(3) J. L. &
EDUC., 405, 405 (2019).
9 National Center for Complementary and Integrative Health, Cannabis (Marijuana)
and Cannabinoids: What You Need to Know (2019), https://nccih.nih.gov/health/marijuanacannabinoids.
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sules, tinctures, and other forms. Known therapeutic benefits of THC
are limited and include treatment to nausea due to chemotherapy
and an appetite enhancer.10 There is concern that THC can be harmful to some people – especially adolescents. Concerns include an increased risk of motor vehicle crashes and a higher risk of developing
schizophrenia and other psychoses in adolescents who are predisposed to these illnesses.11
Unlike THC, CBD can produce a variety of therapeutic applications
including the treatment of seizures, epilepsy, glaucoma, inflammatory bowel disease, multiple sclerosis, and movement disorders due to
Tourette Syndrome without producing the psychoactive “high” produced by THC.12 CBD can be extracted from marijuana and sold in
the form of gels, gummies, oils, supplements, and other forms that
may be added to products such as lotions, soaps, oils for vaping, and
foods and beverages infused with the compound. The U.S. Food &
Drug Administration (FDA) has regulatory authority over CBD products that make therapeutic claims and foods that contain CBD.13
While a growing number of states and the District of Columbia have
legalized marijuana for both recreational and medical use, marijuana
remains illegal under federal law as a Schedule I substance under the
Controlled Substance Act.14
II.MEDICAL MARIJUANA ADMINISTERED AT SCHOOL
In November 2000, Colorado voters approved Amendment 20,
which legalized the use of marijuana by both adults and minors for
medical purposes.15 Since that time, several issues related to the use
of marijuana have surfaced in Colorado’s public schools. A hypothetical case study will be presented to explore the issues related to administering medical marijuana to students.

10 E.A. Carlini, The Good and the Bad Effects of (-) Trans-delta-9tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) Humans, 44(4) TOXICON 461, 461 (2004).
11 National Center for Complementary and Integrative Health, supra note 9.
12 Id.
13 John D. Finch, Hemp, CBD, and Marijuana: What’s the Difference?, N AT’L L. REV.
(2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/hemp-cbd-and-marijuana-what-s-difference.
14 Id.
15 COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14.
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The Case Study

Dr. Mary J. Potter sits at her desk pondering the situation before her and she cannot determine the best course of action. Dr. Potter is the principal of a high school in a suburban community within
an hour’s drive from Denver. Two students out of the roughly 1,500
attending her high school have medical situations that can be alleviated by the use of medical marijuana-based products. The first student has cerebral palsy, is confined to a wheelchair, and relies on
computerized speech assistance to communicate. The student,
named Paul, and his parents have requested an adult, either one of
his parents or a school employee with proper medical training, be
authorized to apply a CBD patch to Paul’s arm during the school day.
According to Paul and his physician, the CBD patch alleviates his seizures and allows him to concentrate better than non-marijuanabased medicine. Paul’s previous pharmaceutical medicine made him
feel like a “zombie” and made school attendance difficult.
The second student, named Casey, has Dravet’s syndrome
and suffers from frequent seizures. Casey takes a CBD capsule to reduce the frequency and severity of her seizures. Casey would like to
be able to take the CBD capsule at school. Casey’s parents have requested that school officials administer the medication to her since
they both work and cannot be at school at the designate time each
day.
Dr. Potter wants to help Paul and Casey, but she has also
identified concerns with the requests, including the fact that schools,
according to federal law, are drug-free zones.16 Dr. Potter feels she is
being asked to make an accommodation related to an activity that is
potentially illegal according to federal law, which could put the entire school in a compromised position.17 Some of Dr. Potter’s concerns and considerations include:
•Are marijuana-based products an illegal form of marijuana?
•Would the school district potentially lose federally funding as a
result of administering marijuana-based medical products to
students?
•Where would the medicine be stored and dispensed?
•Would school personnel administer the marijuana-based medical products?

16 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1988).
17 Id. See also 21 U.S.C. § 812(b) (1970) (establishing marijuana as a Schedule I drug).
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Ultimately, Dr. Potter feels captured in a dilemma pondering
the appropriate course of action based on her desire to provide for
the needs of these students and complying with federal law.
B.

Issues for Consideration from the Case Study

In this case study, the principal has to weigh a number of conflicting interests and legal considerations. These considerations focus on the impact her decisions will have on the students making the
requests, other students, the school, and the employees charged with
overseeing or administering the marijuana-based products. Each is
explained below:
Students: Students in need of marijuana-based medical products are at the core of this issue. Will school officials enable students
with health issues to have access to marijuana-based medical products while at school or not? School officials who decide to support
students in need of marijuana-based medication while at school are
at risk of losing all federal funding; whereas, school officials who opt
to ban marijuana-based medical products in schools run the risk of
creating unnecessarily burdens for certain students and their families.
Other students: What is not clear is how the practice of allowing certain students to have marijuana-based medical products administered to them at school would impact other students. In the
case study, Paul and Casey clearly have medical conditions that can
be alleviated by the use of marijuana-based medical products. A policy allowing students to have marijuana-based medical products at
school could be perceived by others as the school district endorsing
the use of marijuana.
School: In schools where officials chose to allow students to
have marijuana-based medication administered to them, federal
funding could be jeopardized. In addition, there is evidence that parents of students with unique health issues are relocating their families to states with friendly marijuana laws.18 Based on this occurrence, it seems logical that school officials that take a marijuanafriendly stance could see an enrollment increase in students with
significant health issues. However, the alternative stance, a marijuana-unfriendly position, could hold different challenges for school officials. Either decision made by the educational administrators hold
18 King, supra note 8.
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implications.
Employees: Another consideration focuses on employees who
would be required to administer or oversee the administration of the
marijuana-based medical products. Would these employees have the
ability to opt out of performing this duty if they have moral objections?
In addition to the impact on people, there are logistical considerations for educational administrators. These logistical considerations include determining if the marijuana-based medical product
would be stored on campus or would the family have to make special
arrangements to get the medication to the school on a daily basis? If
the medication is stored on campus it would need to be secured in a
way to ensure that it is not accessible to others within the school.
III.RELATED FEDERAL AND STATE STATUTES
There are two federal statutes related to marijuana that will be
reviewed in this section. In addition, Colorado’s Amendment 64,
which legalized the recreational use of marijuana, will be summarized. Finally, two additional state statutes aimed at the administration of marijuana-based medical products at schools are discussed.
A. Controlled Substances Act (1970)
The Controlled Substance Act (CSA), enacted in 1970, is the
federal government’s law related to drugs that explicitly outlaws the
manufacture, importation, possession, use, and distribution of specific illicit drugs (stimulants, depressants, and hallucinogens) and anabolic steroids. CSA breaks drugs into five schedules:
Schedule I - which addresses drugs with a high potential for
abuse and are not used for medical treatment.
Schedule II - which addresses drugs with a high potential for
abuse and are used for medical treatment.
Schedule III - which addresses drugs that have the potential
for being abused but less than the drugs in Schedules 1 and 2.
Schedule IV – which addresses drugs with a lower potential for
being abused than the drugs listed in Schedule 3.
Schedule V - which addresses drugs with a lower potential for
being abused than the drugs listed in Schedule 4.
Specific to this study, marijuana is currently listed under
Schedule I.
84
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B.

Drug-free School Zone Act (1988)

In conjunction with the passage of the CSA in 1970, the federal
government began a campaign widely referred to as the “War on
Drugs” by passing laws that increased the penalties levied on people
in violation of various drug offenses. For decades since, the “War on
Drugs” has continued to focus on reducing the illegal drug trade in
the U.S. In 1988, the U.S. Congress passed the Drug-free School Zone
Act (DFSZ) which levied harsh penalties for illegal drug-related activities that occurred near school grounds.19 Eventually, all 50 states
enacted their own version of the Drug-free School Zone Law.20 The
notion of a DFSZ sought to protect students by increasing the penalty, both in terms of prison sentence and fines, for anyone caught
within the zone attempting to distribute or manufacture controlled
substances.21
In Colorado, state law establishes the DFSZ as the area within
1,000 feet of a public school or school bus.22 Specifically, Colorado
state law targets the possession of illicit drugs with the intent to distribute, deliver, sale, and manufacture. State law places a minimum
of an 8-year sentence for anyone convicted of violating the DFSZ
law.23
C.

Colorado’s Amendment 20

Entitled Medical Use of Marijuana for Persons Suffering From
Debilitating Medical Conditions, Amendment 20 was approved by
Colorado voters in November 2000.24 As can be derived from the title, the focus of the amendment was to provide those suffering from
“debilitating medical conditions” with relief through the use of marijuana-based medical products. However, the language specifically
prohibits eligible individuals from engaging “in the medical use of
marijuana in plain view of, or in a place open to, the general pub-

19 The Chiefs of Police National Drug Task Force, Drug-Free School Zones: Implementation Manual, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/140213NCJRS.pdf.
20 Jeffery T. Walker, Eliminate Residency Requirement for Sex Offenders, 6 CRIMINOLOGY
& PUB. POL’Y 863, 864.
21 The Chiefs of Police National Drug Task Force, supra note 19.
22 Id. at 38.
23 Id.
24 COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14.
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lic.”25 In addition, there are specific requirements placed on individuals under the age of 18 who suffer from debilitating medical conditions. These conditions include two medical doctors diagnosing the
medical condition as debilitating and one of the two doctors explaining to the minor the “possible risks and benefits of medical use of
marijuana to the patient and each of the patient’s parents residing in
Colorado.”26 In addition, each parent of the minor requesting marijuana-based medical products are required to provide the state health
agency with written consent in support of this alternative medical
approach and the parent(s) must be the “patient’s primary caregiver.”27 Finally, the amendment requires the parent(s) of the minor
to possess the medical use identification card and handle the purchasing and administering of the medication. 28
D.

Colorado’s Statutes Related to Marijuana at School

By 2016, state legislative members were growing frustrated by
perceived bureaucratic barriers faced by students with debilitating
medical conditions when these students and their parents attempted
to have marijuana-based medical products administered at school. In
response to these barriers, the state legislature enacted a bill aimed
at requiring school boards of education to adopt policy permitting
the use of medical, non-smokable, marijuana at P-12 schools.29 This
law specifically states that students are prohibited from possessing
or self-administering medical marijuana at P-12 schools or school
functions unless the students and their parents have been approved
to do so.
Once approved to administer medical marijuana at school, the
caregiver is authorized to “possess, and administer to a student who
holds a valid recommendation for medical marijuana,” non-smokable
medical marijuana at the school the student attends.30 However, the
law also requires that the caregiver remove the marijuana-based
medical product from campus once it has been administered. The act
places a burden of expectation on the caregiver, who must be able to

25 Id. at 5.a.ii.
26 Id. at 6.a-c.
27 Id. at 6.d-f.
28 Id. at 6.g-i.
29 COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-1-119.3
30 Id. at § 22-1-119.3.d.I.A.
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come to school at the designated time, administer the medication,
and then leave campus with it. The act also states that “nothing in
this section requires the school district staff to administer medical
marijuana.”31
The act states that these requirements do not apply to school
districts that (1) document they will lose federal funding as a result
of accommodating students, (2) actually lost federal funding, or (3) if
the school district clearly publicizes on its website its decision to not
comply with this law.32 These exceptions are of interest in that state
officials are recognizing Colorado’s medical marijuana laws are not
in compliance with federal regulations and compliance with this law
could result in punitive measures from the federal government negatively impacting funding for public schools. In addition, school district officials can opt to not comply with the law by providing an internet accessible rationale for doing so. In response to the 2016 act,
some school districts decided to avoid all of the legal ambiguities associated with administering marijuana-based medical products in
drug-free school zones by posting their decisions to not comply with
the law on their websites.
Frustrated by the fact that barriers continued to impede students with debilitating medical conditions from accessing alleviating
marijuana-based medical products at school, the Colorado legislature passed a second law in 2018 that allowed school district personnel to administer medical marijuana-based products at school.33
Similar to the law enacted in 2016, the 2018 legislation required
students and parents to obtain written permission from school district officials. The law specifically states that “school personnel may
possess, and administer to a student who holds a valid recommendation for medical marijuana, medical marijuana in a non-smokable
form.”34 In addition, the school personnel administering marijuanabased medical products are required to ensure the act is not seen by
other students and does not disrupt the educational environment.35
The second law still provided school district officials with the
same three ways to opt out of its requirements – (1) document they
31 Id. at § 22-1-119.3.d.II.
32 Id. at § 22-1-119.3.d.A-C.
33 Id. at § 22-1-119.3.
34 Id. at § 22-1-119.3.III.A.
35 Id.
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will lose federal funding as a result of accommodating students, (2)
actually lost federal funding, or (3) if the school district clearly publicizes on its website its decision to not comply with this law.36 This
second law also allowed the minor’s caregiver to provide the school
officials with more than a daily dosage of the medication along with
physician’s written directions that address the patient, route, time,
medication, and dosage.37 In addition, school officials are required to
properly document each administration.
E.

Related Case Law

As of 2019, there has not been an adjudicated case involving a
student’s request to have medical marijuana-based products administered at schools. As a result, educational administrators lack direct
guidance from courts on this issue. However, there have been a
number of cases involving employees’ use of marijuana and the subsequent adverse job actions taken by the employers. These cases
serve to illustrate the conflict between state and federal law. The
available case law potentially discourages educational administrators from taking a friendly position on the issue of marijuana-based
medical products in schools.
1. Ross v. RagingWire Telecommunications (2008)38
In Ross v. RagingWire Telecommunications (2008), a newly
hired employee of RagingWire Telecommunications was subsequently terminated for failing a drug test due to his marijuana use.
Ross, the employee, contended that his valid medical use card authorized him to consume marijuana for medical reasons. California’s
Superior Court upheld the employer’s decision to terminate Ross.
This ruling was appealed and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Ross’
claim centered on a assertion that his termination violated California’s law that permitted him to use marijuana for medical purposes.
However, the court’s decision held that California’s law did not include accommodations for employees using medical marijuana and
that the termination did not violate Ross’ rights since, “federal law …
continues to prohibit the drug’s possession, even by medical us36 Id. at § 22-1-119.3.V.C.
37 Id. at § 22-1-119.3.VII. See also Colorado Department of Education, supra note 5.
38 Ross v. RagingWire Telecommunications, Inc., 174 P.3d 200 (2008).
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ers.”39
2. Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Industry
(2010)40
The second case, Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of
Labor & Industry (2010), dealt with a drill press operator who used
marijuana daily for medical purposes to help alleviate pain, which
was legal in the state of Oregon. When he was scheduled to take a
drug test, the employee informed his supervisor that he would not
pass the test due to his legal use of medical marijuana. The employee
was fired. The case was first argued in front of an administrative law
judge (ALJ) who ruled in favor of the employee. The ALJ ruled that
the employer violated Oregon state law by failing to engage in a
meaningful interactive process with the employee to find a reasonable accommodation. The Oregon Supreme Court ruled that federal
law superseded state law and that the termination was permissible.
3. Coats v. Dish Network (2015)41
The final case, Coats v. Dish Network (2015), began on June 7,
2010, when Dish Network fired Brandon Coats for violating the
company’s drug policy. Coats, who is a quadriplegic and is confined
to a wheelchair, started working for Dish Network as a customer
service agent in 2007. In 2009, Coats applied for and received a Colorado license allowing him to use marijuana to treat painful muscle
spasms he experienced due to his quadriplegia. In May 2010, Coats
tested positive for THC during a random drug test and, even after he
informed his employer that he was a registered medical marijuana
patient, was fired.
Coats filed a wrongful termination lawsuit against Dish Network, citing state law that prohibit employers from terminating an
employee based on engagement in “lawful activities.” Dish filed a
motion to dismiss the claim and the trial court granted the defendant’s motion. Coats appealed the trial court’s decision, and, on a split
decision, the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s decision. On
39 Id. at 202.
40 Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Industry, 230 P.3d 518 (2010).
41 Coats v. Dish Network, 350 P.3d 849 (2015).
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appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court, Coats lost a third time. The
rationale for siding with the defendants given by the Colorado Supreme Court was that lawful activities only included those activities
that were lawful under both state and federal law. “In sum, because
Coats’s marijuana use was unlawful under federal law, it does not fall
within section 24-34-402.5’s protection of ‘lawful’ activities.”42
IV.LEGAL ANALYSIS
In the case study presented at the start of this analysis, Dr. Potter, the high school principal, identified a range of potential legal issues that focused on individuals – from the student requesting to
have marijuana-based medical products administered at school to
the other students in the school. In addition, Dr. Potter recognized
that either decision, to accommodate or deny the request from students, will impact the overall culture of the school. Finally, there are
potential legal issues with individual employees who might object to
administering marijuana-based medical products in school. These
legal issues will be further developed in the discussion section,
which follows the legal analysis. The focus of this section is to highlight the factors contributing to the dilemma practitioners face when
asked by students and their families to have marijuana-based medical products administered to them at school.
A. Conflict Between Federal and State Law
As has been established in this examination of statutes related
to the administering of marijuana-based medical products at schools,
federal and state laws provide school officials with conflicting directives. When state and federal laws conflict, the federal law always
supersedes state law.43 However, federal authority is predicated upon the will of the federal government to intervene in the actions of
the state. When the federal government does not intervene, states
receive quasi-permission to violate federal law.
Thus far, the federal government has chosen not to intervene
in the actions of the 33 states related to medical marijuana use, in
general, and in schools, in particular. In 2013, the US Department of
42 Id. at 853.
43 Kern Alexander & M. David Alexander, AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW 91–93 (9th ed.
2019).
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Justice announced an update to its enforcement policies and clearly
reiterated the federal government’s position that marijuana remains
illegal under federal law as a Schedule I drug under the CSA. However, the department also announced it would defer the right to challenge state legalization at this time while reserving the right to do so
at a later time.44 As a result of this announcement from the Justice
Department as well as continued inaction from the federal government, Colorado or all other states with laws legalizing marijuana use
for medical and/or recreational purposes have not lost federal funding and there is no indication that such punitive measures will occur
in the near future.45 In addition, the U.S. Department of Education
has failed to provide state and local school district officials with clear
direction on the issue of administering marijuana-based medical
products at schools.
B.

Ambiguity Related to Marijuana-based Medical Products

What is not clear for school officials and state-level policymakers is whether THC or CBD products are still considered marijuana
after the compounds have been extracted. In 2018, the U.S. Drug &
Food Administration (FDA) moved certain CBD products to a Schedule V drug while leaving marijuana as a Schedule I drug.46 This governmental action clearly distinguishes between marijuana and the
compounds which can be extracted from marijuana and used in a variety of forms which are considered less harmful and less addictive.
This change has created confusion of the definition of what constitutes medical marijuana and what is a marijuana-based or marijuana-derived product. The evolution of medical marijuana products
has outpaced the law and the FDA has made adjustments to the
Schedule of Controlled Substances creating confusion for many medical marijuana users and school officials.
In Colorado, marijuana-based medical products were exclu-

44 Department of Justice, Justice Department Announces Update to Marijuana Enforcement Policy (2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announcesupdate-marijuana-enforcement-policy.
45 See US Department of Justice, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement (2013),
https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf.
46 Kristi Wolf, DEA Moves CBD Drugs to Schedule V; Follows FDA’s Lead, F OOD & DRUG
LAW ACCESS (2018), https://www.fooddruglaw.com/2018/10/02/dea-moves-cbd-drugs-toschedule-v-follows-fdas-lead/.
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sively available through dispensaries as opposed to pharmacies.
However, the FDA recently approved the first prescription pharmaceutical comprised of a marijuana-derived ingredient to treat a severe form of epilepsy.47 As a result of the FDA approval, this product
will not be considered medical marijuana but a pharmaceutical that
can be prescribed by a physician and sold at a regular pharmacy.
This decision by the FDA, while subtle, is significant since it provides
access to marijuana-derived products to people in states where medical marijuana remains illegal and could alter perceptions concerning
marijuana-based medical products. As medical marijuana becomes
mainstream with widespread application, school boards are more
likely to create policies that normalize its use.
V.DISCUSSION
Highlighted in this legal analysis are the areas of ambiguity
Colorado school administrators have to navigate when students with
prescriptions to use medical marijuana-based products seek to have
these products administered at school. The scope of the analysis is
limited to the state of Colorado, but there are 32 other states with
similar legislation. The issues raised here may not be unique to Colorado and could have applications to educators, policymakers, and legal scholars in other states as well. At the end of the case study, we
posed four questions that Dr. Potter should consider related to the
issues of administering marijuana-based medical products at
schools. The focus of the discussion section will be to answer those
four questions.
A. Are Marijuana-based Medical Products an Illegal Form of
Marijuana?
Most marijuana-based medical products contain CBD, which
are used for therapeutic applications to alleviate a variety of symptoms. Very few marijuana-based medical products contain THC, the
compound primarily responsible for any psychoactive “high” derived
from marijuana, and these products have limited therapeutic applications. Due to the recent changes in definition by the FDA related to
the different Schedule classifications, there is greater understanding

47 Id.
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that certain CBD marijuana-based medical products are distinguished from marijuana and are not subject to the Schedule I restrictions.
B.

Would the School District Lose Federal Funding as a Result of
Administering Marijuana-based Medical Products to Students?

From school leaders’ perspectives, the overarching concern
with introducing marijuana-based medical products in schools is
that such an action could result in the loss of federal funding. The
federal government’s contribution to public education is greater
than $56 billion, which is roughly 9% of the total funding of P-12 education.48 Given the fact that funding for public education in many
states continues to lag behind pre-Great Recession (2008-2013) levels,49 it should come as no surprise that educators can ill afford to
lose federal funding. Although there has been no indication from the
U.S. Department of Education, the Executive Branch, or the Legislative Branch that funding will cease in states or schools where marijuana-based medication is being administered to students, we
acknowledge the validity of this concern that must be taken into
consideration. If state policymakers genuinely see value in having
students access marijuana-based medical products at schools, then
we argue state legislatures should provide local school district officials, as agents of the state charged with carrying out the will of the
legislature, with assurance that they will be held harmless for any
potential loss of federal funding. Short of such assurance, educators
will be forced to assume the worst while state and federal law are in
conflict over the legality of marijuana-based medical products. And,
based on the case law presented in this legal analysis, the courts
have made it explicitly clear that federal law supersedes state law.
C.

Where would the medicine be stored and dispensed?

Colorado state law places a potentially excessive burden on
families that are striving to support a child with debilitating medical
conditions that are alleviated through the use of marijuana-based
48 Spencer C. Weiler & Gabriel R. Serna, PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR APPLIED
AND FISCAL ADMINISTRATION: WHAT WORKS FOR P-12 ADMINISTRATORS 15 (2016).

BUDGETING

49 William N. Evans, Robert M. Schwab & Kathryn L. Wagner, The Great Recession and
Public Education, 14(2) EDUC. FIN. AND POL’Y, 298, 299 (2019).
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medical products. Caregivers can be required to provide school officials with a daily dosage of the medication. This requirement assumes parents enjoy sufficient privilege in their daily schedules and
are able to free themselves from other obligations, including work, to
support their children. This assumption could represent a systemic
barrier that negatively impacts the academic opportunities of certain
students.50 Our contention is if efforts are made to provide students
with access to marijuana-based medical products at school, then educators and policymakers should work to ensure this access is afforded to all within the school community. To restrict access to a
privilege provided to a subset of the student population could be interpreted as discriminatory in nature. As a remedy to this systemic
barrier, if marijuana-based medical products are approved as appropriate therapeutic interventions, then they should be treated as
all other medications. This would include following the same protocols already in place related to how the medication is stored and dispensed at school.
D.

Would school personnel administer the marijuana-based medical
products?

If marijuana-based medical products are normalized and
treated as all other prescription medications, then school personnel
have the responsibility to provide students with care under in loco
parentis.
E.

Other Considerations

Many of the marijuana laws at the federal and state levels are
antiquated when compared to the evolution of marijuana-based
medical products. Our preference would be for the federal government to offer a clear directive for state policymakers and educators
on the issue of administering marijuana-based medical products at
schools. However, the federal government has actually only served
to provide confusion to states on this issue over the last 16 years.51
There is no strong indicator to suggest school officials possess the
expertise necessary to accurately determine permissible and im50 Glenn E. Singleton, COURAGEOUS CONVERSATIONS ABOUT RACE: A FIELD GUIDE FOR
ACHIEVING EQUITY IN SCHOOLS 52 (2015).
51 Bradley E. Markano, Enabling State Deregulation of Marijuana through Executive
Branch Nonenforcement, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 289, 293 (2015).
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permissible marijuana-based medical products to be administered at
public schools. As a result, there is a compelling need for a clarity
from either the FDA, US Department of Education, or Department of
Justice.
VI. CONCLUSION
Medical marijuana use remains controversial and elicits strong
emotional responses. However, compliance with the law related to
therapeutic application of marijuana-based medical products moves
the conversation from an emotional response to a legal obligation to
provide care. The primary issue explored in this legal analysis is that
school officials are currently being asked to comply with conflicting
laws. The use of medical marijuana-based products continues to increase and more accepted within mainstream medicine – particularly the use of CBD products that have therapeutic applications without the psychoactive effects of THC. While the conflict between state
and federal law related to the use of medical marijuana-based products may present a legal conundrum for public school officials, these
products are becoming more normalized in school setting. As these
products become more normalized and perceived as medications, it
stands to reason that they will be treated like all other prescribed
medication administered at schools by school personnel.

95

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2020

95

BYU Education & Law Journal, Vol. 2020, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 1

96

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byu_elj/vol2020/iss1/1

96

Kiracofe: Race-Conscious Admissions Policies in American Institutions of Higher Education

1]

One on One Aides

Patterns of Provision of One on One Aides in Due
Process Hearings: A National Sample
Joel T. Perkins, Ed.D., Michael Owens, Ph.D., Scott Ferrin, J.D., Ed.D.,
Gordon Gibb, Ph.D., Vance Randall, Ph.D.*

INTRODUCTION
In decisions regarding services for a student classified with a
disability under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEIA),1 one of the most impactful choices for an IEP
team or local education agency is whether a student should receive a
one-on-one aide to enhance the least restrictive environment. Many
parents seek such services for their children, while many education
agencies resist, claiming that that one-on-one aides are not appropriate for a particular student and in fact may not actually provide
the least restrictive environment for the student as established under the IDEA.
This study examined patterns of legal provision or refusal of
one-on-one aides when disagreements reached due process hearing
level. Patterns of differences were analyzed among states and among
disabilities for which aides were provided. No single clearinghouse
of data compares patterns among states, but access to national due
process hearing decisions enabled us to make comparisons over a
year as desired. The decision to initiate a due process hearing is a
parental decision, and many subjective factors enter into that decision. As a result, studying due process hearings is not an exact data
point into conflict between parents and schools, because many par-

* Joel T. Perkins is currently the Principal of Skyridge High School in Lehi, Utah; Michael Owens and Vance Randall are professors in the Department of Educational Leadership and
Foundations at Brigham Young University; Scott Ferrin is also a professor in Educational Leadership and Foundations, and an adjunct Professor of Law at Brigham Young University; Gordon Gibb
is a retired professor in Counselling, Psychology and Special Education at Brigham Young University.
1 Disabilities Education Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 10, 17, 20, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
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ents choose, for various reasons to not initiate a due process hearing,
however, such hearings constitute one of the few national large scale
data points available to compare service and aide provision patterns.
Provision or denial of one-on-one aides potentially impacts
students’ rights to be educated in the least restrictive environment
(LRE), and potentially impacts what is a free and appropriate public
education (FAPE) for an individual student. First, all students with
disabilities have the right to be educated with nondisabled peers to
the maximum extent appropriate. Second, only when the regular education placement with the use of supplementary aids and services
cannot provide a satisfactory education does the IDEIA allow for a
student with a disability to be educated in another environment.
When a different setting is considered in an IEP, the IDEIA provides a
continuum of settings from least to most restrictive: regular classroom, special classes, special schools, home instruction, and hospital
or institutional instruction. To enable regular classroom placement,
an IEP team may consider parents' request for a one-on-one aide if
this would be the most appropriate and least restrictive for the student—educationally appropriate with the most complete integration.2
Classic court decisions have helped define factors to be
considered in considering LRE. The U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled
on this issue directly, but several U.S. Courts of Appeals' decisions
provide precedent. From Daniel R.R. v. State Board of Ed., 874 F.2d
1036 (1989), the court created the Daniel R.R. test: Can satisfactory
education in a regular education setting be achieved with supplementary aids and services? If satisfactory education cannot be provided and the school removes the student from a regular classroom,
does the school mainstream the child to the maximum extent appropriate?3 Both Greer v. Rome City School District, 950 F.2d 688 (1991),
and Oberti v. Board of Education, 995 F.2d 1204 (1993), applied the
Daniel R.R. criteria; in both cases the courts ruled that the schools
had not provided adequate support services for the students to remain in regular classrooms and had not sufficiently attempted to
modify the regular class curriculum to assist the students.4
Supplementary aids and services may make learning in the
2 Mitchell L. Yell, The Law and Inclusion: Analysis and Commentary, 39(2)
PREVENTING YOUTH FAILURE: ALTERNATIVE EDUC. FOR CHILDREN & YOUTH 45, 45–49 (1995).
3 Id.
4 Id.
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regular education environment possible for students with disabilities.5 These "may include pre-referral interventions, consultation,
behavior management plans, paraprofessionals, itinerant teachers,
resource rooms, assistive technology, staff in-services, or other . . .
support for the student and his or her teachers.” Such assistance
ranges dramatically depending on the students' needs as well as on
the specific IEP teams, school districts, and states.6
An abundance of research asserts that students with learning
disabilities make significant academic and social improvements
when taught by general education teachers with their grade-level
peers in inclusive settings with appropriate support.7 But providing
appropriate support is challenging and can be costly.8
A one-on-one aide is often a paraprofessional assigned to support a single student in a regular education classroom, allowing the
student to receive grade level instruction with special education
support.9 The LRE definition in IDEIA does not indicate that aides
and services should be limited by disability type, but discrepancies
do exist. Researchers in this study were particularly concerned with
unevenness in support between students with easily identifiable disabilities, such as deafness, and those with behavioral challenges.
Students with less visible physical challenges often may not be provided one on one paraprofessional aides. Also differences by state
are significant. Some states consider a one-on-one special education
aide to be a more restrictive environment than a pull-out special ed5 Mitchell L. Yell, Least Restrictive Environment, Inclusion, and Students with Disabilities: A Legal Analysis, 28(4) J. SPECIAL EDUC., 389, 389–404 (1995).
6 Mitchel L. Yell & Antonis Katsiyannis, Placing Students with Disabilities in Inclusive
Settings: Legal Guidelines and Preferred Practice, 49(1) PREVENTING SCHOOL FAILURE:
ALTERNATIVE EDUC. FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH 28, 31 (2004).
7 Patricia J. Rea, Virginia L. McLaughlin, & Chriss Walther-Thomas, Outcomes for Students With Learning Disabilities in Inclusive and Pullout Programs, 68(2) EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN
203, 219 (2002); Henry M. Levin, Financing the Education of At-Risk Students, 11(1) EDUC.
EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 11–34 (1993); Henry M. Levin, Accelerated Schools: A New
Strategy for At-Risk Students, 1 POL’Y BULLETIN 2–4 (1989); Ruth Carol Hawkins, The Impact of
Inclusion on the Achievement of Middle School Students with Mild to Moderate Learning Disabilities (2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Walden University) (available through ProQuest); Cynthia A. Johnson, The Impact of Inclusion on Standardized Test Scores of Learning Support Students
(2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Walden University) (available through ProQuest); But see
Janette Kettmann Klingner, et al., Outcomes for Students With and Without Learning Disabilities in
Inclusive Classrooms, 13(3) LEARNING DISABILITIES RES. & PRAC. 153, 159 (1998).
8Jennifer A. King, Meeting the Educational Need of At-Risk Students: A Cost Analysis of
Three Models, 16(1) EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 1–19 (1994).
9 Lorna Idol, Toward Inclusion of Special Education Students in General Education: A
Program Evaluation of Eight Schools, 27(2) REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC. J. 77 (2006).
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ucation classroom.10 Also some states are more restrictive in education funding, and our observations have found that a special education aide can cost as much as $12,000–$15,000 a year or even more
per student served.
Parents who are dissatisfied with services or support and cannot resolve the matter with the school district have the right to a due
process hearing (DPH), in which an independent hearing officer
(IHO) considers both positions and makes a binding determination
expressed in a written decision. Nichol (2016) described due process
in the actualization of law:
"[Special education] issues that are adjudicated are done mostly at DPHs. This is the venue where case law is determined. DPHs
might be thought of as a trial court for special education.”11 Legal
practitioners and education administrators utilize these decisions to
guide implementation.
The most helpful source in analyzing patterns of hearing decisions regarding one-on-one special education aides for students with
disabilities has been a nationwide database of due process hearings:
Special Ed Connection. Nichol explained,
This database is an extensive collection of DPHs by experts in
the field. . . . These cases represent all circuits in the United States.
There are very few special-education cases that reach circuit courts
and exponentially fewer that reach the United States Supreme
Court.12
As IDEIA indicates that students with disabilities should not be
removed from general education classes unless "education in regular
classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be
achieved satisfactorily (IDEA Pub. L. No. 108-446 at 118 STAT.
2677),13
we anticipated many parent-school due process decisions regarding a one-on-one special education aide. A longstanding precedent exists for IEP teams providing American Sign Language (ASL)
interpreters; however, we theorized, based on experience and a review of literature, that fewer students with other disabilities were
10 John Copenhaver, The Least Restrictive Environment: A Primer for Parents and Educators, MOUNTAIN PLAINS REGIONAL RESOURCE CTR. (2006), https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED498472.
11 Wendy Seiter Nichol, An Analysis of Due Process Hearings Involving Students with
Significant Disabilities in Their Least Restrictive Environment pp. 10–11 (Jun. 1, 2016) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, BYU) (available through ProQuest).
12 Id. at 11.
13 Disabilities Education Improvement Act, supra note 1.
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provided this service, with students with behavioral disabilities
among the least served.
This research endeavored to provide insight on the applications of the broad goals and pu4rposes of the IDEIA at the local levels
by identifying patterns in states' policies, particularly regarding inequities or blind spots in meeting students’ needs. The undergirding
principle of IDEIA is that decisions should be individualized to the
needs of each qualifying student, not bound by preset guidelines or
paradigms that might prevent considering one-on-one aides when
appropriate. We began this research expecting to find patterns in
due process decisions suggesting the difference alluded to above between provision of aides for students such as students with hearing
loss, and students on the spectrum for autism, or with other behavioral disorders. We investigated all relevant due process hearing decisions in 2014 and 2015, looking particularly for state differences
that might reveal conflicts in interpretations and policies.
I. METHODS
A.

Dataset

Our research dataset consisted of the legally binding due process
hearing decisions digitized and uploaded in Special Ed Connection, the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Reporter (IDELR) nationwide database. With the exception of those sealed by the IHO, the database includes the hearing decisions from across the county. A team of
researchers has worked via Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests
to procure and include all decisions of public record from all states and
the District of Columbia. While efforts have been made to ensure that the
database is comprehensive, some decisions are withheld for privacy concerns.
As all data used in the study are in the public domain, identities
did not require protection. This dataset did not reveal whether due process decisions differed across demographic characteristics, although we
recognized possible demographic factors in the parents likely to seek due
process. Parental factors like socioeconomic status, race, ethnicity, education levels, and advocacy support would have potential influence;
however, as these variables were not identified by the data set, they are
outside the scope of this study.
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Procedure

Search process.

The database is available online, searchable with Boolean operators. We conducted our search using multiple terms in the Boolean operator, including variations of one-on-one aides, one-on-one paraeducator, and one-on-one behavioral aides, while seeking to recognize
heteromorphic and homomorphic issues or fallacies raised by the use of
differing terms in due process hearings to find hearings that were on
point no matter the words used. We mined from the database all decisions involving provision of a one-on-one aide, breaking down the search
by one-year increments with an initial timeframe of four years; Table 1
indicates the first list of Boolean search term combinations and the resulting number of decisions identified per year. Anticipating a widely diversified special education vocabulary by state, we consulted with practitioners at school, district, and university levels to review search terms
and add alternatives potentially missed. We expanded the search terms to
ensure that no relevant decisions were overlooked. Table 2 reflects a further expansion of search terms. In the initial search only two decisions
surfaced in a 10-year window for ASL interpreter. We questioned plausibility considering the widespread acceptability of one-on-one ASL interpreters. Including variations of ASL interpreter, we discovered additional
applicable decisions.14
2. Data analysis.
Hearings in the four most recent years showed no major differences by year in number and type, supporting the team decision to use
purposive sampling to limit the dataset to decisions from a two-year period, 2014 and 2015, for a total of 225 due process hearing decisions.
These 225 published decisions ranged from 1 to 69 pages, providing a
total of 3,971 pages for analyses. We read each case for specific and relevant information: year, state, disability, setting, aide requested, provision/denial, school type, LRE issue, and FAPE issue, as well as whether
the aide provision was the central or pivotal issue in the decision and
whether the parents had made the request. These data were compiled in
an Excel spreadsheet, with most categories noted by short definitive titles
(e.g., year, state, disability, setting, LRE, and FAPE).
14 See infra Table 3.
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Disability categories were based on those indicated in the due
process hearing documents. The majority of states classify attentiondeficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) under other health impairment
(OHI). However, several hearing documents categorized students as having ADHD. For accuracy, this study used classifications from the hearing
decisions. Several states (e.g., Hawaii, New York) remove the student's
specific disability and school level from the decision documents leaving
blank spaces; in this study undisclosed was used in those instances. Occasionally if inferences from the service pattern would reveal the type of
disability, the hearing report would use undisclosed for that information.
Many types of inclusion aides exist, and the states designate
them with different terms in the due process hearings. Using these terms
for type and responsibilities of the aide, we categorized the aides as behavior, instruction, safety, medical, ASL, shadow, communication, physical assistance, language, and unspecified.15 Using Excel we sorted and
categorized the data by different variables, then utilized cross tabulation
features to view relationships and identify specific patterns in the data.
II. FINDINGS
We identified four data patterns involving one-on-one aides: (a)
by state, (b) by type of aide and disability; (c) by central issue and disability; and (d) by LRE and FAPE decisions.
A. One-on-One Aides by State
Specific patterns emerged by state in the number of hearing
decisions reported and the number of one-on-one aides provided; 28
states and the District of Columbia were represented in the
timeframe of hearings.16 Cross-referencing the number of due process decisions with the 10 most populous states in 2014 revealed
some intriguing patterns.17 According to the U.S. Census Bureau Report, California and New York were 1st and 4th respectively in population size18 and were highest in number of due process decisions
and one-on-one aides provided. Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Michigan
15 See infra Table 4.
16 See infra Figure 1.
17 See infra Table 5.
18 Florida Passes New York to Become the Nation’s Third Most Populous State, Census
Bureau Reports, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/2014/cb14-232.html.
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(6th, 7th, and 10th most populous)19 demonstrated comparable results with high numbers of both due process decisions and one-onone aides provided. However, Texas, Florida, and Illinois (2nd, 3rd,
and 5th in population respectively)20 were among the lowest in total
number of applicable due process hearings and in one-on-one aides
provided. Texas and Florida combined had only six hearings regarding one-on-one aides and in our findings provided only three one-onone aides. Georgia and North Carolina, despite large populations, had
no due process hearing on provision of a one-on-one aide.
Another data point we considered in this state-by-state analysis was the issue of per pupil expenditure. Maciag demonstrated that
Florida and Texas were 42nd and 44th in the nation in overall education expenditures in 2014;21 these very large states apparently did
not fund education per pupil at the same level as many others.22 Similarly, Georgia, the eighth most populous state, was 38th in per pupil
spending, and North Carolina, ninth most populous, was 45th.23
These populous states’ lesser willingness or ability to fund education
may be associated with the low number of due process hearings to
obtain aides and low number of aides provided.
B.

Types of One-on-One Aides by Disability

Figure 4 breaks down due process hearing decisions both by
type of aide requested and by disability. In the two-year timeframe,
79 hearing decisions responded to a request for a one-on-one aide
for a student with autism—35% of all the decisions in the sample.24
The U.S. Department of Education reported that during 2013–14 only 8.3% of students had been
classified with autism, a striking contrast to the percentage of
decisions focused on students with this disability.25 A behavior aide
was requested in 57 of the 79 due process decisions.
A deeper examination of these decisions reveals further pat19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Mike Maciag, The States That Spend the Most (and the Least) on Education,
GOVERNING (Aug. 2016), https://www.governing.com/topics/education/gov-education-fundingstates.html; see infra Figure 2.
22 See infra Figure 3 for states in descending order.
23 Maciag, supra note 22.
24 See infra Figure 4.
25 Children 3 to 21 Years Old Served Under Individuals with Disability Education Act,
CTR.
EDUC.
STAT.
(2015),
NAT’L
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d15/tables/dt15_204.30.asp?current=yes.
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terns of interest.26 The data in Figure 5 clearly reveal that, contrary
to our presupposition, students with autism received one-on-one
aides notably more often than students with other disabilities in the
hearing decisions, predominantly for behavior support.27 We expected to find limited provision of one-on-one aides to support behavior, but students in many disability categories have received this
aid.
One-on-one support for students who are deaf was also of particular interest. The dataset contained only nine hearings seeking a
one-on-one ASL interpreter, and in all decisions the aide was provided. The low number of due process hearings for students with deafness and the high provision rate may reflect wide general acceptance
of this support for such students, perhaps giving credence to an inverse relationship between accepted practice and requests through
due process hearings.
Tables 6 and 7 illustrate provision percentages for one-on-one
aides by type of aide support. During 2014 and 2015 one-on-one
aides were provided for 100% of ASL needs, 79% of safety needs,
70% of behavior requests, and 65% of instructional assistants desired.28
C.

One-on-One Aide as Central Issue by Disability

One of the categories explored in this study was central issue,
the categorization given decisions for which the chief complaint
brought to the hearing officer was specifically concerned with provision of a one-on-one aide to provide FAPE and/or place the student
in the LRE. Many decisions in this timeframe referenced provision of
one-on-one aides, but central issue decisions involved parents having requested a one-on-one aide and the school or school district
having disputed the provision. Table 8 represents the findings for
central issue decisions sorted by disability. Discounting the areas
with too few decisions, the disabilities of focus were autism, deafness, emotional disability, and multiple disabilities—those categories with the highest numbers of case references and of decisions
providing one-on-one aides. As mentioned, nearly one third of the

26 See infra Figure 5.
27 Id.
28 See infra Tables 6–7.
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total central issue decisions and the number of aides provided were
for autism; in 55% of such decisions the one-on-one aide was provided.29 For students with multiple disabilities, the provision rate in
central issue decisions was much higher—of the 13 decisions, the
aide was provided eight times (62%).30 The aide was provided in all
seven central issue decisions involving students who were deaf; in
contrast, in the seven central issue decisions for students classified
with an emotional disturbance only three were awarded a one-onone aide.
Table 8 portrays the contrast of ASL interpreters being provided in 100% of cases while behavior aides were provided in only
55% of decisions for students with autism and 43% of decisions for
students with emotional disturbance.31
D.

Decisions of LRE and FAPE

All the due process hearings in this study were based on denial of FAPE, and 76 of them also cited denial of LRE—challenging a
students' class or service placement.32 Significant overlap in the decisions of dual complaints became a confounding variable requiring
that these be counted as both LRE and FAPE decisions.
In the LRE decisions, aides were provided in 29 of the 76 hearings for students with autism.33 These 29 (38%) were parent requests for a one-on-one aide to serve their students in settings they
deemed less restrictive than the IEP team's placement.34 The decisions provided the aide for 62%.35 Emotional disturbance and multiple disabilities, the others having substantial provisions (with caseloads of more than six decisions), showed similar patterns of
provision.36 Provision rates were 75% for emotional disturbance and
71% for multiple disabilities.37 Clearly in due process decisions, IHOs
tended to provide one-on-one aides when LRE was challenged. As
FAPE was the central issue in all 225 decisions, the number of FAPE
decisions equals the total number of decisions; thus analysis and pat29 See infra Table 8.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 See infra Table 9.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
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terns for FAPE decisions are consistent with the previous findings.
Comparison of the FAPE and LRE decisions by provision rates
demonstrated further patterns.38 The provision rate for FAPE decisions was 72%, compared to 66% for LRE. The parity between LRE
provision rate and FAPE provision rate suggests that the outcome of
the decision does not vary distinctly by the type of complaint served
by the hearing.
III. DISCUSSION
The decisions made in the due process hearings analyzed in
this study have shown discrepancies in how needs of students with
disabilities are being met through IEPs. Patterns in IEP team and due
process decisions appear less individualized than the IDEIA language
asserts.
Inclusion done correctly has been highly effective.39 One-onone aides can make inclusion possible for students with disabilities;
IEP teams should include this resource among the appropriate aids
and services provided to support inclusion to the maximum extent
appropriate.40
A. Limitations
This research was intended to identify patterns and draw
broad conclusions in decisions of due process hearings. Several limiting factors warrant consideration. Size of the sample was limited
by the brief two-year timeframe and the number of hearings in the
database. Also examining due process hearings tempts researchers
to make broad and unqualified generalizations about special education needs and practices. Low numbers of hearings and low provision rates from hearings were difficult to interpret: Were one-onone aides provided in a state or for a disability sufficiently such that
parents in that state did not generally feel a high need to seek due
process, or did parents accept low provision rates because of their
prevalence? Our data were insufficient for definite conclusions on
such questions.

38 Id.
39 See supra note 8.
40 Yell, supra note 6.
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Another limitation has been potential for bias. The first author
is a school administrator who has spent years struggling to meet individualized needs of students with disabilities, and is the father of a
student with behavioral disabilities. Other members of the research
team have given continual feedback to balance project objectivity.
B.

Implications for practitioners.

These findings indicate that some students with disabilities
across the country are receiving support from one-on-one aides at a
relatively high rate, while in some states one-on-one aides are rarely
utilized and, as Copenhaver illustrated, often interpreted as a more
restrictive environment than a pull-out class.41 Vast differences of
provision and understanding among states suggest the need for a
critical reevaluation of the benefits of one-on-one aides and their
place on the continuum of services, going beyond widely-recognized
physical disabilities to include students needing behavioral support
in an inclusion setting. IEP teams may use findings such as these to
suggest that they should fully consider whether a student with emotional disturbance or autism could access grade level curriculum in
the regular classroom with a one-on-one behavioral aide. Our findings showed students with these classifications received with this
support in more than 70% of hearings. We recommend that teams
supporting student success consider one-on-one aides for students
in such classifications rather than simply default to pull-out specialty
classes.
C. Implications for future research.
Further studies into state differences in providing one-on-one
aides for various disabilities could include connections with perpupil spending. Additional research is also needed to determine why
such a high percentage of due process decisions regarding one-onone aides involve students with autism compared to the low percentage of students with autism in the school population, perhaps
also comparing percentages of students who qualify for any services
due to autism.
A review of data beyond the due process hearings would help
41 Copenhaver, supra note 10.
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in discovering if students whose disabilities are more visible receive
more appropriate services than students whose disabilities are less
apparent, with serious implications for appropriateness and equity.
School level might also receive consideration.
IV.CONCLUSIONS
The critical finding of these data is that, despite significant differences among states, one-on-one aides are being provided with
greater frequency than anticipated for students with a variety of disabilities, and that autism is the most represented disability in due
process hearings seeking and receiving behavioral aides. Disabilities
such as hearing impairment (with 100% provision) have higher
rates than autism or behavioral disabilities.
Significant patterns emerged in this study regarding differences among states in funding levels and resource allocation. We've
had difficulty discerning whether the small numbers of decisions regarding aides in some states is due to high or low provision
statewide. Perhaps this is the reason inclusion with a one-on-one
aide is considered by some as a more restrictive setting than a pullout class. Further research might begin at this point. Differences also
exist among disabilities: ASL interpreters were provided by 100% of
the hearings in this study, while behavioral aides were provided by
53% for students with autism and 43% for students with emotional
disturbance—a notable contrast between highly visible and less visible disabilities. The patterns in this data, based on a large national
sample, seem to suggest differential provision of one-on-one aides
based on the type of disability presented, rather than based on an
individualized determination in each student’s case. While the patterns seem suggestive, additional research is needed to make meaning from such patterns of provision for one-on-one aides based on
disability type.
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Sexual Education as a Form of Sexual Assault
Prevention: A Survey of Sexual Education Among
States with the Highest and Lowest Rates of Rape
Brittney Herman

INTRODUCTION
Our Nation overwhelmingly supports sexual education in public schools.1 A study by Siecus found that 98% of people surveyed support sexual education in public high schools and 89% in public middle
schools.2 Unfortunately for some students, they will receive no sexual
education of very limited, ineffective sexual education, simply because of where they live.3 Even if a student is fortunate to live in an
area which has or requires sexual education, this education may be
insufficient.4
There have been countless advocates for sexual education.5
With the rise of each new sexual education concern, advocates emerge
as if in waves. Most recently the sexual education debate examines
whether to include curriculum regarding varying sexual preferences.6
1 Zach Eisenstein, Survey says (again): People overwhelmingly support sex ed, SIECUSNEWS AND UPDATES (2019), https://siecus.org/survey-says-people-support-sex-ed/.
2 Id.
3 Planned Parenthood, What’s the State of Sex Education in the U.S.?, FOR EDUCATORS
(2019),
https://www.plannedparenthood.org/learn/for-educators/whats-state-sex-education-us.
4 Id.
5 See Collin Rosenbaum, The Pornography Public Health Crisis: Using a Holistic Approach
to Protect Citizen’s Welfare, 26 ANN. HEALTH L. ADVANCE DIRECTIVE 104, 104, (2017) (arguing in
part that improved sexual education would reduce use of pornography among young adults);
Erica Woebse, Eating Hot Peppers to Avoid HIV/AIDS: New Challenges to Failing Abstinence-Only
Programs, 20 Wm. & Mary J, of Women & L. 709, 716 (2014) (stating issues regarding to abstinence-only education and advocating for the evolution of such education); James McGrath, Abstinence-Only Adolescent Education: Ineffective, Unpopular, and Unconstitutional, 38 U.S.F. L. Rev.
665, 671 (2004) (arguing that abstinence-only education is not an appropriate choice for public
education).
6 See, e.g., Sarahh Camille Conrey, Hey, What About Me?: Why Sexual Education Classes
Shouldn’t Keep Ignoring LGBTQ Students, 23 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 85 (2012).
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In the early 2000’s, the concern was teen pregnancy.7 The 1990’s held
the question of whether there should be sexual education programs
in public schools.8 The hot topic of the 1980’ was raising awareness of
STDs and HIV’s.9
Today, there is a nation-wide sexual assault crisis.10 One study
indicates that one in five women will be sexually assaulted.11 The
#MeToo movement has brought attention to this epidemic. I posit that
public education curriculum on health and sexual education plays or
could potentially play a huge role in these numbers. This subject has
not been widely discussed, and this paper is the first which will survey
the sexual education standards specifically in those states which have
the highest or lowest rate of rape. The goal of this paper is to simply
display those concepts used by the top five states and the lowest five
states so policymakers may observe these policies and decide what
they would like to try for their state. The goal of this essay is not to
conduct a national survey of every state, but rather examine general
sexual education concepts used by those states with the five highest
and five lowest rates of rape for policy consideration.
In Part One of this article I will briefly examine the data regarding the rates of rape in various states, which will be the states I use in
Part Two. In Part Two I will examine the National Health Education
Standards as well as the states analyzed in Part One. Finally, in Part
Three, I will examine additional factors which could contribute to the
rates of rape in various states. In addition to the sexual education
standards, other factors will be discussed which may also affect the
rate of rape in a state.
7 Rebecca Wind, Following Decade-Long Decline, U.S. Teen Pregnancy Rate Increases as
Both Birth and Abortions Rise, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE- NEWS RELEASE (Jan. 26, 2010),
https://www.guttmacher.org/news-release/2010/following-decade-long-decline-us-teenpregnancy-rate-increases-both-births-and
8 https://www.plannedparenthood.org/uploads/filer_public/da/67/da67fd5d-631d438a-85e8-a446d90fd1e3/20170209_sexed_d04_1.pdf
9 Michael Reiss, A Brief History of Sex Education, HEALTH, SPORTS, & PSYCHOLOGY (Sept. 16th,
2005),
https://www.open.edu/openlearn/body-mind/health/health-studies/brief-historysex-education.
10 National Sexual Violence Resource Center, Statistics About Sexual Violence, NATIONAL
SEXUAL VIOLENCE RESOURCE CENTER: INFO & STATS FOR JOURNALISTS (2015)
https://www.nsvrc.org/sites/default/files/publications_nsvrc_factsheet_media-packet_statistics-about-sexual-violence_0.pdf.
11 Id. It is critical however, to note that this study relies only on the reported assaults. In
my nuclear family of five women, only one woman has not been sexually assaulted (that I know
of), and I have been the only one of the four women assaulted to officially report the incident to
law enforcement.
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I. RATES OF RAPE AMONG STATES
The following graph uses FBI crime reporting statistics in order
to determine which states experience the highest rate of rapes per
100,000 people. Rape was chosen as it is the most extreme form of
sexual assault, and as the FBI has multiple definitions of sexual assault
and only one definition of rape.12
The states chosen for this study are; Alaska, Michigan, South Dakota, Colorado, Arkansas, Maryland, North Carolina, Georgia, Connecticut, and New Jersey. These states were chosen because they are the
states with the five highest and five lowest rates of rape per 100,000
people.13 The middle black line on the graph is a representation of the
national average rate of rape over time. All of the aforementioned
states are consistently very distant from the national average, however, those states with the lower rate of rape are increasing in distance from that national average with fewer and fewer rapes per
100,000 people.14 Alaska is also moving further away from the average, but Alaska’s rate of rape is significantly increasing. The states
with the highest rate of rape in 2017 are, from highest to lowest,
Alaska, Michigan, South Dakota, Colorado, and Arkansas.15 The states
with the lowest rate are, again from highest to lowest, Maryland,
North Carolina, Georgia, Connecticut, and New Jersey.16
These therefore are the states which will be examined below
regarding their sexual education standards. While the states with the
highest and lowest rates of rape vary over time, these are states which
have most consistently held spots in the top or bottom five rates of
rape.17
II. STATE EDUCATION STANDARDS
12 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Law Enforcement Support Section, Crime Statistics
Management Unit, Reporting Rape in 2013 Revised, CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES
DIVISION (Apr. 9. 2014), https://ucr.fbi.gov/recent-program-updates/reporting-rape-in-2013revised; Bureau of Justice Statistics, Rape and Sexual Assault, VIOLENT CRIME,
HTTPS://WWW.BJS.GOV/INDEX.CFM?TY=TP&TID=317.
13 The information from which these rates of rape were found is available for various
years at https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
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The effect of sexual education on sexual violence is not widely
discussed and within these limited discussions the link has not been
made so clear that policymakers have taken significant action based
on the assertions of such discussions. However, many of those who
examine this subject area conclude that “[s]ensitising children, parents, teachers, police and local communities to the nature and extent
of sexual violence, and giving permission to discuss it, are essential
steps in tackling it.”18 Studies have suggested that key ideas to the prevention of sexual violence are expressed as coercion, consent, sexual
abuse and gender-based violence, such as dating violence, as a violation of human rights, the responsibility to report sexual abuse and
gender-based violence, where one might go for support of genderbased violence, and the responsibility of all people to advocate for
gender equality and against human right violations like sexual abuse
and gender-based violence.19 Additionally, in order to mitigate the
harmful effects of sexual assault, these studies recommend that programs include what sexual abuse and violence are and what to do
about them, including accessing support should one be assaulted.20
Therefore, as a states teach a wide variety of sexual education topics,
this paper will primarily focus on these sexuality education concepts.

18 Peter Gordon, Sexuality Education and the Prevention of Sexual Assault, in 13
PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE—A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH 175 (2011),
https://www.coe.int/t/dg3/children/1in5/Source/PublicationSexualViolence/Gordon.pdf.
19 Id. at 181.
20 Id. at 184.
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III. THE NATIONAL SEXUALITY EDUCATION STANDARDS
The federal government provides standards of effective sexual
education called the National Health Education Standards.21 In the introduction to these standards, the federal government provides a rationale for sexual education in public schools. 22 This rationale observes that “teen relationship violence continues to be a pressing
problem . . . ten percent of teens are physically harmed by their boyfriend or girlfriend in a given year.”23
The National Health Education Standards serves as a guideline
for standards a state may adopt.24 Much like the common core
adopted by many states, this framework is optional.25 The document
notes that health education has been found to have a positive overall
effect on academic outcomes.26 The federal government has explicitly
stated that “[g]iven the evidence that connects lower risk behaviors
to academic success, schools clearly have as vested an interest in
keeping students healthy . . . [i]n providing comprehensive sexuality
education programs, schools support student health and as such further foster young people’s academic achievement.”27
These standards include instruction regarding rape, sexual assault, sexual abuse, sexual harassment, sexual violence, consent, refusal skills, and coercion.28 According to the National Standards, these
are “essential minimum, core content for sexuality education,” yet
many states still do not include these basic concepts.29
The federal government did not always hold this position.30
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 7 (referring to both physical and sexual violence).
24 National Sexuality Education Standards: Core Content and Skills, K-12 [a special publication of the Journal of School Health], FUTURE OF SEX EDUC. 6 (2011), http://www.futureofsexeducationorg/documents/josh-fose-standards-web.pdf.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 7.
27 Id. at 6.
28 National Sexuality Education Standards, supra note 24, at 19.
29 Id. at 6 In addition to sexual education standards, the National Health Education Standards also provides a reference glossary. The glossary includes the definitions of “comprehensive
sexuality education,” “consensual,” “dating violence,” “rape” “sexual abuse,” “sexual assault,” and
“sexual harassment.” Id. at 39–40; see The SIECUS State Profiles Fiscal Year 2018, SIECUS (2019),
https://siecus.org/state-profiles-2018/.
30 History of Sex Education, FUTURE OF SEX EDUCATION, http://www.futureofsexed.org/background.html.
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Less than a decade ago, abstinence-only education was not only encouraged, but government-funded.31 Sexual education develops
quickly over time as sex education has been subject to social trends,
public health concerns, politics and various controversies.32 Prior to
1900, there was virtually no public school sexual education.33 However, with the sexual revolution in the 1920’s there came the considerations of the federal and state government involvement with sexual
matters.34 “Societal diseases” such as gonorrhea, syphilis, and other
venereal diseases lead to increased government involvement.35
Many individuals believed schools to be the best place to address society’s ills.36 This idea of addressing sexually-related societal
ills in schools grew in the 1980’s as the AIDS epidemic arose.37 By the
end of the 1980’s twenty-three state legislatures passed mandates for
sexuality education, while another twenty-three strongly encouraged
schools to teach sexuality education.38
The peak of this growth era of sexuality education was in 1989
when SIECUS published “Sex Education 2000: A Call to Action.” Siecus,
the only national organization dedicated only to comprehensive sexual education, outlined what comprehensive, effective sexuality education would need to accomplish to ensure children received proper
sexual education by the year 2000.39 At that time, the Surgeon General, the National Academy of Sciences, and the Department of Health
and Human Services all urged the implementation of sexual education
in public schools.40
Until the mid-90’s, abstinence-only education was the standard
program.41 The federal government created the Adolescent Family
Life Act under President Reagan “to promote self-discipline and other
prudent approaches to the problem of adolescent premarital sexual

31 See Valerie J. Huber & Michael W. Firmin, A History of Sex Education in the United States
Since 1900, 23 I NT’L J. OF EDUC. REFORM 25 (Jan. 29, 2014).
32 History of Sex Education, supra note 30.
33 Huber & Firmin, supra note 31, at 44.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.; Huber & Firmin, supra note 31, at 43.
40 History of Sex Education, supra note 30.
41 Id.
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relations” and create federal funding for states using abstinence-only
curriculum for sexuality education. 42 This encouraged states which
didn’t have abstinence-only education, including those states with
comparatively comprehensive sexuality education, to begin abstinence-only programs.43 In 1996 Clinton signed into the Welfare Reform Act which had a ride-on provision increasing federal abstinence
education funding.44
The George W. Bush campaign promised to fund both abstinence-only and comprehensive sexual education.45 While Bush did
support both, eventually comprehensive sexual education became
more popular.46 After Bush, Obama supported comprehensive sexual
education and moved to eliminate all funds previously devoted to abstinence- only programs.47 While he was not entirely successful, many
states have now moved away from abstinence-only education.48 Further examination of individual states displays what the results of state
choices regarding education may be.
IV. SURVEYED CONCEPTS
Those concepts which will be surveyed among the chosen those
aforementioned concepts recommended by the National Health Education Standards. Namely, consent, coercion, and refusal skills. Further, whether students must opt in to sexual education or have the
option to opt out of the education will be considered. Opting into sexual education means that a student or their parent must affirmatively
give consent to the school in order for the student to receive sexual
education instruction. Opting out of sexual education means that the
student or parent must affirmatively act to tell the school the student
shall not be instructed in sexual education. It is critical to note that
even if traits in curriculum are shared by the states with the highest
rate or lowest rate of rape, this does not prove correlation or causation. There are countless factors which could play into the rate of rape
42 Huber & Firmin, supra note 31, at 42 (quoting Robert Pear, Treating the Nation’s Epidemic of Teen-age Pregnancy, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 1984)).
43 Id. at 41
44 Id.
45 Id. at 42.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 43.
48 Guttmacher Institute, Sex and HIV Education, STATE LAWS AND POLICIES (August 1, 2019),
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/sex-and-hiv-education.
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in a state, sexual education simply could be one of them. Rather, the
examination of these gross features of these state’s sexual education
curriculum should allow policymakers another consideration when
developing their system of sexual education.
V. A SURVEY OF THE HIGHEST FIVE STATES
The five states with the highest rate of rape are Alaska, Michigan. Colorado, South Dakota, and Arkansas.49 Alaska’s rate is by far the
highest, occurring 116.7 times per 100,000 persons.50 Michigan is in
second place with 70.6, a number that pales in comparison to Alaska’s
alarming rate.51 These states are also the states that do not have a formal sexual education graduation requirement in public schools.52 Unfortunately, it is extremely easy to analyze the sexual education standards or these states because most of the time, there isn’t any.
A.

Alaska

Prior to this year, Alaska’s sexual education laws and policies
were minimal and ineffective.53 School districts were “encouraged” to
initiate and conduct a health program for students.54 If a school district did have health education, the state suggested this program include the prevention of child abuse, but had no law or regulation regarding sexual health education.55 Further, Alaska schools are
notoriously underfunded and the funding formula for Alaska schools

49 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Law Enforcement Support Section, Crime Statistics
Management Unit, Reporting Rape in 2013 Revised, CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION
SERVICES DIVISION (April 9. 2014), https://ucr.fbi.gov/recent-program-updates/reportingrape-in-2013-revised; Bureau of Justice Statistics, Rape and Sexual Assault, VIOLENT CRIME,
HTTPS://WWW.BJS.GOV/INDEX.CFM?TY=TP&TID=317.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 SIECUS 2018, supra note 29.
53 See Anchorage Daily News Editorial Board, Alaska Overdue for a Better, Standardized
Sex
Education
Curriculum,
ANCHORAGE
DAILY
NEWS
(August
18,
2018),
https://www.adn.com/opinions/editorials/2018/08/18/alaska-overdue-for-a-better-standardized-sex-education-curriculum/.
54 SIECUS, Alaska, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2017 (2018), https://siecus.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ALASKA-FY17-FINAL.pdf.
55 Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Alaska Summary Report, ANALYSIS OF STATE
HEALTH EDUCATION LAWS (Dec. 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/about/pdf/summary_report_factsheets/Alaska.pdf. SIECUS, Alaska, supra note 54.
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did not provide any additional funding or other incentives for schools
to expend resources on these programs.56 While in 1998, one survey
found that health courses were indeed held in 91% of Alaska public
schools, this survey failed to measure how much of this course was
dedicated to sexual education, if any.57
Prior to 2018, the biggest change in Alaska standards was in
2004 when Alaska introduced the Alaska Content Standards, Skills for
a Healthy Life.58 These skills required students learn about the physical sexual development of an individual, personal roles, how to respect others, and how to create safe and healthy environment.59 While
some districts may have followed these standards in a manner sufficient to produce a comparatively comprehensive sexuality education
program, the standards are so broad that there is unclear whether students had to learn about sexual abuse, sexual assault, consent, coercion, refusal skills, dating violence, or other critical sexual-assault prevention techniques.60
However, legislation passed in 2018 brought some of these
needed concepts to Alaska public schools. 61 Alaska now requires the
governing body of each school district to adopt a program of training
for faculty, staff, and students, regarding sexual abuse and assault
awareness.62 Alaska Governor Mike Dunleavy wrote regarding these
changes to K-12 changes, “I’m confident that, together, we will secure
for them a safer and more prosperous Alaska.”63 The program must
be age-appropriate and address warning signs of sexual abuse of a
child, referral and resource information, available student counseling
and educational support, methods for increasing awareness of others
regarding sexual abuse, actions to prevent or report sexual abuse or
56 Elizabeth Nudelman, Alaska Public School Finding Formula Overview, A LASKA DEP’T OF
EDUC. AND EARLY DEVELOPMENT (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_documents.asp?session=28&docid=89; Nathaniel Herz, Here’s What Flat Funding Has Meant for
Alaska School, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS-Education (Feb. 25, 2018), https://www.adn.com/alaskanews/education/2018/02/25/heres-what-three-years-of-flat-funding-has-meant-for-alaskaschools/.
57 Id.
58 SIECUS, Alaska, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2004 (2005), https://siecus.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Alaska04.pdf.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 ALASKA STAT. §14.30.352
62 Id.
63 Michael J. Dunleavy, Time for a conversation about the Alaska we want, A NCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS
https://www.adn.com/opinions/2020/01/04/time-for-a-conversation-about-thealaska-we-want/
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assault.64 This program is an opt-out program.65 One important note
is that this training only says what must be included, and does not
limit the presenter of the program to provide additional information
where the required curriculum for the program may be lacking.66
Also passed in 2018 is an Alaska law now requiring a school
program regarding teen dating violence.67 This program must provide
training to both employees and students and give parental notification.68 The training must be age-appropriate and include the warning
signs of dating violence and abusive behavior, characteristics of
healthy relationships, measures to prevent and stop dating violence
and abuse, and community resources available to victims of dating violence and abuse.69 This also is an opt-out program.70 Again, it is important to note that this program does not limit the instructor only to
the aforementioned concepts, but rather sets the minimum for instruction.71
Given Alaska’s extremely high sexual assault rates in the recent
years, Alaskan officials agreed action was needed.72 It will likely take
time before any benefits of the new Alaskan laws are evident, if there
are any benefits at all. There are issues with the new program. The
state does not give any instruction regarding the length of either the
sexual assault or teen dating violence programs.73 Such a program
could range from single hour-long presentation, to a series of presentations over time. If such a program is brief, a student could easily or
unintentionally miss the presentation day at school. With a brief
presentation, even take a bathroom break could result in a student
missing a significant amount of the information. Alaska should provide additional guidance regarding the program.
Further, because there is no class and the program does not
have to be graded, there is no accountability for students and no practical way to determine whether students have retained the
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 ALASKA STAT. §14.30.356
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Dunleavy, supra note 63.
73 ALASKA STAT. §§ 14.30.352, 14.30.356.
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information. These concepts could be added to Alaska’s Content and
Education Standards which still do not the new program concepts.74
An Alaska student is still not accountable for any more information
than human sexual development information, if the student even
takes a health class.75
B.

Michigan

For over a decade Michigan has required instruction regarding
STDs and HIV/AID.76 During such instruction, abstinence must be
stressed.77 Parents are able to opt students out of the disease prevention education or any part of sexuality instruction.78 Michigan law explicitly states that health and sexuality classes cannot be a requirement for graduation.79 Since as early as 2003, school boards were
allowed to develop sexual education curriculum which could, and was
limited to covering family planning, human sexuality, and family life
education.80 This curriculum had to be reviewed by a board consisting
of parents, students, educators, clergy, and health professionals.81
This may seem outdated, but today, these laws have not changed.82
Because sexual education laws in Michigan have not changed
for nearly twenty years, Michigan communities are taking notice.83
Local churches are offering sexual education courses for students.84
At one church, these programs cover comprehensive sexual education
74 Skills for a Healthy Life, ALASKA CONTENT STANDARDS (2019), https://education.alaska.gov/akstandards/Skills-for-Healthy-Life.pdf
75 Id.
76 SIECUS, Michigan, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2003 (2004), https://siecus.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Michigan-for-2003-web.pdf.
77 Id.
78 SIECUS, Michigan, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2017 (2018), https://siecus.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/MICHIGAN-FY17-FINAL-New.pdf.
79 SIECUS, Michigan, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2012 (2013), https://siecus.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Michigan-Summary-FINAL-2012.pdf; SIECUS, Michigan, STATE PROFILES
FISCAL YEAR 2017 (2018), https://siecus.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/MICHIGAN-FY17FINAL-New.pdf.
80 SIECUS, Michigan, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2003 (2004), https://siecus.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Michigan-for-2003-web.pdf.
81 Id.
82 MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 380.1169–.1170, 380.1506–.1507, and 388.1766–.1766a
83 Id.; Patti Brandt Burgess, Let’s Talk About Sex: Local Church Offers Sex Ed for Young
Teens, TRAVERSE CITY RECORD EAGLE (Aug. 4, 2019), https://www.record-eagle.com/news/body_and_soul/let-s-talk-about-sex-local-church-offers-sex-ed/article_a5343298-b3ad-11e9-9a5c-87393cd2b2e9.html
84 Id.
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topics such as self-worth, gender, consent, and seemingly progressive
topics.85 This program is offered for children who would be public
middle-school aged, 7th to 9th graders.86 These education courses are
well-attended and participation is encouraged.87 Yet, even the least
progressive of the concepts taught at these churches have not reached
public schools.88
Some community leaders remark, “Boys and girls sit in separate
classrooms watching videos about the reproductive system, maybe
getting handouts of free deodorant or tampons. Throw in a lesson that
abstinence is the safest form of sex, and that’s often the extent of it.”89
Those school districts which wish to move beyond current education
programs sometimes do so secretly without telling upper administration.90 Further, Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA) says
sexual assault and domestic violence “remains a little-discussed
topic,” in Michigan schools, despite the fact that Michigan has the second-highest rate of rape in the country for 2017.91 The YWCA also offers education meant to prevent sexual assault and domestic violence.92 In a further effort to prevent sexual violence, many advocacy
groups are working to revolutionize Michigan as one of the first few
states requiring sexual education regarding consent, which helps students know whether they have been sexually assaulted and something that can help them from sexually assaulting someone else.93
The Michigan Department of Education unofficially stated that

85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 SIECUS, MIchigan, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2012 (2013), https://siecus.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Michigan-Summary-FINAL-2012.pdf; SIECUS, Michigan, STATE PROFILES
FISCAL YEAR 2017 (2018), https://siecus.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/MICHIGAN-FY17FINAL-New.pdf.
89 Andy Balaskovitz, Teach the Children Well: Comprehensive Sex Education Advocates
Face Uphill Climb to Change West Michigan Culture, REVENUE (Feb. 21, 2019), https://revuewm.com/features/news/item/4365-teach-the-children-well-comprehensive-sex-education-advocates-face-uphill-climb-to-change-west-michigan-culture.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Jessica Wheeler, Michigan is One of 42 States that Doesn’t Teach Consent as Part of Sexual Education, WEST MICHIGAN (Oct. 2, 2018), https://wwmt.com/news/local/michigan-one-of42-states-that-dont-teach-consent-as-part-of-sex-ed; Planned Parenthood, Sexual Consent, SEX
AND RELATIONSHIPS (2019), https://www.plannedparenthood.org/learn/sex-and-relationships/sexual-consent.
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sex education is not required in public schools because it is up to the
school district, but districts which offer sexual education must teach
it is wrong to take advantage of, harass or exploit another person sexually, and encourage respect for self and others, and provide instruction on healthy dating relationships.94 However, school administrators and officials still complain that it is unclear whether certain kinds
of relationship education and sexual assault education requires state
approval.95 Michigan educators complain these rules need clarification and some subjects should be required. 96 One educator writes,
“this is just basic stuff, like ‘[students] deserve to be respected.”97
Rather than state-funding sexual education programs, all funding comes from districts.98 Which, like Alaska, creates very little incentive for districts to begin any program at all. Some funding has recently been made available for use over the next five years by the CDC
for multiple districts.99 Without this outside funding, Michigan
schools have little to no incentive or resources to develop sexuality
education programs.100 Currently, there is no indication that Michigan
has any intention to change their sexual education laws.101 Michigan
is one of the few states to have failed to change any official aspect of
sexuality education in two decades.102
C.

Colorado

Nearly twenty years ago Colorado school districts were able to
decide whether to teach sexual education in public schools, subject to
guidelines provided by the Colorado Department of Education.103
94 Wheeler, supra note 93.
95 Balaskovitz, supra note 89.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 David Andrews, CDC GIces Big Bucks to Mid-Michigan Sex. Ed Program, WILX 10 (Dec.
6, 2018), https://www.wilx.com/content/news/CDC-gives-big-bucks-to-Mid-michigan-sex-edprogram-502101991.html.
99 Id.
100 Justin Dawes, Study Finds Michigan Schools Underfunded, GRBJ (Feb. 9, 2019),
https://www.grbj.com/articles/89977-study-finds-michigan-schools-underfunded
101 SIECUS, MIchigan, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2012 (2013), https://siecus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/Michigan-Summary-FINAL-2012.pdf; SIECUS, Michigan, STATE
PROFILES
FISCAL
YEAR
2017
(2018),
https://siecus.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/MICHIGAN-FY17-FINAL-New.pdf.
102 See infra, part one.
103 SIECUS, Colorado, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2003 (2004), https://siecus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/Colorado-for-2003-web.pdf; Colorado statute §22-25-104.
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Abstinence was to be emphasized.104 If the school did not receive state
funding for their sexual education program, parents were able to opt
their child out of any sexual education program.105 If a school received
state funding, sexuality education programs had to be opt-in, where
parents have the opportunity to review curriculum and must provide
consent to allow their student to take part in the curriculum.106
In 2006 the sexual education laws in Colorado changed to say
that sexual education programs should include information that was
science-based, age-appropriate, culturally sensitive, and medically accurate.107 Again, in 2009, standards changed to ensure students could
“[a]ccess valid information and resources that provide information
about sexual assault and violence, analyze situations that could lead
to violence and acquaintance rape, and to whom one could confide regarding a sexual assault.108 This was a great victory for sexual assault
prevention in Colorado. However, it is still important to recognize that
this change only affects a student if a school decides to offer sexual
education, if a student chooses to take sexual education, and if the
school chooses to follow a program which will provide them with
state funding.
In 2013, the state legislature created a grant program which explicitly required all state-funded sexuality education to adhere to the
above-mentioned requirements of sexuality education that is sciencebased, age-appropriate, culturally sensitive, and medically accurate.109 Further, this grant program stated that if accepting state
funds, the curriculum, among other concepts, must instruct regarding
personal power, boundary setting, and resisting peer pressure, along
with the aforementioned sexual assault and violence information.110
This curriculum is opt-in and not a requirement for graduation.111
This is the same law today, with the exception of an August 2019 bill
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 SIECUS, Michigan, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2006 (2007), https://siecus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/COLORADO06.pdf.
108 CDE, Comprehensive Health, COLORADO ACADEMIC STANDARDS (Dec. 10, 2009),
https://www.cde.state.co.us/sites/default/files/documents/cohealthpe/documents/health/health_high_school.pdf.
109 SIECUS, Colorado, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2018 (2019), https://siecus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/03/Colorado-FY18-Final-1.pdf.
110 Id.
111 Id.
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which now requires any sexual education, regardless of funding, to be
medically accurate.112 The state does not keep track of how many
schools teach sexual education.113
Colorado is trying to do more, but is facing difficulty.114 A bill
recently failed and faced great community opposition.115 The bill
would consent, removes a charter school waiver out of sexual education requirements, and funds a grant program for schools that want
to teach sexual education but lack the resources.116 Over the past two
decades, there have been changes to Colorado sexuality education
standards.117 This could indicate that more changes will come.
D.

South Dakota

In 2003 South Dakota did not require sexuality education in
public schools, leaving such decisions up to local school boards. 118
Schools were only required to teach character development which included sexual abstinence.119 Today, sexual education is still not required, but the state suggests public schools conform their educational standards to those established by the Board of Education.120
These standards include instruction on sexuality, but only as an

112 SIECUS, Colorado, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2018 (2019), https://siecus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/03/Colorado-FY18-Final-1.pdf; Keren Landman, How #MeToo Is Changing Sex Ed Policies- Even in Red States, KISER HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 12, 2019),
https://khn.org/news/how-metoo-is-changing-sex-ed-policies-even-in-red-states/.
113 Id.
114 Caitlin Curley, Which 4 Colorado Dems are Facing Recall Attempts, COLORADO POLITICS
(Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.coloradopolitics.com/quick-hits/which-colorado-dems-are-facing-recall-attempts/article_4191c2e2-c40f-11e9-b4bb-3baf7a501c7c.html. As of August 2019,
Democrats in Colorado are facing recall over the support of new bills including one which would
expand sexual education in public schools. The new bill causing this facing of recall is Colorado
House Bill 19-1032.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Yesenia Robles, Colorado Changes its Laws Around Sex Ed. Here’s What You Need to
Know, COLORADO SUN (May 22, 2019), https://coloradosun.com/2019/05/22/colorado-sex-edlaw-explained/; Anna Staver, Colorado Sex Education Bill: Separating Fact from Fiction, DENVER
POST (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.denverpost.com/2019/02/27/colorado-sex-ed-bill-fact-fiction/; Nic Garcia, Stalled Sex Ed Bill Moves Forward in Colorado- with Changes, COLORADO
LEGISLATURE- COLORADO POST (May 2, 2019), https://www.denverpost.com/2019/05/02/sexed-bill-moves-forward-in-colorado-senate-with-changes/.
118 SIECUS, Colorado, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2003 (2004), https://siecus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/South-Dakota-for-2003-web.pdf; 13-33-6.1.
119 Id.
120 Id.
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encouragement to abstain from “risky sexual behaviors.”121 The
standards do not include sexual assault or sexual abuse, domestic violence, or what a healthy relationship may look like.122 Peer pressure
is examined, but not within the context of sexual behavior.123 Rather
than “comprehensive sexual education,” South Dakota emphasizes
“comprehensive health education” in which sexuality is but a sentence
in the context of the entirety of the curriculum.124
Recently, there has been little news regarding South Dakota
sexual education laws. There seems to be no indication that South Dakota intends to change its laws or education standards, despite multiple critiques.125 South Dakota appears to be more interested in banning teachings on various sexual education concepts rather than
expanding them.126 South Dakota has however recently joined a sexual abuse prevention campaign, which could lead to future
changes.127
E.

Arkansas

Arkansas law does not require schools to teach sexuality education128 This has always been the case in Arkansas.129 Schools are permitted to offer sexual education, but in such programs, abstinence
121 South Dakota Health Education Standards, SOUTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
(2018), http://doe.sd.gov/board/packets/documents/012618/item6doc2.pdf.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Denise-Marie Ordway, Sex Education: Why an Abstinence-Only Approach is Problematic, JOURNALIST’S RESOURCE (May 22, 2019), https://journalistsresource.org/studies/society/education/sex-education-abstinence-research/; Patrick Springer Forum News Service, Is North
Dakota Taking the Best Approach to Sex Ed?, THE BISMARK TRIBUNE (Jan. 13, 2019), https://bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-regional/is-north-dakota-taking-the-best-approach-tosex-ed/article_4fffb830-a9dd-5c79-8fef-dcd8a6a16969.html.
126 Kelley Czajka, South Dakota Banned the Teaching of Gender Dysphoria in Public
Schools, PACIFIC STANDARD (Feb. 14, 2019), https://psmag.com/news/south-dakota-banned-theteaching-of-gender-dysphoria-in-public-schools; Patrick Anderson, South Dakota Educators
Balk at Proposed Ban on Gender Identity, Expression Instruction, ARGUS LEADER (Feb. 6, 2019),
https://www.argusleader.com/story/news/2019/02/06/south-dakota-legislature-educatorsbalk-proposed-gender-identity-restrictions-class/2787556002/.
127 Associated Press, South Dakota Joining Child Sex Abuse Prevention Campaign, NEWS
CENTER 1 (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.newscenter1.tv/south-dakota-joining-child-sexualabuse-prevention-campaign/.
128 SIECUS, Arkansas, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2018 (2019), https://siecus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/03/Arkansas-FY18-Final-1.pdf.
129 Id.
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must be stressed and sexual activity discouraged.130 Arkansas students are required to complete 0.5 credits in health and safety education and in 2015 this health and education courses was amended to
add dating violence awareness as a mandatory component of this
course.131 Students must learn about relationship abuse, but are not
required to learn sexual among physical and emotional abuse.132
However, the code does refer educators and officials to materials from
various sources.133 While it is not required that educators reference
these materials,134 among these sources is the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, which does include sexual abuse among the types
of abuse inflicted on a partner.135 Therefore, there is a chance, however slim, that students will receive instruction regarding sexual
abuse.
There does not appear to be any indication that Arkansas laws
will expand to include a more comprehensive sexuality education.
Even though many “red” states have recently passed sexual education
reformation bills, such as adding contraception discussion or sexual
violence prevention, recent applicable Arkansas bills have failed.136
Arkansas admits that it ranks highest in the nation for the percentage
of students who have been forced to have sex.137 Still, recent bills have
focused on pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases rather than
sexual assault prevention.138 Arkansas recognizes the importance of
violence prevention, and the fact that violence disproportionately effects youth.139 However, there still has been no indication from Arkansas of an intention to pass a law which would require sexual assault
prevention programs through public education.
Rather, the focus in Arkansas legislation is with regards to
higher education. The Arkansas state legislature has passed new laws
130 Id.
131 ALASKA STAT. § 6-16-1004
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Violence Prevention, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/intimatepartnerviolence/index.html
136 Landman, supra note 112; Spencer Irvine, Sex Education Changes are Coming to Red
States Too, ACCURACY IN ACADEMIA (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.academia.org/sex-educationchanges-are-coming-to-red-states-too/.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139
Violence
Prevention,
ARKANSAS
DEPARTMENT
OF
HEALTH
(2017),
https://www.healthy.arkansas.gov/programs-services/topics/violence-prevention.
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within the past five years to prevent assault on college campuses. One
bill, HB 1518 was recently passed which requires the Arkansas Higher
Education Coordinating Board to develop an action plan to address
the prevention of sexual assault.140 Again, however, there is nothing
being done for lower, public-school education.141 The focus in Arkansas appears to be over college-age students, despite the fact that many
individuals affected by sexual assault and rape are among the
youth.142 This is all despite the fact that Arkansas residents want better sexual education in their public schools.143
VI.

A SURVEY OF THE LOWEST FIVE STATES

The states with the consistently lowest rate of rape per 100,000
inhabitants include New Jersey, Connecticut, Georgia, North Carolina,
and Maryland. New Jersey’s rate of rape is nearly 10% of that of
Alaska.144 Connecticut falls shortly behind.145 Georgia, North Carolina, and Maryland have also earned a spot as some of the states with
the lowest rate of rape.
A. New Jersey
New Jersey has, over the past 10 years, consistently been the
state with the lowest rate of rape. New Jersey also has one of the most
comprehensive sexual education laws the state with the longest history of sexual education curriculum.146 New Jersey was the first state
140 Prevention of Sexual Assault, ARKANSAS DIVISION OF HIGHER EDUCATION (2019),
https://www.adhe.edu/institutions/government-relations-and-student-success/preventionof-sexual-assualt
141 Id.
142 Sexual Violence Prevention Resources, ARKANSAS TECH UNIVERSITY (2019),
https://www.atu.edu/jerrycares/sx_resources.php; Tracy Courage, Campus Activities Planned
to Observe Sexual Assault Awareness Month, UNIVERSITY NEWS- UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS, LITTLE
ROCK (Apr. 1, 2019), https://ualr.edu/news/2019/04/01/saam-week/; Violence Prevention,
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (2017), https://www.healthy.arkansas.gov/programs-services/topics/violence-prevention.
143 Leslie Newell Peacock, When Will the Family Council Grow Up?, ARKANSAS TIMES (Mar.
7, 2019), https://arktimes.com/arkansas-blog/2019/03/07/when-will-the-family-councilgrow-up.
144 See infra, Part One.
145 Id.
146 David Matthau, Why Sex Education in NJ is Still Leaving Students Unsatisfied, NEW
JERSEY 101.5 (Nov. 28, 2016), https://nj1015.com/why-sex-education-in-nj-is-still-leaving-students-unsatisfied/
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to mandate sexual education courses.147 It has been a national leader
in sexual education for more than three decades.148 Sexuality education curriculum was suggested in New Jersey as early as 1967.149 The
state established its current Comprehensive Health Education and
Physical Education Curriculum Framework in 1999 and it has expanded since that time.150 Now, the state includes Core Curriculum
Content Standards for Comprehensive Health and Physical Education.151 Sexual assault prevention programs are part of this education.152 Granted, for some time, sexuality education was not required
as a graduation credit until later on, but since as early as 2004 the
state did mandate at least 150 minutes of health education during
each school week in grades one through twelve.153 These 150 minutes
included requirements that students had to learn how to identify and
address internal and external pressures to become sexually active.154
This was an opt-out policy.155
Now, students receive credit for their 150 minutes of sexual education every week and must acquire 3.75 credits of health education
per year.156 This is the most robust sexual education requirement of
the states, while many other states still have no curriculum. New Jersey does not provide school districts with express curriculum, rather,
standards are expressed in the Core Curriculum Content Standards
for Comprehensive Health and Physical Education.157Again, these
standards do include a sexual assault prevention program.158

147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Sandra Gardner, Sex Education: The Battle Goes On, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 5, 1981),
https://www.nytimes.com/1981/07/05/nyregion/sex-education-the-battle-goes-on.html.
150 SIECUS, New Jersey, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2006 (2007), https://siecus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/NEW-JERSEY06.pdf; SIECUS, New Jersey, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR
2010 (2011), https://siecus.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/NEW-JERSEY10.pdf; N.J.S.A.
18A:35-4.3.
151 Id.
152 SIECUS, New Jersey, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2006 (2007), https://siecus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/NEW-JERSEY06.pdf;
https://siecus.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/NEW-JERSEY10.pdf; N.J.S.A. 18A:35-4.3.
153 SIECUS, New Jersey, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2004 (2005), https://siecus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/New-Jersey04.pdf.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 SIECUS, New Jersey, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2016 (2017), https://siecus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/08/NEW-JERSEY-FY16-New.pdf.
157 Id.
158 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§18A:35-4.3.
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New Jersey’s sexual education program has many admirable
traits. First, New Jersey’s sexual education program is an opt-out program.159 It is only when the parent finds curriculum unacceptable that
the parent must act. Because parental consent is not required, it is
likely that more children end up taking an opt-out class rather than an
opt-in class.160 Second, New Jersey explicitly requires sexual assault
prevention programs.161 These programs include teaching the difference between sexual assault, love, affection, and commitment.162
Third, the state teaches students skills for resisting pressure to
enter into sexual behaviors.163 The safe sexual behaviors teach about
dating violence and encourage the exercise of safe environments for
the discussion of sexual behaviors.164 Fourth, the state teaches responsible sexual behaviors such as the impact of sexual behavior on
oneself, others, and physical, social, and emotional health concerns
from sexual behavior.165 This also includes the impacts that sexual behavior may have on one’s life, including one’s future education, career
plans, and wellness.166
Finally, unlike many states who have sexual education program,
New Jersey law does require that students learn about consent.167
This includes teaching students that they must give consent for every
step of sexual intimacy.168 New Jersey’s curriculum is one of the most
comprehensive of all of the states.
B.

Connecticut

Before recent changes in 2016, Connecticut did not strictly require that students receive any sort of sexual education.169 However,
159 N.J. STAT. ANN. §18A:35-4.7.
160 SIECUS, New Jersey, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2018 (2019), https://siecus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/03/New-Jersey-FY18-Final.pdf.
161 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§18A:35-4.3.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 SIECUS, New Jersey, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2006 (2007), https://siecus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/NEW-JERSEY06.pdf; SIECUS, New Jersey, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR
2010 (2011), https://siecus.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/NEW-JERSEY10.pdf; N.J.S.A.
18A:35-4.3.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 SIECUS, Connecticut, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2016 (2017), https://siecus.org/wp-
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schools were required to teach human growth and development and
disease prevention.170 In 2016, Connecticut’s General Assembly enacted a law stating health would be one of the new graduation requirement for high school students starting with the class of 2020.171
Before the enactment of that law, unlike many states which do not
have sexual education requirements, Connecticut did have sexual education guidelines required by health courses.172 Even unlike those
states which have no law requiring sexual education but do still have
curriculum guidelines, Connecticut has extensive guidelines.173 For
example, Texas does not have sexual education requirements for
graduation, but does require that if there is to be a sexual education
component of a health course, it must teach abstinence-only sexual
education curriculum.174 This abstinence-only guideline is common
among states with no sexual education requirement.175 Or, in the alternative, states will expressly limit what can be taught in a health
course. For example, Utah is an abstinence-only state, but the law does
allow that students learn refusal skills.176 However, such skills are a
limit rather than a requirement.177 The law provides strict standards
for what can and cannot be a part of classroom curriculum, which was
not the case in Connecticut.178 Connecticut did not have such strict
guidelines for sexual education as is guidelines were a floor rather
than a ceiling of what could be taught.
Today, the Connecticut guidelines have evolved into a required
curriculum are quite clear and incredibly comprehensive.179 Like New

content/uploads/2018/08/CONNECTICUT-FY16-New.pdf.
170 Id.
171 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-221a (2018).
172 SIECUS, Connecticut, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2016 (2017), https://siecus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/08/CONNECTICUT-FY16-New.pdf.
173 Id.
174 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-221a (2018)
175 TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 28.004; TEX. STATE BOARD OF EDUC. ADMIN. CODE §§ 115.22,
115.23, 115.32, and 115.33.
176 See SIECUS, The SIECUS State Profiles Fiscal Year 2018, SIECUS (2019),
https://siecus.org/state-profiles-2018/.
177 Id.
178 Id.; SIECUS, Connecticut, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2006 (2007),
https://siecus.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/CONNECTICUT06.pdf.
179 Connecticut Department of Education, Guidelines for the Sexual Health Education Component of Comprehensive Health Education, CONNECTICUT’S OFFICIAL STATE WEBSITE (2019),
https://portal.ct.gov/SDE/Publications/Sexual-Health-Education-Component-ofComprehensive-Health-Education/Sexual-Health-Education-Curriculum-Framework.
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Jersey, Connecticut is an opt-out state.180 Therefore, a parent does not
need to provide affirmative consent for their child’s participation. The
student is required to take on half-credit of health, of which sexual education is included.181 Connecticut expressly states the goals for its
sexual education standards, including the fact that Connecticut aims
to prevent sexual assaults using these standards.182
Connecticut has provided guidelines for every level, from elementary levels to middle and high school requirements.183 For example, under physical, mental, emotional, and social growth and development education standards, kindergarten students must be able to
“[i]dentify displays of affection with appropriate people and situations.”184 By fourth grade students will have the ability to “[d]escribe
and demonstrate appropriate ways to express affection with different
people in various situations.”185 By grade eight students in Connecticut can “[e]xamine appropriate and healthy ways to express affection,
love, friendship and concern.”186 Finally, by graduation students will
be able to “[c]ompare, contrast and analyze appropriate ways to express needs, wants and feelings in relationships.”187
Connecticut has identified eight content standards that must be
included in any sexual education program which include:
• Physical, Mental, Emotional, and Social Growth and Development
• Accessing Health Information and Resources
• Self-Management of Healthy Behaviors
• Analyzing Internal and External Influences
• Communication Skills
• Decision-Making Skills
• Goal Setting Skills
• Advocacy188
180 SIECUS, Connecticut, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2016 (2017), https://siecus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/08/CONNECTICUT-FY16-New.pdf; SIECUS, New Jersey, STATE PROFILES
FISCAL YEAR 2016 (2017), https://siecus.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/New-Jersey-FY18Final.pdf.
181 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-221a (2018).
182 Connecticut Department of Education, supra note 179.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Connecticut Department of Education, supra note 179.
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These standards line up well with the National Health Education Standards, however, the two do not match exactly. There are still
eight National Health Education Standards, but Connecticut omits
some and includes others.189 Additionally, the National Health Education Standards handle grades K-2, 3-5, 6-8, and 9-12 rather than Connecticut’s K-4, 5-8, and 9-12 standards.190
Like the National Health Education Standards, there are a multitude of concepts involved in all of these learning objectives.191 Many
of these concepts aim to prevent sexual assault.192 Under physical,
mental, emotional, and social growth and development students learn
appropriate ways to express their needs, wants, and feelings in a relationship, how to analyze the impact sexual behavior may have on others and analyze the factors of unhealthy relationships, and about how
environments impact sexual health, unhealthy dating practices (such
as violence), and more.193 Under the second standard, Accessing
Health Information and Resources, students learn about existing laws
that protect individuals from sexual harassment, sexual assault, sexual exploitation, and human trafficking and about the legal age for sexual behaviors in Connecticut.194
Third, from the Self-Management of Healthy Behaviors unit students learn how to express their feelings, how to abstain from intercourse, how to respond to harassment, and how to address sexual exploitation and coercion.195 Fourth, students must examine personal
values and their relationship to sexual decisions, the influence of alcohol and drugs on sexual behavior, and internet sexual exploitation under Analyzing Internal and External Influences, Standard Four.196
Fifth, as a part of the Communication Skills area, students must
be able to analyze the effectiveness of both verbal and non-verbal
skills as ways to refuse pressure to engage in sexual behavior, how to
negotiate out of risky situations regarding sexual behavior, how to set
clear expectations and boundaries on sexual behaviors through personal strategy, and analyze sexual harassment and violence impacts
189 National Sexuality Education Standards, supra note 24.
190 Connecticut Department of Education, supra note 179; National Sexuality Education
Standards, supra note 24.
191 Id.
192 Connecticut Department of Education, supra note 179.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id.
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on relationships.197 Six, the Decision-Making Skills standards require
students learn about the external influences of partners, peers, and
the community on sexual activity, the long-term impacts of sexual activity, and alcohol and drug influence on sexual activity. Seventh, under goal-setting students learn how external influences affect goal setting regarding sexual health, among others.198 Finally, under
Advocacy students learn to advocate for sexual health, especially in
relationships, how to campaign for better health and sex education,
and finally, how to best treat others with respect.199 The sexual assault prevention concepts are interwoven into every health education
concept.200 It is important to note that in Connecticut the required
health course is only half of a credit and there is a significant amount
of material to cover.201
C.

Georgia

The fact that Georgia is one of the states with the lowest rate of
rape may be somewhat surprising due to some of the recent sexual
health debates and because Georgia is generally viewed as quite conservative.202 However, since the end of the 1980’s, Georgia law has required schools to teach sexuality education.203 Georgia laws have always set forth minimum standards, and allowed school boards to add
more material where they feel it is appropriate and to develop their
own curriculum.204 It is important to note that having such curriculum is a requirement, rather than encouragement like under Alaska
law.205 State funds are in fact withheld from a school or district until
these programs are in place.206
Unlike other states with the lowest rape rates, Georgia does not
have a set, laid-out curriculum which schools must use for their

197 Id.
198Id.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Keren Landman, supra note 112.
203 SIECUS, Georgia, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2003 (2004), https://siecus.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Georgia-for-2003-web.pdf.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id.
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students.207 Rather, Georgia allows the schools to design their own
curriculum so long as students meet the performance standards Georgia sets.208 Since 2009, Georgia has required schools teach about how
to handle peer pressure, examine community values, and the promotion of self-esteem that could lead to sexual activity.209
The performance standards give clear expectations for instruction, assessment, and student work. These standards are the minimum which schools must teach.210 The sexual education performance
standards are a requirement for graduation, whether the student goes
through the program in what Georgia calls “Health” or “Health and
Personal Fitness” classes.211 The student must a take a half credit of
one of these classes or a physical education class to meet one whole
credit. Even though it is likely that most students take a personal fitness credit in addition to their health credit, it is even still possible
that a student may take both “Health” and “Health and Personal Fitness” and therefore receive additional units on sexual education.
The standards set forth by the State of Georgia begin by citing
the United States Center for Disease Control and that the center has
identified risky sexual behavior as something that needs addressed.212 This is the basis on which Georgia created these requirements.213 Georgia’s sexual education program is an opt-out program.214 Students are expected to take go through sexual education
programs.215 These programs are pro-abstinence, but must still teach
about contraception.216 However, the state does stress that students
must learn how to demonstrate clear limits on sexual behaviors, how
to handle sexual abuse, and how to find access to crisis centers for

207 Georgia Performance Standards for Health Education, GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION
(2009),
https://www.georgiastandards.org/Standards/Georgia%20Performance%20Standards/9-12_Health_Education.pdf.
208 Id.
209 SIECUS, Georgia, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2008 (2009), https://siecus.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/GEORGIA08.pdf
210 SIECUS, Georgia, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2016 (2017), https://siecus.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/GEORGIA-FY17-FINAL.pdf.
211 GA. CODE ANN. §160-4-2-.48.
212 Georgia Performance Standards for Health Education, supra note 207.
213 Id.
214 SIECUS, Georgia, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2017 (2018), https://siecus.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/GEORGIA-FY17-FINAL.pdf.
215 GA. CODE ANN. §160-4-2-.48.
216 SIECUS, Georgia, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2017 (2018), https://siecus.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/GEORGIA-FY17-FINAL.pdf.

146

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byu_elj/vol2020/iss1/1

146

Kiracofe: Race-Conscious Admissions Policies in American Institutions of Higher Education

1]

Sexual Education

rape, sexual assault, and sexual violence.217
Georgia is taking additional steps to prevent sexual assault. Senate Bill 401 by the Georgia state legislature officially added annual
age-appropriate sexual abuse and awareness programs in grades K-9,
meaning children will start learning these concepts younger starting
in 2019.218 However, sexual assault and abuse has been a part of the
high school performance standards since as early as 2009.219
While It is admirable that Georgia does choose to focus much of
the performance standards on how to react to a sexual assault or like
event, there may not be enough explicit prevention measures for
these performance standards to truly be effective on their own. For
example, although “setting clear limits on sexual behaviors” may
cause a school to decide to teach consent, refusal skills, or other prevention techniques, another school may decide that these terms need
not be included in education. It may even be up to the whim of a single
teacher. The Georgia state legislature has been considering adding
“consent” to sex education curriculum as it has become popular
among many school districts, though these are not yet in place.220
Whether the word “consent” or “coercion” is used, Georgia’s
curriculum may still be helpful in preventing sexual assault. In mitigating the harms of sexual assault, it is possible that not explicitly using such terms may not be helpful. If a student’s “clear limits” have
been violated, then they did not provide consent, though the student
would not know the correct terminology. Reporting would likely be
easier if the correct terms were used, therefore it is best that these are
the terms that are taught. Georgia could likely do better by simply rewording the sexual education standards to explicitly include the
terms and tools that an individual would need in order to report their
assault in the way that is most effective.
Georgia also takes additional steps outside of the traditional

217 Georgia Performance Standards for Health Education, supra note 207.
218 Sexual Abuse and Assault Awareness Frequently Asked Questions, GEORGIA DEPARTMENT
OF EDUCATION (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.gadoe.org/Curriculum-Instruction-and-Assessment/Curriculum-and-Instruction/Documents/SB%20401%20FAQ_November%208%202018.pdf.
219 Georgia Performance Standards for Health Education, supra note 207.
220 Vanessa McCray, ‘Consent’ Joins Sex-Ed Topics in Some Metro Atlanta Schools,
EDUCATION: THE ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.ajc.com/news/local-education/consent-joins-sex-topics-some-metro-schools/uuDlCnqDkRuebMla9stjWK/.
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classroom settings.221 Georgia believes that sexual assault is preventable and works on community education as well as public education.222 These programs work on promoting safe dating, advocating
for the respect of women, and more.223
D.

North Carolina

Like the National Sexuality Education Standards, North Carolina breaks their education standards into levels for different ages of
students which are K-2, 3-5, 6-8, and 9-12.224 Students are required
to take a health education course which includes sexual education.225
The sexual education program is currently opt-out; however, North
Carolina has recently entertained the idea of switching to an opt-in
program.226 This is despite the fact that many groups are opposed to
an opt-in program and that North Carolina has had an opt-out policy
for over 15 years. 227
Before the current laws were in place, North Carolina enacted
the Healthy Youth Act in 2016 which provides parents, students, and
schools greater access to sexuality education, and established the Reproductive Health and Safety Education Program.228 The Act established the sexual education programs in schools that compromise between parents’ desires, students’ needs, and the best public health
practices.229
Prior to the enactment of the Healthy Youth Act, the North
221 Sexual Violence Prevention, GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH (2019),
https://dph.georgia.gov/SexualViolence.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 National Sexuality Education Standards, supra note 24.
225 Earning Your High School Diploma-North Carolina, LEARNINGPATH.ORG (2019),
http://learningpath.org/articles/Earning_Your_High_School_Diploma_-_North_Carolina.html
226 Richard Adkins, Sex Ed Would be Opt-In, Not Opt-Out Instruction Under House Bill,
WRAL.COM (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.wral.com/sex-ed-would-be-opt-in-not-opt-out-instruction-under-house-bill/18226327/.
227 Margot Schein, North Carolina Needs Fewer Hurdles to Sex Education, Not More,
PLANNED
PARENTHOOD
VOTES!
SOUTH
ATLANTIC
(Apr.
24,
2019),
https://www.plannedparenthoodaction.org/planned-parenthood-votes-south-atlantic/blog/north-carolina-needs-fewer-hurdles-to-sex-ed-not-more; SIECUS, Georgia, STATE
PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2015 (2016), https://siecus.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/NorthCarolina-for-2003-web.pdf.
228 Healthy Youth Act, SEXUAL HEALTH INITIATIVES FOR TEENS http://www.shiftnc.org/resources/for-schools/healthy-youth-act.
229 Id.
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Carolina General Assembly provided that if a school wanted to provide more than abstinence-only education, it could obtain permission
to do so through the state.230 Up until that point, North Carolina’s sexuality education was controlled at the local level by schools, parents,
and public health professional and widely varied across the state and
over time.231 However, North Carolina sexual education was seen as
largely effective toward preventing both the health concerns at the
time and those of today.232 Additionally, it is important to note that
although there were no strict guidelines regarding what should be
taught in sexual education, sexual education was a state requirement
for schools and for students.233
Today, through the Healthy Youth Act, sexual assault and sexual
abuse risk prevention are required as a part of the sexual education
program, and such a program is required, even though an opt-out program.234 The course is offered through grades 7, 8, and 9.235 The North
Carolina program is not necessarily a “stress abstinence” program like
New Jersey, it does not promote sexual activity either.236 The Healthy
Youth Act did not limit sexual education teaching to only the concepts
provided therein, rather, this curriculum has evolved over time and
schools did not need to ask permission to teach additional concepts
like the schools did under state-mandated abstinence-only education.237 In fact, many school districts have moved to new curriculum
to come back to the Healthy Youth Act standards.238
North Carolina breaks up their concepts into multiple categories which are, Mental and Emotional Health, Personal and Consumer
Health, Interpersonal Communication and Relationships, Nutrition
and Physical Activity, and Alcohol Tobacco, and Other Drugs. 239
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 N.C. School District Votes to End Widely Used Sex Education Program Amid Outcry, CBS
THIS MORNING (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/debate-over-plannedparenthood-sex-education-program-north-carolina/
238 Id.
239 North Carolina Essential Standards: Health Education- High School, PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF
NORTH CAROLINA http://www.ncpublicschools.org/docs/curriculum/healthfulliving/newstandards/healthful-living/9-12.pdf.
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Unlike Connecticut, the North Carolina standards do not include a sexual education component in every unit.240 The third standard is the
one which holds the first sexual education information.241 The information in this unit includes principles of healthy dating thy myths,
misconceptions, and stereotypes pertaining to sexual assault and sexual abuse based on law and research, and designing plans for the prevention of sexual assault and abuse that include appropriate resources and skills.242 The other units do not include more sexualassault prevention information.243 However, in the Alcohol, Tobacco,
and other drugs unit, curriculum advises against engaging in risky behaviors with someone who is under the influence of alcohol or other
drugs, which may include sexual activity risks with alcohol and
drugs.244
In North Carolina there is a direct focus on sexual assault prevention as a part of these North Carolina standards.245 North Carolina
Students have been required to learn refusal skills and strategies to
handle peer pressure regarding sexual acts for over 15 years.246 Additionally, a house bill and senate bill introduced in 2007 and implemented in 2009 requires students learn awareness of sexual abuse
and assault, and reducing the risk of such events.247 One of the current
learning objectives for students is that they “[c]ontrast the myths,
misconceptions, and stereotypes pertaining to sexual assault and sexual abuse with what is known based on law and research.”248 Students
must also “Design safe plans for the prevention of sexual assault and
abuse that include appropriate resources and needed skills.”249 These
are specific strategies intended to allow students to develop and
maintain reproductive and sexual health.250
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 SIECUS, North Carolina, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2003 (2004),
https://siecus.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/North-Carolina-for-2003-web.pdf
247 SIECUS, North Carolina, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2003 (2004),
https://siecus.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/NORTH-CAROLINA08.pdf; SIECUS, North
Carolina, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2003 (2004), https://siecus.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/NORTH-CAROLINA09.pdf
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 Id.
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Although North Carolina does have an admirable sexual education program, especially compared to the majority of the nation, it
could still improve. For example, North Carolina fails to explicitly state
many comprehensive sexual education standards.251 Rather, the state
favors broad learning objectives that then leave room for individual
district, school, or even teacher interpretation.252
There are arguments that the practical applications of many of
the beneficial aspects of North Carolina’s sexual education programs,
including sexual assault prevention and other concepts are not taught
sufficiently. 253 Additionally, those who have personally experienced
North Carolina’s K-12 sexual education system suggest education regarding toxic masculinity or other ways to specifically address perpetrators while they are young and before they become perpetrators.254
While it is likely that these concepts will help and while North Carolina has room to grow, their methods are still significantly more comprehensive than other states.
E.

Maryland

Like Georgia, Maryland’s health education standards are student-objective based rather than specific curriculum. Additionally,
like the other states with the lowest rate of rape, Maryland’s sexual
education program is an “opt out” program.255
In 2003, prior to the implementation of current law, Maryland’s
county school boards were required to work with the county’s health
department in establishing a school health education program which
would meet a number of specified goals.256 The goal applicable to sexuality education was Goal F which was to help students “develop and
use skills for making responsible decisions about sexual behavior and
its consequences for the individual and others.”257 These concepts

251 Id.
252 North Carolina Essential Standards, supra note 239.
253 Aislinn Antrim, N.C. Sex Education is Lacking in Consent Education, THE DAILY TAR HEEL
(Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.dailytarheel.com/article/2018/10/nc-sex-ed-1004.
254 Gordon, supra note 18.
255 SIECUS, Maryland, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2011 (2012), https://siecus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/MARYLAND-FINAL-2011.pdf
256 SIECUS, Maryland, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2003 (2004), https://siecus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/Maryland-for-2003-web.pdf.
257 MD. CODE REGS. 13A.04.18.02, 13A.04.18.03, and 13A.04.18.04
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were a floor, rather than a ceiling.258
The school was required to teach this program every year starting at kindergarten in mixed gender groups and must include information regarding roles of family members, male and female roles in
society, sexual variations, family planning, and more.259 Since (yearat least 2005) it has been required that an elective health education
course is available in middle and high school.260 The required elective
courses in health began in 2005.261 The required sexuality programs
were opt-out, but the elective courses were opt-in.262 Now, all programs are opt-out.263
In 1996, the Maryland Department of Health, Center for Health
Promotion received a grant from the CDC to address rape and sexual
assault prevention by providing education, training, and technical
support to reduce the number of rapes and sexual assaults.264 This
program was implemented in Maryland Public Schools as early as
2009.265 It focuses on preventing bullying, teasing harassment, sexual
abuse, rape, and dating violence among youth.266
Maryland’s health standards are very similar to those of North
Carolina.267 North Carolina and Maryland have almost exactly the
same names for their six health education standards.268 In Maryland
these are, Mental and Emotional Health, Personal and Consumer
Health, Family Life and Human Sexuality, Safety and Injury Prevention, Nutrition and Fitness, Disease Prevention and Control, and

258 SIECUS, Maryland, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2003 (2004), https://siecus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/Maryland-for-2003-web.pdf.
259 Id.
260 SIECUS, Maryland, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2006 (2007), https://siecus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/MARYLAND06.pdf.
261 SIECUS, Maryland, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2004 (2005), https://siecus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/Maryland04.pdf.
262 Id.
263 SIECUS, Maryland, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2010 (2011), https://siecus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/MARYLAND-FINAL-2011.pdf.
264 Rape and Sexual Assault Prevention Program, MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
https://phpa.health.maryland.gov/ohpetup/Pages/rsapp_overview.aspx.
265Joyce Danztler and Sarah Martin, Maryland’s School-Based Sexual Violence Prevention
Program, CALIFORNIA COALITION AGAINST SEXUAL ASSAULT (Oct. 14, 2009), http://www.calcasa.org/2009/10/maryland%E2%80%99s-school-based-sexual-violence-prevention-program/.
266 Rape and Sexual Assault Prevention Program, supra note 264.
267Id.; North Carolina Essential Standards, supra note 239
268 Rape and Sexual Assault Prevention Program, supra note 264; North Carolina Essential
Standards, supra note 239.
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Alcohol Tobacco, and Other Drugs.269
Maryland briefly defines each standard as an introduction to
curriculum set forth by law. Under the standard Family Life and Human Sexuality, the main objective is that “[s]tudents will demonstrate
the ability to use human development knowledge, social skills, and
health enhancing strategies to promote positive relationships and
healthy growth and development throughout the life cycle.”270
Further, the Family Life and Human Sexuality requires that students learn a number concepts, including influences on sexual behavior, the differences between healthy and unhealthy relationships, laws
that relate to sexual behavior, describing limits on sexual intimacy,
advocating for respect on intimacy, refusal strategies for sexual pressure, communicating about sexual behavior, and values which influence attitudes toward sexual behavior.271
Aside from this standard, Maryland has enacted a number of
legislative acts which provide more guidance and requirements as to
what students must learn as part of their sexual education.272 In 2016,
Maryland enacted a bill which officially required the State Board of
Education and certain nonpublic schools to develop a program on sexual abuse and assault prevention and for such a program to be a graduation requirement.273 The teachers of this program must have training in the area of sexual assault prevention.274
Maryland references the National Health Education Standards
as it applies to its health education program, drawing concepts from
the National Health Education standards, though not strictly including
them as a part of required curriculum.275 These standards require students define consent and understand its implications for decisionmaking and analyze the effects of alcohol and other drugs on

269 Rape and Sexual Assault Prevention Program, supra note 264; North Carolina Essential
Standards, supra note 239.
270 Standard: Health Education, High School, SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT IN MARYLAND (JAN. 27,
2009)
https://mdk12.msde.maryland.gov/INSTRUCTION/curriculum/Health/Pages/standard4/high_school.aspx
271 Id.
272 SIECUS, North Carolina, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2017 (2018),
https://siecus.org/state_profile/north-carolina-fy17-state-profile/.https://siecus.org/state_profile/north-carolina-fy17-state-profile/.
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 National Sexuality Education Standards, supra note 24.
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consent.276 Additionally, the provision regarding coercion requires
that students have the ability to explain why tricks, coercion, or
threats in relationships are wrong.277 Finally, there is extensive information in these National Sexuality Education Standards regarding
sexual abuse and sexual assault.278 In 2018, Maryland enacted a bill
which officially adopted some of these standards, including consent,
into Maryland’s curriculum.279
However, one issue with Maryland’s Health Education is that,
although health is required and the sexual education program is an
opt-out program, a student can easily get out of taking the class.280
Students are required to take one half credit of health.281 At some
schools though, this health credit can consist of a class called “Current
Health Issues” rather than a student’s traditional health class, which
would include the above-mentioned curriculum.282 These schools do
not have a posted curriculum for these alternative health classes, so
while it is possible that students are learning the essential concepts
needed for success, it is also possible that they are not. It may be more
effective for the state to lay out specific education standards that include these concepts and do not allow for flexibility for specific
schools.
VII. OTHER FACTORS
This article is not so bold as to assert that sexual education is
the only factor which may affect rape rates. Some factors may include
the demographics of a state’s population such as the male to female
ratio or racial makeup, urbanization, the climate, and more. However,
when comparing these factors in the previously discussed states,
there is an indication that such factors do not heavily affect rape rates.

276 Id.
277 Id.
278 Id.
279 SIECUS, North Carolina, STATE PROFILES FISCAL YEAR 2017 (2018),
https://siecus.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Maryland-FY18-Final.pdf.
280 See Policy 1030- Graduation Requirements, HCPSS (Apr. 12, 2018),
https://www.hcpss.org/policies/8000/8030-graduation-requirements/.
281 Id.
282 Id.
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A. Male to Female Population

Because males are statistically more likely to commit rape, and
females are more likely to be the victims of rape,283 the ratio of males
to females could potentially affect the rates of rape. Under this school
of thought, states with more males than females would have higher
rates of rape. However, the data shows that this is not necessarily the
case.284
New Jersey: 51.2 % female, 48.8% male285
Connecticut: 51.2 % female, 48.8% male286
Georgia: 51.3%female, 48.7% male287
North Carolina: 51.4% female, 48.6% male288
Maryland: 51.6% female, 48.4% male289
In these top five states we see that in fact, as the male population decreases, the rate of rape is actually increasing. New Jersey and
Connecticut have the highest percentage of males of these states, but
the lowest rates of rape.290 The percentage of males in the population
is indeed higher in those states with the highest rate of rape.291 These
populations are as follows:
Alaska: 47.7% female, 52.2% male292
Michigan: 50.8% female, 49.2% male293
Colorado: 49.8% female, 50.2% male294
283 RAINN, Victims of Sexual Violence: Statistics, https://www.rainn.org/statistics/victims-sexual-violence.
284 See infra this section.
285 New Jersey Population 2020, WORLD POPULATION REVIEW (2019), http://worldpopulationreview.com/states/new-jersey-population/
286 Connecticut Population 2020, WORLD POPULATION REVIEW (2019), http://worldpopulationreview.com/states/connecticut-population/
287 Georgia Population 2020, WORLD POPULATION REVIEW (2019), http://worldpopulationreview.com/states/georgia-population/
288North Carolina Population 2020, WORLD POPULATION REVIEW (2019), http://worldpopulationreview.com/states/north-carolina-population/
289 Maryland Population 2020, WORLD POPULATION REVIEW (2019), http://worldpopulationreview.com/states/maryland-population/
290 See notes 285–86.
291 Id.
292 Alaska Population 2020, WORLD POPULATION REVIEW (2019), http://worldpopulationreview.com/states/alaska-population/
293 Michigan Population 2020, WORLD POPULATION REVIEW (2019), http://worldpopulationreview.com/states/michigan-population/
294 Colorado Population 2020, WORLD POPULATION REVIEW (2019), http://worldpopulationreview.com/states/colorado-population/
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South Dakota: 49.7% female, 50.3% male295
Arkansas: 51% female, 49% male296
These numbers do not clearly show that more males will result
in higher rates of rape, but it does not disprove the theory either.
These population makeups could be a factor, but is not dispositive of
higher rates of rape. This is evident as Michigan has a higher population of females that many other states in the top five, yet still has the
second highest rate of rape.
B.

Racial Demographics

Rapes are statistically more likely to be committed by people of
color, and people of color are more likely to be rape victims.297
New Jersey: White: 67.9%; Black: 13.5%; <1% Native American;
9.4% Asian; <1% Native Hawaiian; 6.4% Other; 2.6% two or more
races.298
Connecticut: White: 76.7%; Black: 10.5%; <1% Native
American; 4.4% Asian; <1% Native Hawaiian; 5.1% Other; 3.1%
two or more races.299
Georgia: White: 59.4%; Black: 31.3%; <1% Native
American; 3.8% Asian; <1% Native Hawaiian; 2.8% Other; 2.3%
two or more races.300
North Carolina: White: 69.0%; Black: 21.5%; 1.2% Native American; 2.7% Asian; <1% Native Hawaiian; 3.1% Other;
2.5% two or more races.301
Maryland: 56.6%; Black: 29.7%; <1% Native American;
6.2% Asian; <1% Native Hawaiian; 3.9% Other; 3.2% two or
more races.302
Alaska: 65.3%; Black: 3.2%; 14.2% Native American;
6.2% Asian; 1.2% Native Hawaiian; 1.4% Other; 8.5% two or
more races.303
295 South Dakota Population 2020, WORLD POPULATION REVIEW (2019), http://worldpopulationreview.com/states/south-dakota-population/
296Arkansas Population 2020, WORLD POPULATION REVIEW (2019), http://worldpopulationreview.com/states/arkansas-population/
297 End Rape on Campus, Prevalence, https://endrapeoncampus.org/new-page-3.
298 New Jersey Population, supra note 285.
299 Connecticut Population, supra note 286.
300 Georgia Population, supra note 287.
301 North Carolina Population, supra note 288.
302 Maryland Population, supra note 289.
303 Alaska Population 2020, supra note 292.
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Michigan: 78.7% White; Black: 13.8%; <1% Native
American; 2.9% Asian; <1% Native Hawaiian; 1.2% Other; 2.8%
two or more races.304
Colorado: 84.2% White; Black: 4.1%; <1% Native American; 3.0% Asian; <1% Native Hawaiian; 4.1% Other; 3.5% two
or more races.305
South Dakota: 84.7% White; Black: 1.7%; 8.7% Native
American; 1.4% Asian; <1% Native Hawaiian; <1% Other; 2.7%
two or more races.306
Arkansas: 77.3% White; Black: 15.4%; <1% Native
American; 1.4% Asian; <1% Native Hawaiian; 2.5% Other; 2.4%
two or more races.307
Those states with the highest numbers of persons of color actually
have the lowest rates of rape. Something worth noting, however, is that
those states which have the highest population of Native Americans also
tend to have higher rates of rape, such as Alaska and South Dakota. However, these populations still have predominately white populations.
C.

Urbanization

The percentage of the persons living in urban areas by state are
as follows:
New Jersey: 94.7%308
Connecticut: 88.0%309
Georgia: 75.1%310
North Carolina: 66.1%311
Maryland: 87.2%312
Alaska: 66.0%313
Michigan: 74.6%314
304 Michigan Population 2020, supra note 293.
305 Colorado Population 2020, supra note 294.
306 South Dakota Population 2020, supra note 295.
307 Arkansas Population 2020, supra note 296.
308 Urban Percentage of the Population for States, Historical, IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY,
https://www.icip.iastate.edu/tables/population/urban-pct-states.
309 Id.
310 Id.
311 Id.
312 Id.
313 Id.
314 Id.
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Colorado: 86.2%315
South Dakota: 56.7%316
Arkansas: 56.2%317
Those states with the highest rates of rape are the ones with the
lowest percentages of urbanization. This is by a small margin, however, as North Carolina, one of the states with the lowest rates of rape,
has 66.1% urbanization, and Alaska, the state with the highest rate of
rape, has 66.0% urbanization, just .1% lower than North Carolina.
However, the general trends in the states with the highest rates of
rape is that urbanization percentages are lower.
D.

Climate

Climate could also be a factor in determining which states experience a greater amount of sexual assault and rape. This is because a
colder climate could lead individuals to participating in more indoor
activities which may lead to higher rates of sexual assault and rape.
However, it is clear when comparing those states with the highest rate
and those with the lowest that this may not be a determinative factor.
New Jersey: 52.7318
Connecticut: 49.0319
Georgia: 63.5320
North Carolina: 59.0321
Maryland: 54.2322
Alaska: 26.6323
Michigan: 44.4324
Colorado: 45.1325
South Dakota: 45.2326

315 Id.
316 Id.
317 Id.
318 Average Annual Temperature for Each US State, CURRENT RESULTS (2020),
https://www.currentresults.com/Weather/US/average-annual-state-temperatures.php.
319 Id.
320 Id.
321 Id.
322 Id
323 Id.
324 Id.
325 Id.
326 Id.
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Arkansas: 60.4327
While the states with a higher rate of assault tend to be colder,
it does not appear to be a determining factor in whether there are high
or low rates of rape in a given state.
The aforementioned factors are not the only ones which may
contribute to rates of rape, however they are some of those most easily measured. Other factors may include religion, cultural mores, regional culture, popularity of drinking and drug use, political norms,
level of sexual activity among teens, and even the age of consent between states. Further, studies have indicated that where individuals
are made to feel comfortable reporting a sexual assault, rates of reporting will increase.328 On the other hand, where individuals lack
faith in their reporting systems, they are far less likely to report an
assault.329
There are countless factors, some measurable and some not,
that can and likely do affect the rate of rape in a state. Sexual education
is one possible factor among numerous others. There are some states
which were not included in this study which have lower rates of rape
with minimal sexual education.330 Therefore, other factors must play
a role. It is likely that none of these factors, including sexual education,
are dispositive, but rather that each contribute to the rate of rape.
There is no way to clearly tell which variable has the highest explanatory value, but each is one to consider.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In the states with the lowest rates of rape commonalities include teaching of consent, coercion, dating violence, healthy relationships, and refusal skills. Students in these states often learn about how
to report an assault and the available remedies for assault. Generally,

327 Id.
328 Cameron Kimble, Sexual Assault Remains Dramatically Underreported, BRENNAN
CENTER OF JUSTICE, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/sexual-assaultremains-dramatically-underreported
329 Id.
330 E.g. Iowa, which has a low rate of rape, only mandates that health education include
sexual disease prevention. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Law Enforcement Support Section,
Crime Statistics Management Unit, Reporting Rape in 2013 Revised, CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION
SERVICES DIVISION (April 9, 2014); Bureau of Justice Statistics, Rape and Sexual Assault, VIOLENT
CRIME.
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these states have a state-created sexual education program or curriculum. Additionally, in all of the states with the lowest rate of rape,
some degree of sexual education is mandatory for graduation, and all
are “opt-out” programs.
On the other hand, those states with the highest rates of rape
either have a recent history of or currently have policies which do not
require sexual education in any degree as part of graduation. Sexual
education in these states, if there is sexual education at all, were or are
often limited to certain concepts dictated by the state. These states are
largely limited to abstinence-only education and pregnancy and
STI/STD prevention. If these states have sexual education curriculum,
it is also oftentimes an “opt-in” program. These states also offer little
to no funding for schools that wish to develop sexual education curriculum for students.
Clearly, given the broad number and variety of factors that
could lead to a rate of rape or sexual assault, it is not clear if these
concepts are causal or correlative, but this survey indicates that there
are general concepts shared between those states with the highest
rate of rape and concepts shared between the states with the lowest
rate of rape. Again, there is no definite way to tell which variable has
the highest explanatory value, but, as law and policy is the manner in
which our society addresses social ills, determining whether sexual
education should be implemented in a state is worth consideration. If
a high rate of sexual assault is prevalent in a given state, society would
hope that policy makers and researchers would consider all options,
including education, to remedy this ill. In the past, more comprehensive sexual education has been a way in which sexual education concerns have been addressed and remedied.331
Once again, this survey does not aim to draw the conclusion that sexual education is the only factor which will affect the rate of rape. Rather, this essay provides theory and additional considerations for
policymakers and researchers addressing the ills in their state. The
issues, data, and questions raised by this research should be examined and considered by policymakers and researchers as they seek
all possible solutions to reduce rates of rape and sexual assault in
their states.

331 Evidence-Based Teen Pregnancy Prevention Program, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL,
https://www.cdc.gov/teenpregnancy/practitioner-tools-resources/evidence-based-programs.html
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Being a Good College Student: The History of Good
Moral Character Rules in State Financial Aid
Programs, 1850 to Now
Bradley Custer, Ph.D.

INTRODUCTION
Federal and state governments regulate the character of
their residents as a condition of immigration, employment, social
services, and beyond.1 At the state level, “good moral character”
rules have been analyzed in depth for decades, mostly as they pertain to admission to the bar and other licensed professions.2 Character requirements also affect the ability of college students to get
state-funded financial aid, but these policies have received no scholarly analysis. According to this study’s findings, there have been at
least 50 state financial aid grant programs with character rules,
which begs the question: what does it mean to be a “good” college
student? This paper offers an original study of the character requirements of state financial aid programs, including analysis of how
character requirements were and still are interpreted and enforced.
New insights are offered on the meaning of good moral character in
this higher education law context that contribute to the wider literature on the use of good moral character requirements.
This paper begins with a two-part literature review, first on
the history of state financial aid programs and second on the use of
good moral character requirements in American law. Then, the
methods and results of this original study are presented. Three historic state case studies are discussed in depth to explain how good
moral character requirements were interpreted in the past. Also explained is how the few remaining good moral character rules are
currently enforced. Finally, a rationale is made for eliminating all
good moral character requirements from state financial aid programs.
1 Deborah L. Rhode, Virtue and the Law: The Good Moral Character Requirement in Occupational Licensing, Bar Regulation, and Immigration Proceedings, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
1027 (2018).
2 See id.; Bruce E. May, The Character Component of Occupational Licensing Laws: A
Continuing Barrier to the Ex-Felon's Employment Opportunities, 71 N. D. L. REV. 187 (1995).
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I. THE HISTORY OF STATE FINANCIAL AID
A brief history of how state governments have funded college
scholarships provides needed context for the forthcoming study of
their eligibility requirements. Though much has been written about
the history of federal financial aid programs,3 a comprehensive history of state-funded financial aid programs has not been written –
something that the field of higher education needs. Writers typically
describe the history of state financial aid dating back only to the mid20th century, when states began implementing broad-scale needbased grant programs that are the predecessors of today’s programs.4 However, some states offered scholarships to their residents
at least one hundred years before then.5 To illustrate, I conducted a
review of state statutes 1800-1950 by searching for the term “scholarship” in the HeinOnline State Session Laws Library, yielding 2,170
results.6 In this section, I first outline my findings from the database
search. Then, I summarize trends in state financial aid programs
from 1950 to present with evidence from the higher education research literature.
A. Early State Scholarship Programs, 1800-1950
Some of the earliest references to scholarships in state statutes are actually privately-endowed scholarships. States and institutions solicited donors by offering full-tuition scholarships to them
and their dependents, like at the Virginia Military Institute in 1848,7
Ohio’s St. Clairsville Collegiate Seminary in 1855,8 and Kentucky’s

3 See Matthew B. Fuller, A History of Financial Aid to Students, 44 J. OF STUDENT

FINANCIAL AID 42 (2014); Elizabeth A. Duffy & Idana Goldberg, The Development of Need-Based
Aid, in CRAFTING A CLASS: COLLEGE ADMISSIONS AND FINANCIAL AID, 1955-1994 at 169 (1998).
4 See Donald E. Heller, The Policy Shift in State Financial Aid Programs, in HIGHER
EDUCATION: HANDBOOK OF THEORY AND RESEARCH 221 (John C. Smart ed., 2002).
5 See infra this section.
6 The HeinOnline State Session Laws Library is an online database containing over 12.7
million pages of state session laws for all 50 states and more with coverage going back to each
state’s inception. The word “scholarship” has several meanings. For example, a “certificate of
scholarship” is an old name for a college diploma, and being of “requisite scholarship” or the
“highest scholarship” means a person is properly trained and well educated. Thus, a majority
of the search results for “scholarship” did not pertain to a financial aid program as it is being
used here.
7 1848 Va. Acts 18.
8 1837 Ohio Laws 55.
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Frankfort Female University in 1867.9 In these cases, and others like
them, state statutes authorized such donations and established rules
for the scholarships.
State funds were also directly appropriated to scholarships
by the mid-1800s. After the federal Morrill Act granted land to public
universities in 1862,10 the authorizing statutes for the Illinois Industrial University in 186711 and Arkansas Industrial University in
186812 created full-tuition scholarships for children of veterans plus
one honorary scholarship per county. Likewise, when Cornell University13 and the Pennsylvania Museum and School for Industrial
Arts14 were founded in 1887, a full scholarship for one student per
county was created. The “competitive scholarship” for students attending a state’s flagship university also became relatively common.
A fixed number of full-tuition scholarships were appropriated to
students who succeeded on competitive exams, sometimes to students with financial need only. For example, in 1870, California began offering just five competitive scholarships to students with the
inability “to provide his own maintenance at the University [of California].”15 Other states tied the number of available competitive
scholarships to the number of counties or congressional districts,
like the University of South Carolina State Scholarship of 1874,16 the
University of Oregon scholarships of 1876,17 the Massachusetts Institute of Technology scholarship of 1887,18 and the University of Illinois State Scholarship of 1895.19 Like still today, scholarships were
commonly created to recruit new teachers, like the 1853 Massachusetts State Scholarship,20 the 1876 Vermont scholarship for students

9 1867 Ky. Local & Private Acts, 295.
10 Morrill Act, Act of July 2, 1862, Pub. L. No. 37-130, at 503, which established land
grant colleges.
11 Now the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; Ill. Pub. L., 25th Gen. Assemb., 1st
Sess., Act of March 8, 1867, at 123.
12 Now the University of Arkansas; 1868 Ark. Acts 327.
13 1887 N.Y. Laws 366.
14 Now the University of the Arts; 1887 Pa. Laws 380.
15 1870 Cal. Stat. 546.
16 1874 S.C. Acts, Spec. & Reg. Sess., 555.
17 1876 Or. Laws 52.
18 1889 Mass. Private & Special Stat. 1287.
19 1985 Ill. Laws 325.
20 1853 Mass. Acts 473.
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attending normal schools,21 the 1892 scholarship for students from
Frederick County to attend the Maryland Normal School,22 and the
1899 Utah Normal School scholarship.23
After the turn of the 20th century, more states implemented
the types of programs previously described, but new scholarship opportunities were created for targeted populations, including veterans, African-Americans, students with disabilities, and nurses. In the
wake of World War I, new scholarships were created for military
veterans and their dependents that were later expanded to include
World War II veterans, like those in New York and Illinois in 1919
and Kentucky and South Carolina in 1920.24 Another group that increasingly got financial aid was African-American students, like Oklahoma’s 1921 scholarships for African-American students to study
agriculture.25 Maryland in 1935, Tennessee in 1937, and Texas in
1939, among others, created scholarships for students to attend universities in other states because their own universities did not admit
African-Americans in certain programs, typically graduate and professional programs.26 Then, students with disabilities were awarded
scholarships, including Tennessee’s 1949 scholarship for blind students and Pennsylvania’s 1949 Blind or Deaf Higher Education Beneficiary Grant.27 Finally, a persistent post-war shortage of nurses
spurred the implementation of nursing scholarships, like those in
Florida, North Dakota, and Rhode Island in 1955.28
B. Modern State Financial Aid Programs, 1950 to Present
At mid-20th century, the United States population, its economy, and its higher education systems were rapidly expanding. State
governments wanted more residents to go to college and recognized
that price was a significant barrier. The introduction to Pennsylvania’s 1966 State Scholarship Program eloquently summarized what

21 1876 Vt. Acts & Resolves 117.
22 1892 Md. Laws 833.
23 1899 Utah Laws 121.
24 1919 N.Y. Laws 1602; 1919 Ill. Laws 922; 1920 Ky. Acts 281; 1920 S.C. Acts 973.
25 1921 Okla. Sess. Laws 222.
26 1935 Md. Laws 1203; Tenn. Acts., Act of May 21, 1937, ch. 256, at 1048; L. of Tex., 46th
Leg., R.S., Act of Sept. 1, 1939, ch. 8, at 359.
27 Tenn. Acts 1949, ch. 208; 24 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §13-1381 (West 2019).
28 1955 Fla. Laws 572; 1955 N.D. Laws, ch. 283; 1955 R.I. Acts & Resolves 548.
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many states were experiencing and why legislators created scholarship programs:
Although the enrollments of the postsecondary institutions of higher learning of this Commonwealth and throughout the nation continue to increase at a rapid pace, and although larger numbers
of the Commonwealth's children graduate from both
the public and nonpublic secondary schools each
year, there continues to be a tragic underdevelopment of the Commonwealth's human talent because
of the inability of many needy students to finance a
postsecondary educational program. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania can achieve its full economic
and social potential only if every individual has the
opportunity to contribute to the full extent of his capabilities and only when the financial barriers to his
economic, social and educational goals are removed.
It is therefore the policy of the Legislature and the
purpose of this act to establish a broad-scale State
scholarship program designed to guarantee that the
most able students from all sectors of the Commonwealth, the most needy students and students with
the capability to successfully complete postsecondary
educational programs, and deserving postsecondary
students are given the opportunity to continue their
program of self-improvement in an institution of
higher learning of their choice.29
Around this time, states commissioned studies of their higher education institutions, the postsecondary educational needs of their residents, and financial aid programs, like those of California in 1947,30
Louisiana in 1948,31 and Illinois in 1957.32 In the 1950s and 1960s, in
part due to these commissioned studies, some of the country’s largest state need-based programs were created, including what are now

29 Pa. Act of Jan. 25, Pub. L. 1546, No. 541, § 1 (1966).
30 Stat. Cal., 1947, ch. 47, at 542. See A Report of a Survey of the Needs of California in
ARCHIVE
OF
CALIFORNIA
(1948),
Higher
Education,
ONLINE
https://oac.cdlib.org/view?docId=hb2p3004kd&brand=oac4&chunk.id=meta.
31 1948 La. Acts. 1078.
32 ILL. HIGHER EDUC. COMM’N, ILL. LOOKS TO THE FUTURE IN HIGHER EDUC. (1957),
https://www.hathitrust.org/.
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the California Cal Grants, Illinois Monetary Award Program, Indiana
Frank O’Bannon Grants, New Jersey Tuition Aid Grant, and Pennsylvania State Grant. Before Congress created the federal Pell Grant
program in 1972,33 these and other state grant programs were critical sources of financial aid to needy college students.
In the early 1990s, the broad-based merit scholarship entered the state financial aid policy scene in Arkansas and Georgia,
quickly spreading throughout the Southeast and beyond.34 Unlike the
need-based scholarships of the preceding decades, these programs
were characterized by their academic requirements, and in many
cases, by their funding from state lottery proceeds. Innovative at the
time, at least 14 states implemented broad-based merit-aid programs by 2004.35 Many scholars have since studied and critiqued
these programs, none more so than the Georgia HOPE Scholarship.36
In recent years, the new state financial aid fad is the so-called
“promise” or “free college” program, which typically incentivizes
middle and high school students to attend in-state colleges by promising them scholarships.37 A recent study identified 150 such statefunded programs, though many are not recent inventions.38 New
promise programs, like Tennessee Promise and New York’s Excelsior
Scholarship, are making headlines as evidence of their effectiveness
becomes available and as politicians latch on to the free college
movement.39 Financial aid scholars and state policy experts are care33 Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235.
34 Donald E. Heller, State Merit Scholarship Programs: An Introduction, in WHO SHOULD
WE HELP? THE NEGATIVE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF MERIT SCHOLARSHIPS 15 (Donald E. Heller & Patricia Marin eds., 2002).
35 William K. Ingle & Jason R. Ratliff, Then and Now: An Analysis of Broad-based Merit
aid Initial Eligibility Policies After Twenty Years, 3 KY. J. OF HIGHER EDUC. POL’Y & PRAC. 1 (2015).
36 Critics of the Georgia HOPE Scholarship primarily point to its funding, the lottery.
Lower income people tend to play the lottery. Lottery proceeds then fund merit-based scholarships for students with the highest academic achievements, who typically come from middle
and higher-income families and better-resourced schools; therein lies the problem. See ERIK C.
NESS, MERIT AID AND THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION (2008); STATE MERIT SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAMS AND
RACIAL INEQUALITY (Donald E. Heller & Patricia Marin eds., 2004); WHO SHOULD WE HELP? THE
NEGATIVE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF MERIT SCHOLARSHIPS (Donald E. Heller & Patricia Marin eds.,
2002).
37 Laura W. Perna & Elaine W. Leigh, Understanding the Promise: A Typology of State
and Local College Promise Programs, 47 EDUC. RESEARCHER 155 (2018).
38 Id.; e.g., Indiana’s 1990 21st Century Scholars, Arkansas’ 1991 Academic Challenge
Scholarship, Florida’s 1997 Bright Futures, and 1998 Kentucky Educational Excellence Scholarship.
39 Tom Hilliard, Excelsior Scholarship Serving Very Few New York Students. CENTER FOR
AN URBAN FUTURE

(Aug. 2018), https://nycfuture.org/research/excelsior-scholarship; Poutre &
Voight, The State of Free College: Tennessee Promise and New York’s Excelsior Scholarship, INST.

49

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byu_elj/vol2020/iss1/1

168

Kiracofe: Race-Conscious Admissions Policies in American Institutions of Higher Education

BYU Education & Law Journal

[2020

fully watching the free college movement to see if promise programs
will revolutionize higher education finance.
As of the 2016-2017 academic year, the National Association
of State Student Grant and Aid Programs estimated that states spent
$12.8 billion on financial aid directly to students through over 600
different programs, including grants, loans, conditional grants, loan
forgiveness, tuition waivers, and others.40 With college costs on the
rise and the proportion of direct state appropriations to public colleges on the decline,41 state financial aid to students will remain an
important funding source of higher education.
For much of the history of American higher education, state
governments have funded scholarships for college students. Program trends evolved from competitive scholarships, to financial
need-based grants, to merit-aid scholarships, to the newest promise
programs. Throughout this history of state financial aid, as will be
demonstrated in this paper, state legislators put an important caveat
on some of their scholarship applicants: to be of “good moral character.” For context, I next delve into the history of good moral character requirements.
II. GOOD MORAL CHARACTER
The use of good moral character rules in American law is
ubiquitous. For example, a search for the phrase “good moral character” in HeinOnline yields over 17,000 entries dating back to 1782,
and that is not including all the variations of character rules, including “good character,” “high moral character,” or simply “character.”
Because much as already been written about good moral character
requirements, this brief review points readers to seminal articles on
the topic and establishes a foundation for this study of good moral
character requirements in state financial aid programs.42
The study of good moral character rules has focused on at
least three subjects: immigration law, occupational licensing, and the
HIGHER EDUC. POL’Y, (Sept. 2018), http://www.ihep.org/research/publications/state-freecollege-tennessee-promise-and-new-yorks-excelsior-scholarship.
FOR

40 NAT. ASSOCIATION OF STATE STUDENT GRANT AND AID PROGRAMS, 48TH ANNUAL SURVEY
REPORT ON STATE-SPONSORED STUDENT FINANCIAL AID: 2016-2017 A CADEMIC YEAR (2017),
https://www.nassgapsurvey.com/survey_reports.aspx.
41 STATE HIGHER EDUC. EXECUTIVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, STATE OF HIGHER EDUCATION
FINANCE:
FY
2017
(2018),
http://www.sheeo.org/sites/default/files/projectfiles/SHEEO_SHEF_FY2017_FINAL.pdf.
42 See infra this section.
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state bar.43 Of the three, the good moral character requirements in
immigration law are now the best defined. Since the 1790 Naturalization Act, persons seeking to become citizens of the US had to prove
their “good character,” but “for over 150 years, Congress offered no
guidance whatsoever on what constituted good moral character in
the naturalization context.”44 It was not until the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 that Congress delineated a list of crimes that
would disqualify a person from satisfying the good moral character
requirement, which was greatly expanded in the 1980s and 1990s.45
Today, hundreds of criminal charges and non-criminal behaviors
from before and after the five-year statutory review period are permanent or temporary bans on naturalization, including being a “habitual drunkard,” practicing polygamy, being involved in prostitution, and even having convictions that were expunged or pardoned.46
With few legal mechanisms for relief, immigrants with such experiences hesitate to apply for citizenship and are vulnerable to removal.47
State governments also regulate the character of working
professionals. As many occupations were professionalized in the late
19th and early 20th centuries, states exerted control by implementing
licensure systems, including good moral character requirements.48
Rationales for character requirements include professional gatekeeping (keeping undesirables out), protecting the status and reputation of the profession, protecting the public from bad practitioners,
and symbolic reasons.49 Legislators, regulatory agencies, and courts
have struggled – if not refused – to define good moral character.
Criminal convictions are the most common bar, but evidence of other
qualities and behaviors that courts may consider range from honesty
to integrity, fiscal responsibility, mental or emotional instability,
substance abuse, and failure to pay child support.50 Some courts,
however, have established that a person’s misconduct under ques43 Rhode, supra note 1.
44 Kevin Lapp, Reforming the Good Moral Character Requirement for US Citizenship, 87
IND. L. J. 1571, 1572 (2012).
45 Id.
46 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(2)(iv) (1993).
47 Lapp, supra note 44.
48 Rhode, supra note 1.
49 Id.
50 Larry Craddock, Good Moral Character as a Licensing Standard, 28 J. NAT. ASSOC.
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY. 449 (2008).

51

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byu_elj/vol2020/iss1/1

170

Kiracofe: Race-Conscious Admissions Policies in American Institutions of Higher Education

BYU Education & Law Journal

[2020

tion must be reasonably related to the occupation in order to be denied a license.51 Nonetheless, such requirements are serious employment barriers to the millions of Americans with criminal records.52
No application of good moral character rules among the professions has been more scrutinized than that of admission to the
bar.53 Character requirements have been a fixture of the Western law
profession for centuries, but in the United States, they were of little
importance until the late 19th century.54 In the first decades of the
20th century, the law profession began to formalize its entry standards, and character reviews became more systematic after the 1930s
as national and state bar associations garnered prominence.55 Since
then, courts have avoided defining good moral character and have
upheld bar denials for a host of “inconsistent and idiosyncratic” reasons,56 including adultery, public homosexual acts and other sexual
conduct,57 racist beliefs,58 failure to pay back student loans,59 failure
to pay child support or other financial debt,60 lack of candor on the
application, and a wide range of criminal conduct.61 Though denials
overall are relatively infrequent, there seems to have been a stark increase in the number of bar admission denials based on character in
51 Id.
52 Rhode, supra note 1; May, supra note 2.
53 See Tarra Simmons, Transcending the Stigma of a Criminal Record: A Proposal to Reform State Bar Character and Fitness Evaluations. 128 YALE L. J. FORUM 759 (2019); Keith
Swisher, The Troubling Rise of the Legal Profession's Good Moral Character, 82 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 1037 (2008); Theresa Keeley, Good Moral Character: Already an Unconstitutionally Vague
Concept and Now Putting Bar Applicants in a Post-9/11 World on an Elevated Threat Level, 6
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 844 (2004); Marcus Ratcliff, The Good Character Requirement: A Proposal for
a Uniform National Standard, 36 TULSA L. J. 487 (2000); Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a
Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491 (1985);; John R. Starrs, Considerations on Determination of Good Moral Character, 18 U. DETROIT L. J. 195 (1955); George W. Wickersham, The Moral
Character of Candidates for the Bar, 9 A.B.A.J. 617 (1923).
54 Rhode, supra note 53.
55 Id.
56 Rhode, supra note 53; Rhode, supra note 1.
57 Barbara Blackford, Good Moral Character and Homosexuality, 5 J. LEGAL PROF. 139

(1980).
58 Jason O. Billy, Confronting Racists at the Bar: Matthew Hale, Moral Character, and
Regulating the Marketplace of Ideas, 22 HARV. BLACKLETTER L. J. 25 (2006).
59 Tyler R. Martinez, The Effects of Student Loan Debt on State Bar Admission – Recalibrating the Good Moral Character Requirement, 14 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 37 (2011).
60 Aaron M. Clemens, Facing the Klieg Lights: Understanding the Good Moral Character
Examination for Bar Applicants, 40 AKRON L. REV. 255 (2007).
61 Rhode, supra note 53.
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recent decades.62 Perhaps recent newsworthy cases of formerlyincarcerated people defying the odds by being admitted to the bar
are a hopeful foreshadowing of fairer, more merciful character reviews in the modern era.63
Many legal scholars have called for the elimination or reform
of good moral character requirements for a variety of reasons. As a
matter of philosophy and psychology, character remains a contested
issue; a person’s actions are situation-dependent, and making character assessments based on limited information (perhaps a single
bad act) is flawed.64 Similarly, one study found that the personal history information reviewed during character reviews is a poor predictor of future misconduct among lawyers.65 Thus, if the purpose of reviewing character prior to occupational licensure is to protect safety,
some argue that a better strategy would be to discipline more consistently the practicing professionals who commit work-related offenses.66 Historically, character reviews were used to keep out political radicals, women, and ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities,
which may still occur today.67 Similarly, the fear of impending character reviews may dissuade people from seeking mental health support or exercising their free speech rights.68 For people formerly involved in the criminal justice system, denying employment because
of character rules is a perpetual punishment; doing so often ignores
evidence of rehabilitation or how old or unrelated one’s crime is to
an occupation, is often racially discriminatory, and is counterproductive to reducing criminal recidivism.69 Pragmatically, the process or
reviewing character itself is taxing and expensive for applicants and
agency reviewers alike,70 and there is known to be a great deal of
subjectivity and administrative error in making character determi-

62 Rhode, supra note 53; Swisher, supra note 53.
63 Simmons, supra note 53; Susan Svrluga, He Robbed Banks and Went to Prison. His
Time There Put Him on Track for a New Job: Georgetown Law Professor, THE WASHINGTON POST,
Apr. 21, 2017.
64 Rhode, supra note 1.
65 Leslie C. Levin, Christine Zozula & Peter Siegelman, The Questionable Character of the
Bar's Character and Fitness Inquiry, 40 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 51 (2015).
66 Rhode, supra note 53; Rhode, supra note 1.
67 Rhode, supra note 53.
68 Keeley, supra note 53; Rhode, supra note 53; Levin, Zozula & Siegelman, supra note

66.
69 Rhode, supra note 1; May, supra note 2.
70 Lapp, supra note 44; Levin, Zozula & Siegelman, supra note 66.
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nations.71 For these reasons and more, scholars and advocates in the
United States have called for reform of moral character reviews in
immigration law, occupational licensing, and bar admissions.
The character of people in the United States has been regulated by governments beyond these three areas. Applicants for state financial aid programs for college have been, and continue to be, subject to character reviews, but legal scholars have not examined this
subject with the same dedication as the others. How many state financial aid programs have character requirements? What does it
mean to be of good moral character as a scholarship applicant? How
have state officials and courts interpreted good moral character requirements in state financial aid programs? The following study was
guided by these questions.
II. THE STUDY
Though scholarship programs and good moral character rules
are both nearly as old as the American states themselves, there has
never been an analysis of their convergence in state higher education law. The purpose of this study is first to identify historical and
current state financial aid programs that contain character requirements and second to analyze how state governments interpreted and
enforced character requirements on scholarship applicants.
A. Methods
I analyzed the content of current state statutes for all 524
grants, conditional grants, and tuition waiver programs identified in
the 2017 National Association of State Student Grant and Aid Programs (NASSGAP) inventory.72 This process identified all the currently-funded scholarship programs with active character requirements.73 Next, I used HeinOnline’s session laws and historic state
statutes databases to find the original session law for each of the 524
programs, which I also analyzed for content. This process further
identified all the currently-active programs that formerly had charac-

71 Lapp, supra note 44.
72 See supra note 40. A grant is a non-repayable scholarship. A conditional grant or loan
is a non-repayable scholarship that becomes a repayable loan if the student does not comply
with the conditions of the program, typically post-graduation in-state work requirements. A
tuition waiver is where colleges do not charge a student for tuition at all, which may or may
not be reimbursed by the state.
73 See infra Table 3.
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ter rules earlier in their history.74 Then, I analyzed 2,170 HeinOnline
search results for “scholarship” between 1800-1950 to identify programs with character rules that are no longer active and thus were
not included in the NASSGAP program database.75 Finally, through a
process analogous to “snowball sampling,” I sometimes found relevant programs in the databases while in the process of searching for
another. These iterative steps add confidence that most programs
with character rules (current or old) were identified.
With the programs identified, I then sought to understand
the meaning of the character rules. I collected statutes, regulations,
court cases, attorney general opinions, government agency reports,
research articles, news reports, and other documents from online
databases, library archives, and state agencies. Because some programs with character rules are still active, I contacted state higher
education agency officials to get official statements on how they currently interpret the existing character rules. At times, when I did not
receive an initial response to my requests for records or explanations, I invoked open records laws to compel a timely response.

A. Limitations
Despite my due diligence, I do not claim to have identified
every program that ever contained a good moral character rule. My
systematic review of HeinOnline records was thorough, but it is possible that some eligible programs were not recorded in the database.
In addition, some programs may contain character rules not in statutes but within state administrative codes or agency regulations,
which I did not systemically review.76 Due to the complexity of the
state financial aid landscape, I did not review state loan programs,
loan forgiveness or repayment programs, savings or prepaid tuition
programs, dual enrollment programs, or work study programs.77
There is much still for higher education historians to learn about
state financial aid programs; perhaps this paper will inspire new inquiries into the topic.
74 See infra Table 2.
75 See infra Table 1.
76 See exception Table 2, Tennessee Student Assistance Award.
77 I point readers to a few examples of state loan programs that contain character rules,
including eight of New Mexico’s loan forgiveness programs: Allied Loan for Service, Health Professions Loan for Service, Health Professions Loan Repayment, Medical Loan for Service, Nurse
Educator Loan for Service, Nursing Loan for Service, Teacher Loan for Service, Western Interstate Commission on Higher Education (WICHE) Loan for Service Programs.
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B. Results

In total, 50 state grant programs with character requirements across 19 states were identified. Table 1 displays the 32 programs that are defunct, meaning they were repealed, reformulated
into new programs, or are no longer funded. Table 2 displays the
seven programs that are still active but whose character rules have
been deleted; states still award these scholarships, but applicants are
no longer reviewed for character. Finally, Table 3 displays the 11
programs that are still active and that still contain character requirements.
Most character rules were original to the authorizing statute,
except in the few cases where noted when character rules were later
added to a program through statutory amendments. The tables display the exact phrases in statute that pertain to a scholarship applicant’s character. There are as many as nine variations of character
rules, though “good moral character” is most common.
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III. BEING A GOOD STUDENT: THE MEANING OF GOOD MORAL
CHARACTER
Most state financial aid programs with character rules are
relics of the past.78 Historically, how did state policymakers, government officials, and university administrators interpret and enforce the character rules in these programs? Programs from Illinois,
Pennsylvania, and Michigan are discussed next as “case studies” because they are insightful for their unique historical circumstances.

A.Illinois
In 1955, Illinois Governor William Stratton created the Illinois Higher Education Commission (IHEC) to study the condition of
higher education in Illinois.79 In 1957, IHEC issued its report, which
included a proposal for a new need- and merit-based scholarship
that would support the training of more Illinois residents.80 The legislature adopted the proposal as the State Scholarship Act of 1957.81
IHEC proposed specific eligibility requirements for the scholarship,
including a “good moral character” requirement. IHEC’s only explanation for the requirement was rather uninformative: “For obvious
reasons, good moral character should be a condition of eligibility.”82
Further, nothing in the report indicated where this “obvious” rule
came from, but a historian of Illinois’ scholarship programs pointed
to one explanation. According to a report of the Illinois State Scholarship Commission, “the IHEC patterned the [State Scholarship Program] after a recently created California program.”83 Indeed, California legislators created the Competitive Scholarship in 1955.84
Applicants had to demonstrate financial need and “high moral char-

78 See Tables 1 & 2.
79 See supra note 32.
80 Id.
81 1957 Ill. Laws 855-861. By 1971, the State Scholarship was defunded, but still today,
the most academically strong students from across Illinois are designated as State Scholars by
the Illinois Student Assistance Commission.
82 See supra note 32, at 158.
83 Paul R. Eber, The ISSC’s Statutory Evolution: Scholarship and Grant Programs 19571982, IL. HIGHER EDUC. STUDENT ASSISTANCE COMM’N, at 27 (1982) (on file with author).
84 1955 Cal. Stat. ch. 1846.
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acter, good citizenship, and dedication to American ideals.”85 If IHEC
did model the State Scholarship off the California Competitive Scholarship, perhaps this is from where the good moral character requirement came.
Regardless of where it came from, the good moral character
requirement was “historically troubling for the [Illinois State Scholarship Commission]” to implement.86 An agency rule adopted prior
to 1973 defined good moral character as:
A student’s personal record of conduct, determined by the
high school to be in keeping with school and community standards.
High schools which withhold their recommendations of students for
reasons of ‘moral character’ shall have the responsibility of explaining their positions, as necessary, to parties having a proper and valid
interest in this information.87
In practice, high school principals determined who had good
moral character. Officials from the scholarship commission had to
clarify parameters for character occasionally, like in the 1960s when
they decided that premarital pregnancy should not disqualify a student on moral grounds.88 According to meeting minutes, commission
officials debated the legal standard of good moral character at least
six times between 1957 and 1973, and the rule was recommended to
be abolished several times between 1972 and 1975.89 It was estimated that six to ten students each year were denied scholarships
for moral reasons, though “no systematic study has been done of the
reasons high schools have withheld moral character certifications to
otherwise qualified State Scholar applicants.”90
In 1967, legislators created what is now called the Monetary
Award Program (MAP), a need-based grant with no initial academic
qualifications.91 They included the character rule in the MAP program, too, which shortly thereafter subsumed and replaced the State
Scholarship. The good moral character requirement continued to be
challenging to interpret after the creation of the MAP grant, especially when it came to the question of whether incarcerated students
should be disqualified on moral grounds. In 1971, the Illinois State
85 Id. at § 21702(e).
86 Eber, supra note 84, at 22.
87 Id at 23.
88 Id at 22.
89 Id at 23.
90 Id.
91 1967 Ill. Laws 2644, 2646.
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Scholarship Commission Executive Director, Joseph Boyd, asked the
Illinois Attorney General to issue an opinion on the matter. Mr. Boyd
asked:
Is there a legal definition of good moral character? Does a
person assigned by the courts to any institution of correction automatically disqualify himself for an award as long as he is serving out
his/her sentence? This matter has become an issue since a considerable number of public and private institutions in Illinois are now offering credit courses to those persons in Illinois institutions of correction.92
In March 1972, the Illinois Attorney General William Scott
responded with a 12-page, unpublished opinion.93 On the first question, the attorney general stated there was no consistent legal definition of good moral character and that each case needed to be decided
on the facts: “It is the applicant’s actual conduct that is at issue, not
the reputation of the applicant.”94 His best advice was that officials
“must objectively determine whether an applicant is of good moral
character by determining whether he measures up to the generally
accepted moral standards currently prevalent within the State of Illinois.”95
On the second question, the attorney general opined: “the
fact than an applicant for a scholarship is incarcerated in a correctional institution does not automatically disqualify him for a scholarship.” Though a person who commits a felony was, at the time, not of
good moral character, he suggested, other factors must be weighed
when evaluating the character of a person after the fact, such as evidence of rehabilitation.
According to the ISSC historian, the opinion was not particularly helpful to the agency, and it is not clear how officials handled
the good moral character requirement in its wake.96 However, when
ISSC issued its first program regulations in the new 1986 Illinois
Administrative Code, a person was said to be of good moral character “if the applicant will benefit from postsecondary instruction and
is allowed to enroll at an approved postsecondary institution.”97 This
92 1972 Ill. Att’y Gen. Op. 434 (NP) at 1-2.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 5.
95 Id. at 6.
96 Eber, supra note 84, at 31.
97 23 Ill. Admin. Code pt. 1700.20 (1986).

65

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byu_elj/vol2020/iss1/1

184

Kiracofe: Race-Conscious Admissions Policies in American Institutions of Higher Education

BYU Education & Law Journal

[2020

definition left open the possibility that incarcerated students enrolled in prison higher education programs could receive state
grants, which indeed happened so frequently that it caught the attention of state legislators. After a lively debate on the merits of funding
scholarships for incarcerated students, legislators eliminated their
eligibility through statutory amendment in 1989.98 Then, they eliminated the good moral character rule from the MAP statute in 1992
amidst a broad reorganization of the Higher Education Assistance
Act.99 Nonetheless, the 1986 definition of good moral character remains today in the definitions section of the Illinois Student Assistance Commission regulations that apply to all grant programs.100
However, there is no good moral character requirement listed in the
regulations’ section on general applicant eligibility requirements,
nor is it listed on the commission’s official website,101 which seems
to indicate that the good moral character rule no longer applies to
grant applicants in Illinois.102

B.Pennsylvania
In 1966, the Pennsylvania legislature created the State Scholarship Program to be administered by the recently created Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Authority (PHEAA). An original
statutory rule stated that scholarship applicants “shall satisfactorily
meet the qualifications of ‘financial need,’ character and academic
promise, as well as academic achievement, as established by the
agency,”103 which remains in statute today.104 In 1969, the legislature
left the character rule in place but added requirements related to
criminal history:
(a) The agency may deny all forms of financial assistance to
any student:

98 1989 Ill. Laws 6809, 6820.
99 1992 Ill. Laws 2128, 2137.
100 Formerly the Illinois State Scholarship Commission; 23 Ill. Admin. Code pt. 2700.20

(2018).
101 Illinois Student Assistance Commission, Monetary Award Program, Eligibility
(2019),
https://www.isac.org/students/during-college/types-of-financialaid/grants/monetary-award-program/#Eligibility.
102 23 Ill. Admin. Code pt. 2700.40 (2018).
103 Emphasis added; Pa. Act of Jan. 25, P.L. 1546, No. 541 (1966).
104 24 Pa. Stat. § 5154 (a)(5).
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(1) Who is convicted by any court of record of a criminal offense which was committed after the effective date of
this act which, under the laws of the United States or Pennsylvania, would constitute a misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude or a felony; or
(2) Who has been expelled, dismissed or denied enrollment by an approved institution of higher learning for refusal to obey, after the effective date of this act, a lawful regulation or order of any institution of higher education, which
refusal, in the opinion of the institution, contributed to a disruption of the activities, administration or classes of such institution; or
(3) Who has been convicted in any court of record of
any offense committed in the course of disturbing, interfering with or preventing, or in an attempt to disturb, interfere
with or prevent the orderly conduct of the activities, administration or classes of an institution of higher education.105

Punishing college students for campus unrest saw brief popularity in
the late 1960s, spurred on by Congress’ decision in the 1968 Higher
Education Amendments to block students convicted of similar disruptive behaviors from receiving federal financial aid.106 By 1971, at
least eleven states passed laws to prohibit scholarship eligibility to
students convicted of similar offenses (Keeney, 1971),107 but these
rules did not last long,108 including in Pennsylvania.
In Corporation of Haverford College v. Reeher (1971), students
and colleges sued PHEAA over the new rules.109 A majority of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
struck down the “misdemeanor involving moral turpitude” rule as
unconstitutionally vague and struck down the two rules pertaining
to students who were disciplined or convicted for campus disruptions as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.110 The court left in
105 Pa. Act of Dec. 18, 1969 (P.L. 171, No. 169) § 2.
106 Higher Education Amendments of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-575, § 504, 82 Stat. 1062.
107 Gregory D. Keeney, Aid to Education, Student Unrest, and Cutoff Legislation: An
Overview, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 1003 (1971).
108 The campus disruption rules were repealed from the Higher Education Act in 1980;
Education Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-374, 94 Stat. 1367.
109 Corporation of Haverford College v. Reeher, 329 F. Supp. 1196 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
110 The legislature never corrected the statute, so the unconstitutional provisions remain. See 24 Pa. Stat. § 5158.2.
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tact the state’s ability to deny state financial aid to felons. The plaintiffs did not ask the court to rule on the constitutionality of the
“character” requirement, though a dissenting judge commented on it.
Judge John William Ditter Jr., citing language from the 1966 statute,111 argued that the state should be allowed to deny aid to people
convicted of the prescribed crimes for fiscal reasons under the authority of the statutory character rule:
PHEAA must dispense millions of dollars of taxpayer's money and choose which among thousands of
applicants are "deserving" and which are most likely
to help the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania "achieve
its full economic and social potential" because they
are persons of "character". Viewed as a part of a legislative plan to allocate state money, the subsections in
question do not offend the requirements of due process.112
After winning another lawsuit in which PHEAA’s ability to withhold
aid from scholarship applicants who had pending felony charges was
upheld,113 PHEAA issued new regulations to correct the unconstitutional provisions. Relying on the character rule, it created new restrictions for people convicted of felonies and other specified crimes:
In order to be eligible for financial assistance a student applicant or recipient shall have and maintain
satisfactory character. A student applicant or recipient who is convicted of any of the following offenses
may be deemed to lack satisfactory character and be
denied any or all forms of financial assistance by the
Agency:
(1) A criminal offense which under the laws of the
United States or Pennsylvania constitutes a felony.
(2) Adultery. (3) Arson of personal property. (4) Assault and battery. (5) Pointing deadly weapons. (6)
Bribery. (7) Fornication and bastardy. (8) Prostitution and assignation. (9) Bigamy. (10 Blackmail. (11)
111 See supra p. 6; Pa. Act of Jan. 25, 1966 (P.L. 1546, No. 541) § 1.
112 Reeher, 329 F. Supp. at [PINCITE NEEDED].
113 Corporation of Haverford College v. Reeher, 53 F.R.D. 374 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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Abandoning an infant. (12) Corrupting the morals of
children. (13) Neglect to maintain child. (14) Use of
drugs. (15) Extortion. (16) False pretense. (17)
Fraud. (18) Desecrating flag of United States or Pennsylvania. (19) Forcible entry and detainer. (20) Indecent assault. (21) Libel. (22) Perjury. (23) Driving
under the influence of liquor or drugs or permitting
same.114

With the “misdemeanor involving moral turpitude” rule struck
down, PHEAA relied on the statutory character rule to delineate
these crimes as eligibility requirements. Dissatisfied with the new
regulations, convicted students returned to the same federal court to
sue PHEAA again.
In Carbonaro v. Reeher (1975), students who were convicted
of felonies and who lost aid eligibility under PHEAA’s new satisfactory character regulations sued PHEAA on the grounds that discriminating against people with felony convictions violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection under the law.115 The
court analyzed the extent to which denying financial aid to felons
had a legitimate state purpose. The state made a fiscal argument
with which the court agreed, much like Ditter’s dissent in Corporation of Haverford College v. Reeher (1971): “The state contends that
the classification is reasonable because the state has only finite resources and wishes to maximize the potential gain from the available
funds by providing assistance only to those students with ‘satisfactory character.’”116 The court returned to the original language of the
1966 statute, which states that only “deserving” students should be
given the aid and that students must “satisfactorily meet the qualifications of ‘financial need,’ character and academic promise.” Character, according to the court, was distinct from the other academic and
financial requirements, and a felony conviction may be indicative of
unsatisfactory character. The state, the court concluded, was justified in requiring felons to prove their satisfactory character to
PHEAA:

114 Emphasis added; 2 Pa. B. 506 (March 25, 1972).
115 Carbonaro v. Reeher, 392 F. Supp. 753, 755 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
116 Id. at 757.
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To reiterate, we hold that the statutory and administrative program whereby Pennsylvania places the
burden on former felons to prove that they are of satisfactory character in order to receive state financial
assistance for postsecondary education does not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The felon classification bears a rational
relationship to the legitimate state purpose of assuring that only responsible citizens receive state aid.117
PHEAA prevailed in this case, but the agency grew weary of defending itself in court. Seeking the most stable legal footing possible to
avoid future litigation, PHEAA made regulatory changes by loosening
its requirements on convicted students. In the months after the 1975
lawsuit, PHEAA began approving all applicants with misdemeanors
and first-degree felonies for aid “based on (1) the experience of [the
Administrative Review Committee] approving such cases [on appeal]
and (2) a question as to whether courts would uphold our denial of
aid based on a misdemeanor conviction.”118 In 1978, PHEAA eliminated the character test in the loan program so that any felon denied
grant aid could at least get a loan.119
In the 1980s, PHEAA further narrowed how it defined unsatisfactory character. In 1980, the Administrative Review Committee
began automatically reviewing any felon applicants that initial staff
could not agree on, and in 1985, staff were permitted to approve
nearly all felons so long as they paid for their first term of college out
pocket, which apparently was a demonstration of deservingness for
future aid.120 By 1988, data showed that almost all students with felony convictions were eventually approved for aid after exhausting
their appeal options.121 From then on, including still today, PHEAA
assumes “that once an applicant is released from incarceration, he
will be presumed to be of satisfactory character and eligible for aid.
Therefore, only currently incarcerated applicants are now denied
grant aid under the satisfactory character provision of the law.”122 It
117 Id. at 760.
118 Gary D. Smith, BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SATISFACTORY CHARACTER/CRIME POLICY, PA. HIGHER
EDUC. ASSISTANCE AUTHORITY, at 2 (1990) (on file with author).
119 8 Pa. B. 3085 (November 11, 1985).
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.

70

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2020

189

BYU Education & Law Journal, Vol. 2020, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 1

2]

Being a Good College Student

took nearly twenty years, but Pennsylvania finally came to an interpretation of good character that it could maintain and justify, which
remains in force today.

C.Michigan
By 1979, the state of Michigan administered four grant programs for college students. That year, the auditor general conducted
an audit of the four programs, finding many inconsistencies in their
eligibility requirements.123 One such inconsistency was that two of
the programs – the 1964 Competitive Scholarship and the 1966 Tuition Grant program – contained “good moral character” rules but the
other two did not. State legislators authored bills to correct the inconsistencies.124 In the first drafts of Senate Bills 1275 and 1276 introduced on September 23, 1980, the legislators proposed to strike
the good moral character rules from both scholarship programs, but
two weeks later, they added a rule making incarcerated students ineligible for the Competitive Scholarship in Bill 1276. According to a
senate analysis summary from November 10, 1980, this amendment
was thought to “sharpen the original intent of the ‘good moral character’ provision.”125 For consistency, they then added the incarceration rule to Bill 1275 to replace the character rule in the Tuition
Grant program, which senate analyses again suggested would sharpen the original intent of the character rule.126 When Senate Bills 1275
and 1276 passed in 1981, the character rules were indeed replaced
with prohibitions on aid to incarcerated students,127 as remains the
case today.128 Thus, legislators apparently believed that incarcerated
people were not of good moral character and were therefore undeserving of scholarships for college. Today, only the incarceration re-

123 STATE OF MICH. OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GEN., AUDIT REPORT: STUDENT FIN. ASSISTANCE
SERVS., ET AL., DEP’T OF EDUC. (1979) (on file with author).
124 Mich. 1980 SB 1275 (Michigan Tuition Grants); Mich. 1980 SB 1276 (Michigan Competitive Scholarship); Mich. 1980 SB 1277 (Differential Grants Program); Mich. 1980 SB 1278
(Legislative Merit Awards Program).
125 MICH. S. ANALYSIS SECTION, S.B. 1275, 1276, 1277, & 1278: FIRST ANALYSIS, at 3 (Nov. 10,
1980) (on file with author).
126 MICH. S. ANALYSIS SECTION, S.B. 1275, 1276, 1277, & 1278: SECOND ANALYSIS, at 3 (Dec.
22, 1980) (on file with author).
127 Mich. 1981 P.A. 500 § 4; Mich. 1981 P.A. 503 § 3.
128 Mich. Compiled Laws 390.974 (2017); MCL 390.993 (2017).
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quirements remain in both programs, freeing state officials from
having to define good moral character.

D.Active Programs
The three state case studies presented above demonstrate
how state lawmakers, government officials, and courts interpreted
good moral character rules in financial aid programs between the
1960s and 1980s. But Table 3 shows that there are at least 11 active
programs that still contain character rules, suggesting that student
applicants must continue to meet character requirements. How do
officials currently interpret and enforce the character rules in these
programs? This section discusses the six states shown in Table 3.
In Pennsylvania, the original “character” rule from 1966 remains in statute, and a state regulation still stipulates “a student applicant or recipient shall have and maintain satisfactory character.”129 As described above, court decisions and regulatory actions of
the 1970s and 1980s yielded what is still today the interpretation of
satisfactory character for the Pennsylvania State Grant.130 Though
there is no statute or regulation that says so, the only condition that
triggers the satisfactory character clause is incarceration, even
though other conditions are still listed as possibilities in the Pennsylvania Code.131 In the eyes of the Pennsylvania Higher Education
Assistance Authority, to be of unsatisfactory character is to be incarcerated. This interpretation is made clear in the 2017 Pennsylvania
State Grant Program Policy Manual in a section titled “Satisfactory
Character,” which states: “State Grant eligibility is not impacted by a
felony conviction unless the student is also currently incarcerated.
All incarcerated students are ineligible for State Grant awards.”132 As
Pennsylvania added new scholarship programs over the years,
PHEAA tied their eligibility requirements to that of the State Grant,
rendering incarcerated students in Pennsylvania ineligible for all
state-funded grant programs.
There is one remaining Illinois scholarship statute that still
contains a character rule. The present-day University of Illinois Children of Veterans Tuition Waiver has its roots in one of the oldest
129 22 Pa. Code § 121.6(a).
130 See discussion supra Part IV.B.
131 22 Pa. Code § 121.6(a)(1-3).
132 PA HIGHER EDUC. ASSISTANCE AUTHORITY, PA STATE GRANT PROGRAM POL’Y MANUAL, at 23
(2017), https://www.pheaa.org/documents/grants/ph/2017-18-policy-manual.pdf.
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scholarship programs in the study sample: the 1867 Illinois Industrial University scholarship: “for the benefit of the descendants of the
soldiers and seamen who served in the armies and navies of the
United States during the late rebellion.”133 Though amended many
times, the program is still active, and the state administers this program directly through the University of Illinois, rather than through
the state’s financial aid agency. However, the University of Illinois
application for the program conspicuously omits any mention of the
character requirement, despite an otherwise detailed accounting of
the eligibility requirements.134 It seems the old character rule is
simply ignored in practice, and an official from the University of Illinois did not respond to my request for more information about how
they evaluate character.
Virginia funds three programs that contain character rules.
The Virginia State Board of Health administers four scholarships for
undergraduate and graduate students under the 1950 Nurse Scholarship program. Regarding character, the Board checks all applicants’ nursing licenses for disciplinary issues, and on the application
forms, college nursing faculty must attest to a scholarship applicant’s
character.135 Officials from Virginia Tech did not respond to my
emails about how they administer the 1970 Soil Scientist Scholarship. Each institution in Virginia administers the 1936 “unfunded
scholarship,” and I did not attempt to learn from each institution
how they define character.
Similarly, three entities administer scholarship programs in
Alabama with character rules. The Alabama Board of Nursing administers the 1977 Graduate Nursing Scholarship, but a Board official
reported that there is no single definition of “good character” for the
purpose of the scholarship.136 Instead, several sections of the administrative code outline the standards of practice, conduct, and accountability that would be referenced when selecting scholarship
applicants.137 Officials from the Alabama Optometric Association and
the Alabama Board of Dental Scholarship Awards did not respond to
133 1867 Ill. Pub. L. 123.
134
See
application
form,
available
content/uploads/2018/11/1920_COV_App.pdf.

at

https://osfa.illinois.edu/wp-

135
See
application
forms,
VA
DEPT.
OF
HEALTH,
available
at
http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/health-equity/forms-and-applications/; Personal Communication, Mar. 21, 2019 (notes on file with author).
136 Personal Communication, Feb. 20, 2019 (e-mail on file with author).
137 Ala. Admin. Code Rules 610-X-6; 610-X-6-.03; 610-X-8; 610-X-8-.03.
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my requests for information about the scholarship programs that
they administer.
In South Carolina, two grant programs still have character
rules, which are administered by separate state agencies. An official
from the South Carolina Higher Education Tuition Grants Commission informed me that they do not interpret or define the “good moral character” requirement in the 1970 Tuition Grant program, nor
would they deny an applicant based on moral reasons, alone.138 Any
denials would be based on other existing requirements. An official
from the South Carolina Commission on Higher Education did not respond to my email about the 1996 Need-based Grant program.
Finally, regarding the 1971 Oklahoma Tuition Grant Program, an official from the Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education was not able to clarify the state’s position on enforcing the “high
moral character” requirement.139 Since higher education institutions
share responsibility for eligibility requirement enforcement, it is
possible that a student may be denied eligibility under the character
rule following an incident of campus misconduct, the official suggested. What is more likely is that the 1995 amendment to the Tuition Grant program statute that made incarcerated students ineligible for aid rendered the character rule itself moot.140
V. ELIMINATING CHARACTER REQUIREMENTS
Good moral character rules in state financial aid programs
are mostly relics of the past. Of the 50 programs identified with such
rules since 1850, just 11 (22%) are active today with their character
rules still intact. In the historical cases of Pennsylvania, Illinois, and
Michigan, the character rules were eventually converted into bans on
financial aid to incarcerated students, which may represent contemporary beliefs about what it meant to be of good moral character. In
the six states where financial aid programs still contain character
rules, the rules are largely ignored, as best illustrated by the requirement being left off the Illinois Children of Veterans Tuition
Waiver application. In others, explicit eligibility requirements pertaining to criminal history, financial standing (e.g., not being in default on loans or owing child support), or other misconduct are enforced in lieu of any behavior that otherwise might be representative
138 Personal Communication, Apr. 12, 2018 (e-mail on file with author).
139 Personal Communication, Mar. 23, 2018 (e-mail on file with author).
140 1995 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 247.
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of unsatisfactory character. In other words, character rules are
meaningless or redundant as applied in most of today’s state financial aid programs.
At least six states have stripped their current financial aid
programs of old character rules.141 There are good reasons for policymakers to continue this trend by deleting the last remaining good
character rules from financial aid program statutes and regulations.
First, despite one court’s assertion that it is in the state’s interest to
award scholarships only to deserving applicants with satisfactory
character,142 character requirements contradict the policy goals of
modern state financial aid programs. The broad need-based programs are intended to make college affordable so that all residents
can gain new knowledge and skills, get higher paying jobs, and bolster the American economy.143 Thus, denying any academicallyqualified state resident the benefits of college scholarships because
of character or criminal history works against the public interests of
a well-educated society. Access to and completion of higher education is more dependent now than ever on the ability to pay for college,144 and denying aid to applicants based on character is an arcane
way to save the state a small amount of money. Any state resident
who has been admitted to a recognized college should be considered
to meet the baseline qualifications for a grant.145
Second, the inconsistency of program rules is cumbersome.
Of the six states that still have character requirements, only Pennsylvania’s character statute applies to all programs. In the other states,
it is a fluke of history that just one or two programs still have character requirements. For example, Virginia currently funds 38 grants,
conditional grants or loans, and tuition waiver programs to undergraduate, graduate, and professional students, just three of which
have character requirements.146 Like Michigan did in 1981, states
should eliminate their remaining character requirements for the
sake of simplicity and consistency across programs.

141 See supra Table 2.
142 Carbonaro v. Reeher, 392 F. Supp. 753, 759 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
143 Supra notes 25 & 27.
144 See SARA GOLDRICK-RAB, PAYING THE PRICE: COLLEGE COSTS, FINANCIAL AID, AND THE
BETRAYAL OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (2016).
145 For example, see Illinois’ definition of good moral character: 23 Ill. Admin. Code pt.
2700.20 (2018).
146 See supra note 40.
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Third, the rules themselves are burdensome to administer.
State officials, program administrators, and college financial aid officers would not have to field questions from students, parents, and
the rare researcher about the meaning of good moral character if
they deleted them. Perhaps the reason that six state officials – even
after making open records requests in some cases – did not respond
to my request for clarification on the character rules is evidence they
did not have an answer or were too busy. Either way, governmental
efficiency would be improved ever so slightly by striking these burdensome rules.
Fourth, though likely infrequent, there still may be colleges
or state agencies that deny eligibility to students for ill-defined reasons of unsatisfactory character. This is especially possible where
individual institutions make character determinations for scholarship programs based on their knowledge of an applicant’s prior behavior (e.g., criminal convictions or discipline at previous educational institutions) or an applicant’s behavior on campus (e.g., academic
or behavioral misconduct violations). Eliminating character requirements may restore scholarship eligibility to some students.
Finally, confusion around what constitutes good moral character may be a deterrent to qualified applicants. In a U.S. Department
of Education survey of college students who did not apply for federal
financial aid, 18.9% said the forms were too much work and 60.7%
thought they would be ineligible, though over half of them were in
fact eligible for a Pell Grant.147 Combine that with evidence that formerly-convicted students were deterred from applying to college
when they knew they faced criminal history questions on the application.148 It stands to reason that an otherwise qualified student with
a criminal conviction, for example, may be deterred from applying
for a state scholarship with a nebulous character requirement out of
stigma, fear of rejection, or confusion over the requirement. Eliminating character rules helps to ensure that students will not be deterred from applying because of confusing requirements.
For these reasons, the current practice of ignoring or haphazardly enforcing good moral character rules is unsatisfactory.
State policymakers should delete the few remaining good moral
character requirements from financial aid programs.

147 Mark Kantrowitz, Reasons Why Students Do Not File the FAFSA, STUDENT FINANCIAL
AID POL’Y ANALYSIS, (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.finaid.org/educators/studentaidpolicy.phtml.
148 Center for Community Alternatives, Boxed Out: Criminal History Screening and College Application Attrition (2015), http://www.communityalternatives.org/fb/boxed-out.html.
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VI. CONCLUSION
For nearly a century, legal scholars have lamented good moral character rules in immigration law, occupational licensing, and bar
admissions; yet during that period and prior, good moral character
rules also existed in state financial aid programs for college students.
For the first time, this paper offered an accounting of state scholarship programs with good moral character rules and an analysis of
what they mean and how they are enforced. Most of the 50 identified
programs with character rules are now defunct, but applicants for at
least 11 programs in six states still must contend with character requirements, to varying degrees. I join the chorus of other scholars in
advocating that good moral character requirements should be deleted.
The identification of character requirements in financial aid
programs raises the question as to what other previouslyunidentified subjects are affected by good moral character rules, especially within education law. For example, in my review of historical state statutes, I found laws that listed good character as a requirement for admission to college, not just for scholarships. Today,
most colleges require students to disclose criminal history on college
applications,149 but do any still evaluate character? Law schools, for
example, certainly ask applicants “character and fitness” questions,
ranging from criminal history, educational discipline, military discipline, substance abuse history, to involvement in civil litigation.150
Future research might pursue a review of good moral character requirements in college admissions policies and in other higher education laws.

149 See Bradley D. Custer, College Admission Policies for Ex-Offender Students: A Literature Review, 67 J. CORRECTIONAL EDUC. 35 (2016); Douglas N. Evans, Jason Szkola & Victor St.
John, Going Back to College? Criminal Stigma in Higher Education Admissions in Northeastern
US, CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2019) (advance online publication); Robert Stewart & Christopher
Uggen, Criminal Records and College Admissions: A National Experimental Audit (Sept. 10,
2018) (unpublished working paper).
150 John S. Dzienkowski, Character and Fitness Inquiries in Law School Admissions, 45
S. TEX. L. REV. 921 (2004).
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Being a Good College Student: The History of Good
Moral Character Rules in State Financial Aid
Programs, 1850 to Now
Bradley Custer, Ph.D.

INTRODUCTION
Federal and state governments regulate the character of
their residents as a condition of immigration, employment, social
services, and beyond.1 At the state level, “good moral character”
rules have been analyzed in depth for decades, mostly as they pertain to admission to the bar and other licensed professions.2 Character requirements also affect the ability of college students to get
state-funded financial aid, but these policies have received no scholarly analysis. According to this study’s findings, there have been at
least 50 state financial aid grant programs with character rules,
which begs the question: what does it mean to be a “good” college
student? This paper offers an original study of the character requirements of state financial aid programs, including analysis of how
character requirements were and still are interpreted and enforced.
New insights are offered on the meaning of good moral character in
this higher education law context that contribute to the wider literature on the use of good moral character requirements.
This paper begins with a two-part literature review, first on
the history of state financial aid programs and second on the use of
good moral character requirements in American law. Then, the
methods and results of this original study are presented. Three historic state case studies are discussed in depth to explain how good
moral character requirements were interpreted in the past. Also explained is how the few remaining good moral character rules are
currently enforced. Finally, a rationale is made for eliminating all
good moral character requirements from state financial aid programs.
1 Deborah L. Rhode, Virtue and the Law: The Good Moral Character Requirement in Occupational Licensing, Bar Regulation, and Immigration Proceedings, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
1027 (2018).
2 See id.; Bruce E. May, The Character Component of Occupational Licensing Laws: A
Continuing Barrier to the Ex-Felon's Employment Opportunities, 71 N. D. L. REV. 187 (1995).
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I. THE HISTORY OF STATE FINANCIAL AID
A brief history of how state governments have funded college
scholarships provides needed context for the forthcoming study of
their eligibility requirements. Though much has been written about
the history of federal financial aid programs,3 a comprehensive history of state-funded financial aid programs has not been written –
something that the field of higher education needs. Writers typically
describe the history of state financial aid dating back only to the mid20th century, when states began implementing broad-scale needbased grant programs that are the predecessors of today’s programs.4 However, some states offered scholarships to their residents
at least one hundred years before then.5 To illustrate, I conducted a
review of state statutes 1800-1950 by searching for the term “scholarship” in the HeinOnline State Session Laws Library, yielding 2,170
results.6 In this section, I first outline my findings from the database
search. Then, I summarize trends in state financial aid programs
from 1950 to present with evidence from the higher education research literature.
A. Early State Scholarship Programs, 1800-1950
Some of the earliest references to scholarships in state statutes are actually privately-endowed scholarships. States and institutions solicited donors by offering full-tuition scholarships to them
and their dependents, like at the Virginia Military Institute in 1848,7
Ohio’s St. Clairsville Collegiate Seminary in 1855,8 and Kentucky’s

3 See Matthew B. Fuller, A History of Financial Aid to Students, 44 J. OF STUDENT

FINANCIAL AID 42 (2014); Elizabeth A. Duffy & Idana Goldberg, The Development of Need-Based
Aid, in CRAFTING A CLASS: COLLEGE ADMISSIONS AND FINANCIAL AID, 1955-1994 at 169 (1998).
4 See Donald E. Heller, The Policy Shift in State Financial Aid Programs, in HIGHER
EDUCATION: HANDBOOK OF THEORY AND RESEARCH 221 (John C. Smart ed., 2002).
5 See infra this section.
6 The HeinOnline State Session Laws Library is an online database containing over 12.7
million pages of state session laws for all 50 states and more with coverage going back to each
state’s inception. The word “scholarship” has several meanings. For example, a “certificate of
scholarship” is an old name for a college diploma, and being of “requisite scholarship” or the
“highest scholarship” means a person is properly trained and well educated. Thus, a majority
of the search results for “scholarship” did not pertain to a financial aid program as it is being
used here.
7 1848 Va. Acts 18.
8 1837 Ohio Laws 55.
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Frankfort Female University in 1867.9 In these cases, and others like
them, state statutes authorized such donations and established rules
for the scholarships.
State funds were also directly appropriated to scholarships
by the mid-1800s. After the federal Morrill Act granted land to public
universities in 1862,10 the authorizing statutes for the Illinois Industrial University in 186711 and Arkansas Industrial University in
186812 created full-tuition scholarships for children of veterans plus
one honorary scholarship per county. Likewise, when Cornell University13 and the Pennsylvania Museum and School for Industrial
Arts14 were founded in 1887, a full scholarship for one student per
county was created. The “competitive scholarship” for students attending a state’s flagship university also became relatively common.
A fixed number of full-tuition scholarships were appropriated to
students who succeeded on competitive exams, sometimes to students with financial need only. For example, in 1870, California began offering just five competitive scholarships to students with the
inability “to provide his own maintenance at the University [of California].”15 Other states tied the number of available competitive
scholarships to the number of counties or congressional districts,
like the University of South Carolina State Scholarship of 1874,16 the
University of Oregon scholarships of 1876,17 the Massachusetts Institute of Technology scholarship of 1887,18 and the University of Illinois State Scholarship of 1895.19 Like still today, scholarships were
commonly created to recruit new teachers, like the 1853 Massachusetts State Scholarship,20 the 1876 Vermont scholarship for students

9 1867 Ky. Local & Private Acts, 295.
10 Morrill Act, Act of July 2, 1862, Pub. L. No. 37-130, at 503, which established land
grant colleges.
11 Now the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; Ill. Pub. L., 25th Gen. Assemb., 1st
Sess., Act of March 8, 1867, at 123.
12 Now the University of Arkansas; 1868 Ark. Acts 327.
13 1887 N.Y. Laws 366.
14 Now the University of the Arts; 1887 Pa. Laws 380.
15 1870 Cal. Stat. 546.
16 1874 S.C. Acts, Spec. & Reg. Sess., 555.
17 1876 Or. Laws 52.
18 1889 Mass. Private & Special Stat. 1287.
19 1985 Ill. Laws 325.
20 1853 Mass. Acts 473.
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attending normal schools,21 the 1892 scholarship for students from
Frederick County to attend the Maryland Normal School,22 and the
1899 Utah Normal School scholarship.23
After the turn of the 20th century, more states implemented
the types of programs previously described, but new scholarship opportunities were created for targeted populations, including veterans, African-Americans, students with disabilities, and nurses. In the
wake of World War I, new scholarships were created for military
veterans and their dependents that were later expanded to include
World War II veterans, like those in New York and Illinois in 1919
and Kentucky and South Carolina in 1920.24 Another group that increasingly got financial aid was African-American students, like Oklahoma’s 1921 scholarships for African-American students to study
agriculture.25 Maryland in 1935, Tennessee in 1937, and Texas in
1939, among others, created scholarships for students to attend universities in other states because their own universities did not admit
African-Americans in certain programs, typically graduate and professional programs.26 Then, students with disabilities were awarded
scholarships, including Tennessee’s 1949 scholarship for blind students and Pennsylvania’s 1949 Blind or Deaf Higher Education Beneficiary Grant.27 Finally, a persistent post-war shortage of nurses
spurred the implementation of nursing scholarships, like those in
Florida, North Dakota, and Rhode Island in 1955.28
B. Modern State Financial Aid Programs, 1950 to Present
At mid-20th century, the United States population, its economy, and its higher education systems were rapidly expanding. State
governments wanted more residents to go to college and recognized
that price was a significant barrier. The introduction to Pennsylvania’s 1966 State Scholarship Program eloquently summarized what

21 1876 Vt. Acts & Resolves 117.
22 1892 Md. Laws 833.
23 1899 Utah Laws 121.
24 1919 N.Y. Laws 1602; 1919 Ill. Laws 922; 1920 Ky. Acts 281; 1920 S.C. Acts 973.
25 1921 Okla. Sess. Laws 222.
26 1935 Md. Laws 1203; Tenn. Acts., Act of May 21, 1937, ch. 256, at 1048; L. of Tex., 46th
Leg., R.S., Act of Sept. 1, 1939, ch. 8, at 359.
27 Tenn. Acts 1949, ch. 208; 24 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §13-1381 (West 2019).
28 1955 Fla. Laws 572; 1955 N.D. Laws, ch. 283; 1955 R.I. Acts & Resolves 548.
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many states were experiencing and why legislators created scholarship programs:
Although the enrollments of the postsecondary institutions of higher learning of this Commonwealth and throughout the nation continue to increase at a rapid pace, and although larger numbers
of the Commonwealth's children graduate from both
the public and nonpublic secondary schools each
year, there continues to be a tragic underdevelopment of the Commonwealth's human talent because
of the inability of many needy students to finance a
postsecondary educational program. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania can achieve its full economic
and social potential only if every individual has the
opportunity to contribute to the full extent of his capabilities and only when the financial barriers to his
economic, social and educational goals are removed.
It is therefore the policy of the Legislature and the
purpose of this act to establish a broad-scale State
scholarship program designed to guarantee that the
most able students from all sectors of the Commonwealth, the most needy students and students with
the capability to successfully complete postsecondary
educational programs, and deserving postsecondary
students are given the opportunity to continue their
program of self-improvement in an institution of
higher learning of their choice.29
Around this time, states commissioned studies of their higher education institutions, the postsecondary educational needs of their residents, and financial aid programs, like those of California in 1947,30
Louisiana in 1948,31 and Illinois in 1957.32 In the 1950s and 1960s, in
part due to these commissioned studies, some of the country’s largest state need-based programs were created, including what are now

29 Pa. Act of Jan. 25, Pub. L. 1546, No. 541, § 1 (1966).
30 Stat. Cal., 1947, ch. 47, at 542. See A Report of a Survey of the Needs of California in
ARCHIVE
OF
CALIFORNIA
(1948),
Higher
Education,
ONLINE
https://oac.cdlib.org/view?docId=hb2p3004kd&brand=oac4&chunk.id=meta.
31 1948 La. Acts. 1078.
32 ILL. HIGHER EDUC. COMM’N, ILL. LOOKS TO THE FUTURE IN HIGHER EDUC. (1957),
https://www.hathitrust.org/.
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the California Cal Grants, Illinois Monetary Award Program, Indiana
Frank O’Bannon Grants, New Jersey Tuition Aid Grant, and Pennsylvania State Grant. Before Congress created the federal Pell Grant
program in 1972,33 these and other state grant programs were critical sources of financial aid to needy college students.
In the early 1990s, the broad-based merit scholarship entered the state financial aid policy scene in Arkansas and Georgia,
quickly spreading throughout the Southeast and beyond.34 Unlike the
need-based scholarships of the preceding decades, these programs
were characterized by their academic requirements, and in many
cases, by their funding from state lottery proceeds. Innovative at the
time, at least 14 states implemented broad-based merit-aid programs by 2004.35 Many scholars have since studied and critiqued
these programs, none more so than the Georgia HOPE Scholarship.36
In recent years, the new state financial aid fad is the so-called
“promise” or “free college” program, which typically incentivizes
middle and high school students to attend in-state colleges by promising them scholarships.37 A recent study identified 150 such statefunded programs, though many are not recent inventions.38 New
promise programs, like Tennessee Promise and New York’s Excelsior
Scholarship, are making headlines as evidence of their effectiveness
becomes available and as politicians latch on to the free college
movement.39 Financial aid scholars and state policy experts are care33 Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235.
34 Donald E. Heller, State Merit Scholarship Programs: An Introduction, in WHO SHOULD
WE HELP? THE NEGATIVE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF MERIT SCHOLARSHIPS 15 (Donald E. Heller & Patricia Marin eds., 2002).
35 William K. Ingle & Jason R. Ratliff, Then and Now: An Analysis of Broad-based Merit
aid Initial Eligibility Policies After Twenty Years, 3 KY. J. OF HIGHER EDUC. POL’Y & PRAC. 1 (2015).
36 Critics of the Georgia HOPE Scholarship primarily point to its funding, the lottery.
Lower income people tend to play the lottery. Lottery proceeds then fund merit-based scholarships for students with the highest academic achievements, who typically come from middle
and higher-income families and better-resourced schools; therein lies the problem. See ERIK C.
NESS, MERIT AID AND THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION (2008); STATE MERIT SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAMS AND
RACIAL INEQUALITY (Donald E. Heller & Patricia Marin eds., 2004); WHO SHOULD WE HELP? THE
NEGATIVE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF MERIT SCHOLARSHIPS (Donald E. Heller & Patricia Marin eds.,
2002).
37 Laura W. Perna & Elaine W. Leigh, Understanding the Promise: A Typology of State
and Local College Promise Programs, 47 EDUC. RESEARCHER 155 (2018).
38 Id.; e.g., Indiana’s 1990 21st Century Scholars, Arkansas’ 1991 Academic Challenge
Scholarship, Florida’s 1997 Bright Futures, and 1998 Kentucky Educational Excellence Scholarship.
39 Tom Hilliard, Excelsior Scholarship Serving Very Few New York Students. CENTER FOR
AN URBAN FUTURE

(Aug. 2018), https://nycfuture.org/research/excelsior-scholarship; Poutre &
Voight, The State of Free College: Tennessee Promise and New York’s Excelsior Scholarship, INST.
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fully watching the free college movement to see if promise programs
will revolutionize higher education finance.
As of the 2016-2017 academic year, the National Association
of State Student Grant and Aid Programs estimated that states spent
$12.8 billion on financial aid directly to students through over 600
different programs, including grants, loans, conditional grants, loan
forgiveness, tuition waivers, and others.40 With college costs on the
rise and the proportion of direct state appropriations to public colleges on the decline,41 state financial aid to students will remain an
important funding source of higher education.
For much of the history of American higher education, state
governments have funded scholarships for college students. Program trends evolved from competitive scholarships, to financial
need-based grants, to merit-aid scholarships, to the newest promise
programs. Throughout this history of state financial aid, as will be
demonstrated in this paper, state legislators put an important caveat
on some of their scholarship applicants: to be of “good moral character.” For context, I next delve into the history of good moral character requirements.
II. GOOD MORAL CHARACTER
The use of good moral character rules in American law is
ubiquitous. For example, a search for the phrase “good moral character” in HeinOnline yields over 17,000 entries dating back to 1782,
and that is not including all the variations of character rules, including “good character,” “high moral character,” or simply “character.”
Because much as already been written about good moral character
requirements, this brief review points readers to seminal articles on
the topic and establishes a foundation for this study of good moral
character requirements in state financial aid programs.42
The study of good moral character rules has focused on at
least three subjects: immigration law, occupational licensing, and the
HIGHER EDUC. POL’Y, (Sept. 2018), http://www.ihep.org/research/publications/state-freecollege-tennessee-promise-and-new-yorks-excelsior-scholarship.
FOR

40 NAT. ASSOCIATION OF STATE STUDENT GRANT AND AID PROGRAMS, 48TH ANNUAL SURVEY
REPORT ON STATE-SPONSORED STUDENT FINANCIAL AID: 2016-2017 A CADEMIC YEAR (2017),
https://www.nassgapsurvey.com/survey_reports.aspx.
41 STATE HIGHER EDUC. EXECUTIVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, STATE OF HIGHER EDUCATION
FINANCE:
FY
2017
(2018),
http://www.sheeo.org/sites/default/files/projectfiles/SHEEO_SHEF_FY2017_FINAL.pdf.
42 See infra this section.
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state bar.43 Of the three, the good moral character requirements in
immigration law are now the best defined. Since the 1790 Naturalization Act, persons seeking to become citizens of the US had to prove
their “good character,” but “for over 150 years, Congress offered no
guidance whatsoever on what constituted good moral character in
the naturalization context.”44 It was not until the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 that Congress delineated a list of crimes that
would disqualify a person from satisfying the good moral character
requirement, which was greatly expanded in the 1980s and 1990s.45
Today, hundreds of criminal charges and non-criminal behaviors
from before and after the five-year statutory review period are permanent or temporary bans on naturalization, including being a “habitual drunkard,” practicing polygamy, being involved in prostitution, and even having convictions that were expunged or pardoned.46
With few legal mechanisms for relief, immigrants with such experiences hesitate to apply for citizenship and are vulnerable to removal.47
State governments also regulate the character of working
professionals. As many occupations were professionalized in the late
19th and early 20th centuries, states exerted control by implementing
licensure systems, including good moral character requirements.48
Rationales for character requirements include professional gatekeeping (keeping undesirables out), protecting the status and reputation of the profession, protecting the public from bad practitioners,
and symbolic reasons.49 Legislators, regulatory agencies, and courts
have struggled – if not refused – to define good moral character.
Criminal convictions are the most common bar, but evidence of other
qualities and behaviors that courts may consider range from honesty
to integrity, fiscal responsibility, mental or emotional instability,
substance abuse, and failure to pay child support.50 Some courts,
however, have established that a person’s misconduct under ques43 Rhode, supra note 1.
44 Kevin Lapp, Reforming the Good Moral Character Requirement for US Citizenship, 87
IND. L. J. 1571, 1572 (2012).
45 Id.
46 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(2)(iv) (1993).
47 Lapp, supra note 44.
48 Rhode, supra note 1.
49 Id.
50 Larry Craddock, Good Moral Character as a Licensing Standard, 28 J. NAT. ASSOC.
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY. 449 (2008).
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tion must be reasonably related to the occupation in order to be denied a license.51 Nonetheless, such requirements are serious employment barriers to the millions of Americans with criminal records.52
No application of good moral character rules among the professions has been more scrutinized than that of admission to the
bar.53 Character requirements have been a fixture of the Western law
profession for centuries, but in the United States, they were of little
importance until the late 19th century.54 In the first decades of the
20th century, the law profession began to formalize its entry standards, and character reviews became more systematic after the 1930s
as national and state bar associations garnered prominence.55 Since
then, courts have avoided defining good moral character and have
upheld bar denials for a host of “inconsistent and idiosyncratic” reasons,56 including adultery, public homosexual acts and other sexual
conduct,57 racist beliefs,58 failure to pay back student loans,59 failure
to pay child support or other financial debt,60 lack of candor on the
application, and a wide range of criminal conduct.61 Though denials
overall are relatively infrequent, there seems to have been a stark increase in the number of bar admission denials based on character in
51 Id.
52 Rhode, supra note 1; May, supra note 2.
53 See Tarra Simmons, Transcending the Stigma of a Criminal Record: A Proposal to Reform State Bar Character and Fitness Evaluations. 128 YALE L. J. FORUM 759 (2019); Keith
Swisher, The Troubling Rise of the Legal Profession's Good Moral Character, 82 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 1037 (2008); Theresa Keeley, Good Moral Character: Already an Unconstitutionally Vague
Concept and Now Putting Bar Applicants in a Post-9/11 World on an Elevated Threat Level, 6
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 844 (2004); Marcus Ratcliff, The Good Character Requirement: A Proposal for
a Uniform National Standard, 36 TULSA L. J. 487 (2000); Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a
Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491 (1985);; John R. Starrs, Considerations on Determination of Good Moral Character, 18 U. DETROIT L. J. 195 (1955); George W. Wickersham, The Moral
Character of Candidates for the Bar, 9 A.B.A.J. 617 (1923).
54 Rhode, supra note 53.
55 Id.
56 Rhode, supra note 53; Rhode, supra note 1.
57 Barbara Blackford, Good Moral Character and Homosexuality, 5 J. LEGAL PROF. 139

(1980).
58 Jason O. Billy, Confronting Racists at the Bar: Matthew Hale, Moral Character, and
Regulating the Marketplace of Ideas, 22 HARV. BLACKLETTER L. J. 25 (2006).
59 Tyler R. Martinez, The Effects of Student Loan Debt on State Bar Admission – Recalibrating the Good Moral Character Requirement, 14 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 37 (2011).
60 Aaron M. Clemens, Facing the Klieg Lights: Understanding the Good Moral Character
Examination for Bar Applicants, 40 AKRON L. REV. 255 (2007).
61 Rhode, supra note 53.
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recent decades.62 Perhaps recent newsworthy cases of formerlyincarcerated people defying the odds by being admitted to the bar
are a hopeful foreshadowing of fairer, more merciful character reviews in the modern era.63
Many legal scholars have called for the elimination or reform
of good moral character requirements for a variety of reasons. As a
matter of philosophy and psychology, character remains a contested
issue; a person’s actions are situation-dependent, and making character assessments based on limited information (perhaps a single
bad act) is flawed.64 Similarly, one study found that the personal history information reviewed during character reviews is a poor predictor of future misconduct among lawyers.65 Thus, if the purpose of reviewing character prior to occupational licensure is to protect safety,
some argue that a better strategy would be to discipline more consistently the practicing professionals who commit work-related offenses.66 Historically, character reviews were used to keep out political radicals, women, and ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities,
which may still occur today.67 Similarly, the fear of impending character reviews may dissuade people from seeking mental health support or exercising their free speech rights.68 For people formerly involved in the criminal justice system, denying employment because
of character rules is a perpetual punishment; doing so often ignores
evidence of rehabilitation or how old or unrelated one’s crime is to
an occupation, is often racially discriminatory, and is counterproductive to reducing criminal recidivism.69 Pragmatically, the process or
reviewing character itself is taxing and expensive for applicants and
agency reviewers alike,70 and there is known to be a great deal of
subjectivity and administrative error in making character determi-

62 Rhode, supra note 53; Swisher, supra note 53.
63 Simmons, supra note 53; Susan Svrluga, He Robbed Banks and Went to Prison. His
Time There Put Him on Track for a New Job: Georgetown Law Professor, THE WASHINGTON POST,
Apr. 21, 2017.
64 Rhode, supra note 1.
65 Leslie C. Levin, Christine Zozula & Peter Siegelman, The Questionable Character of the
Bar's Character and Fitness Inquiry, 40 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 51 (2015).
66 Rhode, supra note 53; Rhode, supra note 1.
67 Rhode, supra note 53.
68 Keeley, supra note 53; Rhode, supra note 53; Levin, Zozula & Siegelman, supra note

66.
69 Rhode, supra note 1; May, supra note 2.
70 Lapp, supra note 44; Levin, Zozula & Siegelman, supra note 66.
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nations.71 For these reasons and more, scholars and advocates in the
United States have called for reform of moral character reviews in
immigration law, occupational licensing, and bar admissions.
The character of people in the United States has been regulated by governments beyond these three areas. Applicants for state financial aid programs for college have been, and continue to be, subject to character reviews, but legal scholars have not examined this
subject with the same dedication as the others. How many state financial aid programs have character requirements? What does it
mean to be of good moral character as a scholarship applicant? How
have state officials and courts interpreted good moral character requirements in state financial aid programs? The following study was
guided by these questions.
II. THE STUDY
Though scholarship programs and good moral character rules
are both nearly as old as the American states themselves, there has
never been an analysis of their convergence in state higher education law. The purpose of this study is first to identify historical and
current state financial aid programs that contain character requirements and second to analyze how state governments interpreted and
enforced character requirements on scholarship applicants.
A. Methods
I analyzed the content of current state statutes for all 524
grants, conditional grants, and tuition waiver programs identified in
the 2017 National Association of State Student Grant and Aid Programs (NASSGAP) inventory.72 This process identified all the currently-funded scholarship programs with active character requirements.73 Next, I used HeinOnline’s session laws and historic state
statutes databases to find the original session law for each of the 524
programs, which I also analyzed for content. This process further
identified all the currently-active programs that formerly had charac-

71 Lapp, supra note 44.
72 See supra note 40. A grant is a non-repayable scholarship. A conditional grant or loan
is a non-repayable scholarship that becomes a repayable loan if the student does not comply
with the conditions of the program, typically post-graduation in-state work requirements. A
tuition waiver is where colleges do not charge a student for tuition at all, which may or may
not be reimbursed by the state.
73 See infra Table 3.
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ter rules earlier in their history.74 Then, I analyzed 2,170 HeinOnline
search results for “scholarship” between 1800-1950 to identify programs with character rules that are no longer active and thus were
not included in the NASSGAP program database.75 Finally, through a
process analogous to “snowball sampling,” I sometimes found relevant programs in the databases while in the process of searching for
another. These iterative steps add confidence that most programs
with character rules (current or old) were identified.
With the programs identified, I then sought to understand
the meaning of the character rules. I collected statutes, regulations,
court cases, attorney general opinions, government agency reports,
research articles, news reports, and other documents from online
databases, library archives, and state agencies. Because some programs with character rules are still active, I contacted state higher
education agency officials to get official statements on how they currently interpret the existing character rules. At times, when I did not
receive an initial response to my requests for records or explanations, I invoked open records laws to compel a timely response.

A. Limitations
Despite my due diligence, I do not claim to have identified
every program that ever contained a good moral character rule. My
systematic review of HeinOnline records was thorough, but it is possible that some eligible programs were not recorded in the database.
In addition, some programs may contain character rules not in statutes but within state administrative codes or agency regulations,
which I did not systemically review.76 Due to the complexity of the
state financial aid landscape, I did not review state loan programs,
loan forgiveness or repayment programs, savings or prepaid tuition
programs, dual enrollment programs, or work study programs.77
There is much still for higher education historians to learn about
state financial aid programs; perhaps this paper will inspire new inquiries into the topic.
74 See infra Table 2.
75 See infra Table 1.
76 See exception Table 2, Tennessee Student Assistance Award.
77 I point readers to a few examples of state loan programs that contain character rules,
including eight of New Mexico’s loan forgiveness programs: Allied Loan for Service, Health Professions Loan for Service, Health Professions Loan Repayment, Medical Loan for Service, Nurse
Educator Loan for Service, Nursing Loan for Service, Teacher Loan for Service, Western Interstate Commission on Higher Education (WICHE) Loan for Service Programs.
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B. Results

In total, 50 state grant programs with character requirements across 19 states were identified. Table 1 displays the 32 programs that are defunct, meaning they were repealed, reformulated
into new programs, or are no longer funded. Table 2 displays the
seven programs that are still active but whose character rules have
been deleted; states still award these scholarships, but applicants are
no longer reviewed for character. Finally, Table 3 displays the 11
programs that are still active and that still contain character requirements.
Most character rules were original to the authorizing statute,
except in the few cases where noted when character rules were later
added to a program through statutory amendments. The tables display the exact phrases in statute that pertain to a scholarship applicant’s character. There are as many as nine variations of character
rules, though “good moral character” is most common.
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III. BEING A GOOD STUDENT: THE MEANING OF GOOD MORAL
CHARACTER
Most state financial aid programs with character rules are
relics of the past.78 Historically, how did state policymakers, government officials, and university administrators interpret and enforce the character rules in these programs? Programs from Illinois,
Pennsylvania, and Michigan are discussed next as “case studies” because they are insightful for their unique historical circumstances.

A.Illinois
In 1955, Illinois Governor William Stratton created the Illinois Higher Education Commission (IHEC) to study the condition of
higher education in Illinois.79 In 1957, IHEC issued its report, which
included a proposal for a new need- and merit-based scholarship
that would support the training of more Illinois residents.80 The legislature adopted the proposal as the State Scholarship Act of 1957.81
IHEC proposed specific eligibility requirements for the scholarship,
including a “good moral character” requirement. IHEC’s only explanation for the requirement was rather uninformative: “For obvious
reasons, good moral character should be a condition of eligibility.”82
Further, nothing in the report indicated where this “obvious” rule
came from, but a historian of Illinois’ scholarship programs pointed
to one explanation. According to a report of the Illinois State Scholarship Commission, “the IHEC patterned the [State Scholarship Program] after a recently created California program.”83 Indeed, California legislators created the Competitive Scholarship in 1955.84
Applicants had to demonstrate financial need and “high moral char-

78 See Tables 1 & 2.
79 See supra note 32.
80 Id.
81 1957 Ill. Laws 855-861. By 1971, the State Scholarship was defunded, but still today,
the most academically strong students from across Illinois are designated as State Scholars by
the Illinois Student Assistance Commission.
82 See supra note 32, at 158.
83 Paul R. Eber, The ISSC’s Statutory Evolution: Scholarship and Grant Programs 19571982, IL. HIGHER EDUC. STUDENT ASSISTANCE COMM’N, at 27 (1982) (on file with author).
84 1955 Cal. Stat. ch. 1846.
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acter, good citizenship, and dedication to American ideals.”85 If IHEC
did model the State Scholarship off the California Competitive Scholarship, perhaps this is from where the good moral character requirement came.
Regardless of where it came from, the good moral character
requirement was “historically troubling for the [Illinois State Scholarship Commission]” to implement.86 An agency rule adopted prior
to 1973 defined good moral character as:
A student’s personal record of conduct, determined by the
high school to be in keeping with school and community standards.
High schools which withhold their recommendations of students for
reasons of ‘moral character’ shall have the responsibility of explaining their positions, as necessary, to parties having a proper and valid
interest in this information.87
In practice, high school principals determined who had good
moral character. Officials from the scholarship commission had to
clarify parameters for character occasionally, like in the 1960s when
they decided that premarital pregnancy should not disqualify a student on moral grounds.88 According to meeting minutes, commission
officials debated the legal standard of good moral character at least
six times between 1957 and 1973, and the rule was recommended to
be abolished several times between 1972 and 1975.89 It was estimated that six to ten students each year were denied scholarships
for moral reasons, though “no systematic study has been done of the
reasons high schools have withheld moral character certifications to
otherwise qualified State Scholar applicants.”90
In 1967, legislators created what is now called the Monetary
Award Program (MAP), a need-based grant with no initial academic
qualifications.91 They included the character rule in the MAP program, too, which shortly thereafter subsumed and replaced the State
Scholarship. The good moral character requirement continued to be
challenging to interpret after the creation of the MAP grant, especially when it came to the question of whether incarcerated students
should be disqualified on moral grounds. In 1971, the Illinois State
85 Id. at § 21702(e).
86 Eber, supra note 84, at 22.
87 Id at 23.
88 Id at 22.
89 Id at 23.
90 Id.
91 1967 Ill. Laws 2644, 2646.
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Scholarship Commission Executive Director, Joseph Boyd, asked the
Illinois Attorney General to issue an opinion on the matter. Mr. Boyd
asked:
Is there a legal definition of good moral character? Does a
person assigned by the courts to any institution of correction automatically disqualify himself for an award as long as he is serving out
his/her sentence? This matter has become an issue since a considerable number of public and private institutions in Illinois are now offering credit courses to those persons in Illinois institutions of correction.92
In March 1972, the Illinois Attorney General William Scott
responded with a 12-page, unpublished opinion.93 On the first question, the attorney general stated there was no consistent legal definition of good moral character and that each case needed to be decided
on the facts: “It is the applicant’s actual conduct that is at issue, not
the reputation of the applicant.”94 His best advice was that officials
“must objectively determine whether an applicant is of good moral
character by determining whether he measures up to the generally
accepted moral standards currently prevalent within the State of Illinois.”95
On the second question, the attorney general opined: “the
fact than an applicant for a scholarship is incarcerated in a correctional institution does not automatically disqualify him for a scholarship.” Though a person who commits a felony was, at the time, not of
good moral character, he suggested, other factors must be weighed
when evaluating the character of a person after the fact, such as evidence of rehabilitation.
According to the ISSC historian, the opinion was not particularly helpful to the agency, and it is not clear how officials handled
the good moral character requirement in its wake.96 However, when
ISSC issued its first program regulations in the new 1986 Illinois
Administrative Code, a person was said to be of good moral character “if the applicant will benefit from postsecondary instruction and
is allowed to enroll at an approved postsecondary institution.”97 This
92 1972 Ill. Att’y Gen. Op. 434 (NP) at 1-2.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 5.
95 Id. at 6.
96 Eber, supra note 84, at 31.
97 23 Ill. Admin. Code pt. 1700.20 (1986).
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definition left open the possibility that incarcerated students enrolled in prison higher education programs could receive state
grants, which indeed happened so frequently that it caught the attention of state legislators. After a lively debate on the merits of funding
scholarships for incarcerated students, legislators eliminated their
eligibility through statutory amendment in 1989.98 Then, they eliminated the good moral character rule from the MAP statute in 1992
amidst a broad reorganization of the Higher Education Assistance
Act.99 Nonetheless, the 1986 definition of good moral character remains today in the definitions section of the Illinois Student Assistance Commission regulations that apply to all grant programs.100
However, there is no good moral character requirement listed in the
regulations’ section on general applicant eligibility requirements,
nor is it listed on the commission’s official website,101 which seems
to indicate that the good moral character rule no longer applies to
grant applicants in Illinois.102

B.Pennsylvania
In 1966, the Pennsylvania legislature created the State Scholarship Program to be administered by the recently created Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Authority (PHEAA). An original
statutory rule stated that scholarship applicants “shall satisfactorily
meet the qualifications of ‘financial need,’ character and academic
promise, as well as academic achievement, as established by the
agency,”103 which remains in statute today.104 In 1969, the legislature
left the character rule in place but added requirements related to
criminal history:
(a) The agency may deny all forms of financial assistance to
any student:

98 1989 Ill. Laws 6809, 6820.
99 1992 Ill. Laws 2128, 2137.
100 Formerly the Illinois State Scholarship Commission; 23 Ill. Admin. Code pt. 2700.20

(2018).
101 Illinois Student Assistance Commission, Monetary Award Program, Eligibility
(2019),
https://www.isac.org/students/during-college/types-of-financialaid/grants/monetary-award-program/#Eligibility.
102 23 Ill. Admin. Code pt. 2700.40 (2018).
103 Emphasis added; Pa. Act of Jan. 25, P.L. 1546, No. 541 (1966).
104 24 Pa. Stat. § 5154 (a)(5).
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(1) Who is convicted by any court of record of a criminal offense which was committed after the effective date of
this act which, under the laws of the United States or Pennsylvania, would constitute a misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude or a felony; or
(2) Who has been expelled, dismissed or denied enrollment by an approved institution of higher learning for refusal to obey, after the effective date of this act, a lawful regulation or order of any institution of higher education, which
refusal, in the opinion of the institution, contributed to a disruption of the activities, administration or classes of such institution; or
(3) Who has been convicted in any court of record of
any offense committed in the course of disturbing, interfering with or preventing, or in an attempt to disturb, interfere
with or prevent the orderly conduct of the activities, administration or classes of an institution of higher education.105

Punishing college students for campus unrest saw brief popularity in
the late 1960s, spurred on by Congress’ decision in the 1968 Higher
Education Amendments to block students convicted of similar disruptive behaviors from receiving federal financial aid.106 By 1971, at
least eleven states passed laws to prohibit scholarship eligibility to
students convicted of similar offenses (Keeney, 1971),107 but these
rules did not last long,108 including in Pennsylvania.
In Corporation of Haverford College v. Reeher (1971), students
and colleges sued PHEAA over the new rules.109 A majority of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
struck down the “misdemeanor involving moral turpitude” rule as
unconstitutionally vague and struck down the two rules pertaining
to students who were disciplined or convicted for campus disruptions as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.110 The court left in
105 Pa. Act of Dec. 18, 1969 (P.L. 171, No. 169) § 2.
106 Higher Education Amendments of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-575, § 504, 82 Stat. 1062.
107 Gregory D. Keeney, Aid to Education, Student Unrest, and Cutoff Legislation: An
Overview, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 1003 (1971).
108 The campus disruption rules were repealed from the Higher Education Act in 1980;
Education Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-374, 94 Stat. 1367.
109 Corporation of Haverford College v. Reeher, 329 F. Supp. 1196 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
110 The legislature never corrected the statute, so the unconstitutional provisions remain. See 24 Pa. Stat. § 5158.2.
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tact the state’s ability to deny state financial aid to felons. The plaintiffs did not ask the court to rule on the constitutionality of the
“character” requirement, though a dissenting judge commented on it.
Judge John William Ditter Jr., citing language from the 1966 statute,111 argued that the state should be allowed to deny aid to people
convicted of the prescribed crimes for fiscal reasons under the authority of the statutory character rule:
PHEAA must dispense millions of dollars of taxpayer's money and choose which among thousands of
applicants are "deserving" and which are most likely
to help the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania "achieve
its full economic and social potential" because they
are persons of "character". Viewed as a part of a legislative plan to allocate state money, the subsections in
question do not offend the requirements of due process.112
After winning another lawsuit in which PHEAA’s ability to withhold
aid from scholarship applicants who had pending felony charges was
upheld,113 PHEAA issued new regulations to correct the unconstitutional provisions. Relying on the character rule, it created new restrictions for people convicted of felonies and other specified crimes:
In order to be eligible for financial assistance a student applicant or recipient shall have and maintain
satisfactory character. A student applicant or recipient who is convicted of any of the following offenses
may be deemed to lack satisfactory character and be
denied any or all forms of financial assistance by the
Agency:
(1) A criminal offense which under the laws of the
United States or Pennsylvania constitutes a felony.
(2) Adultery. (3) Arson of personal property. (4) Assault and battery. (5) Pointing deadly weapons. (6)
Bribery. (7) Fornication and bastardy. (8) Prostitution and assignation. (9) Bigamy. (10 Blackmail. (11)
111 See supra p. 6; Pa. Act of Jan. 25, 1966 (P.L. 1546, No. 541) § 1.
112 Reeher, 329 F. Supp. at [PINCITE NEEDED].
113 Corporation of Haverford College v. Reeher, 53 F.R.D. 374 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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Abandoning an infant. (12) Corrupting the morals of
children. (13) Neglect to maintain child. (14) Use of
drugs. (15) Extortion. (16) False pretense. (17)
Fraud. (18) Desecrating flag of United States or Pennsylvania. (19) Forcible entry and detainer. (20) Indecent assault. (21) Libel. (22) Perjury. (23) Driving
under the influence of liquor or drugs or permitting
same.114

With the “misdemeanor involving moral turpitude” rule struck
down, PHEAA relied on the statutory character rule to delineate
these crimes as eligibility requirements. Dissatisfied with the new
regulations, convicted students returned to the same federal court to
sue PHEAA again.
In Carbonaro v. Reeher (1975), students who were convicted
of felonies and who lost aid eligibility under PHEAA’s new satisfactory character regulations sued PHEAA on the grounds that discriminating against people with felony convictions violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection under the law.115 The
court analyzed the extent to which denying financial aid to felons
had a legitimate state purpose. The state made a fiscal argument
with which the court agreed, much like Ditter’s dissent in Corporation of Haverford College v. Reeher (1971): “The state contends that
the classification is reasonable because the state has only finite resources and wishes to maximize the potential gain from the available
funds by providing assistance only to those students with ‘satisfactory character.’”116 The court returned to the original language of the
1966 statute, which states that only “deserving” students should be
given the aid and that students must “satisfactorily meet the qualifications of ‘financial need,’ character and academic promise.” Character, according to the court, was distinct from the other academic and
financial requirements, and a felony conviction may be indicative of
unsatisfactory character. The state, the court concluded, was justified in requiring felons to prove their satisfactory character to
PHEAA:

114 Emphasis added; 2 Pa. B. 506 (March 25, 1972).
115 Carbonaro v. Reeher, 392 F. Supp. 753, 755 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
116 Id. at 757.
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To reiterate, we hold that the statutory and administrative program whereby Pennsylvania places the
burden on former felons to prove that they are of satisfactory character in order to receive state financial
assistance for postsecondary education does not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The felon classification bears a rational
relationship to the legitimate state purpose of assuring that only responsible citizens receive state aid.117
PHEAA prevailed in this case, but the agency grew weary of defending itself in court. Seeking the most stable legal footing possible to
avoid future litigation, PHEAA made regulatory changes by loosening
its requirements on convicted students. In the months after the 1975
lawsuit, PHEAA began approving all applicants with misdemeanors
and first-degree felonies for aid “based on (1) the experience of [the
Administrative Review Committee] approving such cases [on appeal]
and (2) a question as to whether courts would uphold our denial of
aid based on a misdemeanor conviction.”118 In 1978, PHEAA eliminated the character test in the loan program so that any felon denied
grant aid could at least get a loan.119
In the 1980s, PHEAA further narrowed how it defined unsatisfactory character. In 1980, the Administrative Review Committee
began automatically reviewing any felon applicants that initial staff
could not agree on, and in 1985, staff were permitted to approve
nearly all felons so long as they paid for their first term of college out
pocket, which apparently was a demonstration of deservingness for
future aid.120 By 1988, data showed that almost all students with felony convictions were eventually approved for aid after exhausting
their appeal options.121 From then on, including still today, PHEAA
assumes “that once an applicant is released from incarceration, he
will be presumed to be of satisfactory character and eligible for aid.
Therefore, only currently incarcerated applicants are now denied
grant aid under the satisfactory character provision of the law.”122 It
117 Id. at 760.
118 Gary D. Smith, BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SATISFACTORY CHARACTER/CRIME POLICY, PA. HIGHER
EDUC. ASSISTANCE AUTHORITY, at 2 (1990) (on file with author).
119 8 Pa. B. 3085 (November 11, 1985).
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
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took nearly twenty years, but Pennsylvania finally came to an interpretation of good character that it could maintain and justify, which
remains in force today.

C.Michigan
By 1979, the state of Michigan administered four grant programs for college students. That year, the auditor general conducted
an audit of the four programs, finding many inconsistencies in their
eligibility requirements.123 One such inconsistency was that two of
the programs – the 1964 Competitive Scholarship and the 1966 Tuition Grant program – contained “good moral character” rules but the
other two did not. State legislators authored bills to correct the inconsistencies.124 In the first drafts of Senate Bills 1275 and 1276 introduced on September 23, 1980, the legislators proposed to strike
the good moral character rules from both scholarship programs, but
two weeks later, they added a rule making incarcerated students ineligible for the Competitive Scholarship in Bill 1276. According to a
senate analysis summary from November 10, 1980, this amendment
was thought to “sharpen the original intent of the ‘good moral character’ provision.”125 For consistency, they then added the incarceration rule to Bill 1275 to replace the character rule in the Tuition
Grant program, which senate analyses again suggested would sharpen the original intent of the character rule.126 When Senate Bills 1275
and 1276 passed in 1981, the character rules were indeed replaced
with prohibitions on aid to incarcerated students,127 as remains the
case today.128 Thus, legislators apparently believed that incarcerated
people were not of good moral character and were therefore undeserving of scholarships for college. Today, only the incarceration re-

123 STATE OF MICH. OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GEN., AUDIT REPORT: STUDENT FIN. ASSISTANCE
SERVS., ET AL., DEP’T OF EDUC. (1979) (on file with author).
124 Mich. 1980 SB 1275 (Michigan Tuition Grants); Mich. 1980 SB 1276 (Michigan Competitive Scholarship); Mich. 1980 SB 1277 (Differential Grants Program); Mich. 1980 SB 1278
(Legislative Merit Awards Program).
125 MICH. S. ANALYSIS SECTION, S.B. 1275, 1276, 1277, & 1278: FIRST ANALYSIS, at 3 (Nov. 10,
1980) (on file with author).
126 MICH. S. ANALYSIS SECTION, S.B. 1275, 1276, 1277, & 1278: SECOND ANALYSIS, at 3 (Dec.
22, 1980) (on file with author).
127 Mich. 1981 P.A. 500 § 4; Mich. 1981 P.A. 503 § 3.
128 Mich. Compiled Laws 390.974 (2017); MCL 390.993 (2017).
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quirements remain in both programs, freeing state officials from
having to define good moral character.

D.Active Programs
The three state case studies presented above demonstrate
how state lawmakers, government officials, and courts interpreted
good moral character rules in financial aid programs between the
1960s and 1980s. But Table 3 shows that there are at least 11 active
programs that still contain character rules, suggesting that student
applicants must continue to meet character requirements. How do
officials currently interpret and enforce the character rules in these
programs? This section discusses the six states shown in Table 3.
In Pennsylvania, the original “character” rule from 1966 remains in statute, and a state regulation still stipulates “a student applicant or recipient shall have and maintain satisfactory character.”129 As described above, court decisions and regulatory actions of
the 1970s and 1980s yielded what is still today the interpretation of
satisfactory character for the Pennsylvania State Grant.130 Though
there is no statute or regulation that says so, the only condition that
triggers the satisfactory character clause is incarceration, even
though other conditions are still listed as possibilities in the Pennsylvania Code.131 In the eyes of the Pennsylvania Higher Education
Assistance Authority, to be of unsatisfactory character is to be incarcerated. This interpretation is made clear in the 2017 Pennsylvania
State Grant Program Policy Manual in a section titled “Satisfactory
Character,” which states: “State Grant eligibility is not impacted by a
felony conviction unless the student is also currently incarcerated.
All incarcerated students are ineligible for State Grant awards.”132 As
Pennsylvania added new scholarship programs over the years,
PHEAA tied their eligibility requirements to that of the State Grant,
rendering incarcerated students in Pennsylvania ineligible for all
state-funded grant programs.
There is one remaining Illinois scholarship statute that still
contains a character rule. The present-day University of Illinois Children of Veterans Tuition Waiver has its roots in one of the oldest
129 22 Pa. Code § 121.6(a).
130 See discussion supra Part IV.B.
131 22 Pa. Code § 121.6(a)(1-3).
132 PA HIGHER EDUC. ASSISTANCE AUTHORITY, PA STATE GRANT PROGRAM POL’Y MANUAL, at 23
(2017), https://www.pheaa.org/documents/grants/ph/2017-18-policy-manual.pdf.
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scholarship programs in the study sample: the 1867 Illinois Industrial University scholarship: “for the benefit of the descendants of the
soldiers and seamen who served in the armies and navies of the
United States during the late rebellion.”133 Though amended many
times, the program is still active, and the state administers this program directly through the University of Illinois, rather than through
the state’s financial aid agency. However, the University of Illinois
application for the program conspicuously omits any mention of the
character requirement, despite an otherwise detailed accounting of
the eligibility requirements.134 It seems the old character rule is
simply ignored in practice, and an official from the University of Illinois did not respond to my request for more information about how
they evaluate character.
Virginia funds three programs that contain character rules.
The Virginia State Board of Health administers four scholarships for
undergraduate and graduate students under the 1950 Nurse Scholarship program. Regarding character, the Board checks all applicants’ nursing licenses for disciplinary issues, and on the application
forms, college nursing faculty must attest to a scholarship applicant’s
character.135 Officials from Virginia Tech did not respond to my
emails about how they administer the 1970 Soil Scientist Scholarship. Each institution in Virginia administers the 1936 “unfunded
scholarship,” and I did not attempt to learn from each institution
how they define character.
Similarly, three entities administer scholarship programs in
Alabama with character rules. The Alabama Board of Nursing administers the 1977 Graduate Nursing Scholarship, but a Board official
reported that there is no single definition of “good character” for the
purpose of the scholarship.136 Instead, several sections of the administrative code outline the standards of practice, conduct, and accountability that would be referenced when selecting scholarship
applicants.137 Officials from the Alabama Optometric Association and
the Alabama Board of Dental Scholarship Awards did not respond to
133 1867 Ill. Pub. L. 123.
134
See
application
form,
available
content/uploads/2018/11/1920_COV_App.pdf.

at

https://osfa.illinois.edu/wp-

135
See
application
forms,
VA
DEPT.
OF
HEALTH,
available
at
http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/health-equity/forms-and-applications/; Personal Communication, Mar. 21, 2019 (notes on file with author).
136 Personal Communication, Feb. 20, 2019 (e-mail on file with author).
137 Ala. Admin. Code Rules 610-X-6; 610-X-6-.03; 610-X-8; 610-X-8-.03.
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my requests for information about the scholarship programs that
they administer.
In South Carolina, two grant programs still have character
rules, which are administered by separate state agencies. An official
from the South Carolina Higher Education Tuition Grants Commission informed me that they do not interpret or define the “good moral character” requirement in the 1970 Tuition Grant program, nor
would they deny an applicant based on moral reasons, alone.138 Any
denials would be based on other existing requirements. An official
from the South Carolina Commission on Higher Education did not respond to my email about the 1996 Need-based Grant program.
Finally, regarding the 1971 Oklahoma Tuition Grant Program, an official from the Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education was not able to clarify the state’s position on enforcing the “high
moral character” requirement.139 Since higher education institutions
share responsibility for eligibility requirement enforcement, it is
possible that a student may be denied eligibility under the character
rule following an incident of campus misconduct, the official suggested. What is more likely is that the 1995 amendment to the Tuition Grant program statute that made incarcerated students ineligible for aid rendered the character rule itself moot.140
V. ELIMINATING CHARACTER REQUIREMENTS
Good moral character rules in state financial aid programs
are mostly relics of the past. Of the 50 programs identified with such
rules since 1850, just 11 (22%) are active today with their character
rules still intact. In the historical cases of Pennsylvania, Illinois, and
Michigan, the character rules were eventually converted into bans on
financial aid to incarcerated students, which may represent contemporary beliefs about what it meant to be of good moral character. In
the six states where financial aid programs still contain character
rules, the rules are largely ignored, as best illustrated by the requirement being left off the Illinois Children of Veterans Tuition
Waiver application. In others, explicit eligibility requirements pertaining to criminal history, financial standing (e.g., not being in default on loans or owing child support), or other misconduct are enforced in lieu of any behavior that otherwise might be representative
138 Personal Communication, Apr. 12, 2018 (e-mail on file with author).
139 Personal Communication, Mar. 23, 2018 (e-mail on file with author).
140 1995 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 247.
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of unsatisfactory character. In other words, character rules are
meaningless or redundant as applied in most of today’s state financial aid programs.
At least six states have stripped their current financial aid
programs of old character rules.141 There are good reasons for policymakers to continue this trend by deleting the last remaining good
character rules from financial aid program statutes and regulations.
First, despite one court’s assertion that it is in the state’s interest to
award scholarships only to deserving applicants with satisfactory
character,142 character requirements contradict the policy goals of
modern state financial aid programs. The broad need-based programs are intended to make college affordable so that all residents
can gain new knowledge and skills, get higher paying jobs, and bolster the American economy.143 Thus, denying any academicallyqualified state resident the benefits of college scholarships because
of character or criminal history works against the public interests of
a well-educated society. Access to and completion of higher education is more dependent now than ever on the ability to pay for college,144 and denying aid to applicants based on character is an arcane
way to save the state a small amount of money. Any state resident
who has been admitted to a recognized college should be considered
to meet the baseline qualifications for a grant.145
Second, the inconsistency of program rules is cumbersome.
Of the six states that still have character requirements, only Pennsylvania’s character statute applies to all programs. In the other states,
it is a fluke of history that just one or two programs still have character requirements. For example, Virginia currently funds 38 grants,
conditional grants or loans, and tuition waiver programs to undergraduate, graduate, and professional students, just three of which
have character requirements.146 Like Michigan did in 1981, states
should eliminate their remaining character requirements for the
sake of simplicity and consistency across programs.

141 See supra Table 2.
142 Carbonaro v. Reeher, 392 F. Supp. 753, 759 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
143 Supra notes 25 & 27.
144 See SARA GOLDRICK-RAB, PAYING THE PRICE: COLLEGE COSTS, FINANCIAL AID, AND THE
BETRAYAL OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (2016).
145 For example, see Illinois’ definition of good moral character: 23 Ill. Admin. Code pt.
2700.20 (2018).
146 See supra note 40.
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Third, the rules themselves are burdensome to administer.
State officials, program administrators, and college financial aid officers would not have to field questions from students, parents, and
the rare researcher about the meaning of good moral character if
they deleted them. Perhaps the reason that six state officials – even
after making open records requests in some cases – did not respond
to my request for clarification on the character rules is evidence they
did not have an answer or were too busy. Either way, governmental
efficiency would be improved ever so slightly by striking these burdensome rules.
Fourth, though likely infrequent, there still may be colleges
or state agencies that deny eligibility to students for ill-defined reasons of unsatisfactory character. This is especially possible where
individual institutions make character determinations for scholarship programs based on their knowledge of an applicant’s prior behavior (e.g., criminal convictions or discipline at previous educational institutions) or an applicant’s behavior on campus (e.g., academic
or behavioral misconduct violations). Eliminating character requirements may restore scholarship eligibility to some students.
Finally, confusion around what constitutes good moral character may be a deterrent to qualified applicants. In a U.S. Department
of Education survey of college students who did not apply for federal
financial aid, 18.9% said the forms were too much work and 60.7%
thought they would be ineligible, though over half of them were in
fact eligible for a Pell Grant.147 Combine that with evidence that formerly-convicted students were deterred from applying to college
when they knew they faced criminal history questions on the application.148 It stands to reason that an otherwise qualified student with
a criminal conviction, for example, may be deterred from applying
for a state scholarship with a nebulous character requirement out of
stigma, fear of rejection, or confusion over the requirement. Eliminating character rules helps to ensure that students will not be deterred from applying because of confusing requirements.
For these reasons, the current practice of ignoring or haphazardly enforcing good moral character rules is unsatisfactory.
State policymakers should delete the few remaining good moral
character requirements from financial aid programs.

147 Mark Kantrowitz, Reasons Why Students Do Not File the FAFSA, STUDENT FINANCIAL
AID POL’Y ANALYSIS, (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.finaid.org/educators/studentaidpolicy.phtml.
148 Center for Community Alternatives, Boxed Out: Criminal History Screening and College Application Attrition (2015), http://www.communityalternatives.org/fb/boxed-out.html.
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VI. CONCLUSION
For nearly a century, legal scholars have lamented good moral character rules in immigration law, occupational licensing, and bar
admissions; yet during that period and prior, good moral character
rules also existed in state financial aid programs for college students.
For the first time, this paper offered an accounting of state scholarship programs with good moral character rules and an analysis of
what they mean and how they are enforced. Most of the 50 identified
programs with character rules are now defunct, but applicants for at
least 11 programs in six states still must contend with character requirements, to varying degrees. I join the chorus of other scholars in
advocating that good moral character requirements should be deleted.
The identification of character requirements in financial aid
programs raises the question as to what other previouslyunidentified subjects are affected by good moral character rules, especially within education law. For example, in my review of historical state statutes, I found laws that listed good character as a requirement for admission to college, not just for scholarships. Today,
most colleges require students to disclose criminal history on college
applications,149 but do any still evaluate character? Law schools, for
example, certainly ask applicants “character and fitness” questions,
ranging from criminal history, educational discipline, military discipline, substance abuse history, to involvement in civil litigation.150
Future research might pursue a review of good moral character requirements in college admissions policies and in other higher education laws.

149 See Bradley D. Custer, College Admission Policies for Ex-Offender Students: A Literature Review, 67 J. CORRECTIONAL EDUC. 35 (2016); Douglas N. Evans, Jason Szkola & Victor St.
John, Going Back to College? Criminal Stigma in Higher Education Admissions in Northeastern
US, CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2019) (advance online publication); Robert Stewart & Christopher
Uggen, Criminal Records and College Admissions: A National Experimental Audit (Sept. 10,
2018) (unpublished working paper).
150 John S. Dzienkowski, Character and Fitness Inquiries in Law School Admissions, 45
S. TEX. L. REV. 921 (2004).
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Being a Good College Student: The History of Good
Moral Character Rules in State Financial Aid
Programs, 1850 to Now
Bradley Custer, Ph.D.

INTRODUCTION
Federal and state governments regulate the character of
their residents as a condition of immigration, employment, social
services, and beyond.1 At the state level, “good moral character”
rules have been analyzed in depth for decades, mostly as they pertain to admission to the bar and other licensed professions.2 Character requirements also affect the ability of college students to get
state-funded financial aid, but these policies have received no scholarly analysis. According to this study’s findings, there have been at
least 50 state financial aid grant programs with character rules,
which begs the question: what does it mean to be a “good” college
student? This paper offers an original study of the character requirements of state financial aid programs, including analysis of how
character requirements were and still are interpreted and enforced.
New insights are offered on the meaning of good moral character in
this higher education law context that contribute to the wider literature on the use of good moral character requirements.
This paper begins with a two-part literature review, first on
the history of state financial aid programs and second on the use of
good moral character requirements in American law. Then, the
methods and results of this original study are presented. Three historic state case studies are discussed in depth to explain how good
moral character requirements were interpreted in the past. Also explained is how the few remaining good moral character rules are
currently enforced. Finally, a rationale is made for eliminating all
good moral character requirements from state financial aid programs.
1 Deborah L. Rhode, Virtue and the Law: The Good Moral Character Requirement in Occupational Licensing, Bar Regulation, and Immigration Proceedings, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
1027 (2018).
2 See id.; Bruce E. May, The Character Component of Occupational Licensing Laws: A
Continuing Barrier to the Ex-Felon's Employment Opportunities, 71 N. D. L. REV. 187 (1995).
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I. THE HISTORY OF STATE FINANCIAL AID
A brief history of how state governments have funded college
scholarships provides needed context for the forthcoming study of
their eligibility requirements. Though much has been written about
the history of federal financial aid programs,3 a comprehensive history of state-funded financial aid programs has not been written –
something that the field of higher education needs. Writers typically
describe the history of state financial aid dating back only to the mid20th century, when states began implementing broad-scale needbased grant programs that are the predecessors of today’s programs.4 However, some states offered scholarships to their residents
at least one hundred years before then.5 To illustrate, I conducted a
review of state statutes 1800-1950 by searching for the term “scholarship” in the HeinOnline State Session Laws Library, yielding 2,170
results.6 In this section, I first outline my findings from the database
search. Then, I summarize trends in state financial aid programs
from 1950 to present with evidence from the higher education research literature.
A. Early State Scholarship Programs, 1800-1950
Some of the earliest references to scholarships in state statutes are actually privately-endowed scholarships. States and institutions solicited donors by offering full-tuition scholarships to them
and their dependents, like at the Virginia Military Institute in 1848,7
Ohio’s St. Clairsville Collegiate Seminary in 1855,8 and Kentucky’s

3 See Matthew B. Fuller, A History of Financial Aid to Students, 44 J. OF STUDENT

FINANCIAL AID 42 (2014); Elizabeth A. Duffy & Idana Goldberg, The Development of Need-Based
Aid, in CRAFTING A CLASS: COLLEGE ADMISSIONS AND FINANCIAL AID, 1955-1994 at 169 (1998).
4 See Donald E. Heller, The Policy Shift in State Financial Aid Programs, in HIGHER
EDUCATION: HANDBOOK OF THEORY AND RESEARCH 221 (John C. Smart ed., 2002).
5 See infra this section.
6 The HeinOnline State Session Laws Library is an online database containing over 12.7
million pages of state session laws for all 50 states and more with coverage going back to each
state’s inception. The word “scholarship” has several meanings. For example, a “certificate of
scholarship” is an old name for a college diploma, and being of “requisite scholarship” or the
“highest scholarship” means a person is properly trained and well educated. Thus, a majority
of the search results for “scholarship” did not pertain to a financial aid program as it is being
used here.
7 1848 Va. Acts 18.
8 1837 Ohio Laws 55.
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Frankfort Female University in 1867.9 In these cases, and others like
them, state statutes authorized such donations and established rules
for the scholarships.
State funds were also directly appropriated to scholarships
by the mid-1800s. After the federal Morrill Act granted land to public
universities in 1862,10 the authorizing statutes for the Illinois Industrial University in 186711 and Arkansas Industrial University in
186812 created full-tuition scholarships for children of veterans plus
one honorary scholarship per county. Likewise, when Cornell University13 and the Pennsylvania Museum and School for Industrial
Arts14 were founded in 1887, a full scholarship for one student per
county was created. The “competitive scholarship” for students attending a state’s flagship university also became relatively common.
A fixed number of full-tuition scholarships were appropriated to
students who succeeded on competitive exams, sometimes to students with financial need only. For example, in 1870, California began offering just five competitive scholarships to students with the
inability “to provide his own maintenance at the University [of California].”15 Other states tied the number of available competitive
scholarships to the number of counties or congressional districts,
like the University of South Carolina State Scholarship of 1874,16 the
University of Oregon scholarships of 1876,17 the Massachusetts Institute of Technology scholarship of 1887,18 and the University of Illinois State Scholarship of 1895.19 Like still today, scholarships were
commonly created to recruit new teachers, like the 1853 Massachusetts State Scholarship,20 the 1876 Vermont scholarship for students

9 1867 Ky. Local & Private Acts, 295.
10 Morrill Act, Act of July 2, 1862, Pub. L. No. 37-130, at 503, which established land
grant colleges.
11 Now the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; Ill. Pub. L., 25th Gen. Assemb., 1st
Sess., Act of March 8, 1867, at 123.
12 Now the University of Arkansas; 1868 Ark. Acts 327.
13 1887 N.Y. Laws 366.
14 Now the University of the Arts; 1887 Pa. Laws 380.
15 1870 Cal. Stat. 546.
16 1874 S.C. Acts, Spec. & Reg. Sess., 555.
17 1876 Or. Laws 52.
18 1889 Mass. Private & Special Stat. 1287.
19 1985 Ill. Laws 325.
20 1853 Mass. Acts 473.
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attending normal schools,21 the 1892 scholarship for students from
Frederick County to attend the Maryland Normal School,22 and the
1899 Utah Normal School scholarship.23
After the turn of the 20th century, more states implemented
the types of programs previously described, but new scholarship opportunities were created for targeted populations, including veterans, African-Americans, students with disabilities, and nurses. In the
wake of World War I, new scholarships were created for military
veterans and their dependents that were later expanded to include
World War II veterans, like those in New York and Illinois in 1919
and Kentucky and South Carolina in 1920.24 Another group that increasingly got financial aid was African-American students, like Oklahoma’s 1921 scholarships for African-American students to study
agriculture.25 Maryland in 1935, Tennessee in 1937, and Texas in
1939, among others, created scholarships for students to attend universities in other states because their own universities did not admit
African-Americans in certain programs, typically graduate and professional programs.26 Then, students with disabilities were awarded
scholarships, including Tennessee’s 1949 scholarship for blind students and Pennsylvania’s 1949 Blind or Deaf Higher Education Beneficiary Grant.27 Finally, a persistent post-war shortage of nurses
spurred the implementation of nursing scholarships, like those in
Florida, North Dakota, and Rhode Island in 1955.28
B. Modern State Financial Aid Programs, 1950 to Present
At mid-20th century, the United States population, its economy, and its higher education systems were rapidly expanding. State
governments wanted more residents to go to college and recognized
that price was a significant barrier. The introduction to Pennsylvania’s 1966 State Scholarship Program eloquently summarized what

21 1876 Vt. Acts & Resolves 117.
22 1892 Md. Laws 833.
23 1899 Utah Laws 121.
24 1919 N.Y. Laws 1602; 1919 Ill. Laws 922; 1920 Ky. Acts 281; 1920 S.C. Acts 973.
25 1921 Okla. Sess. Laws 222.
26 1935 Md. Laws 1203; Tenn. Acts., Act of May 21, 1937, ch. 256, at 1048; L. of Tex., 46th
Leg., R.S., Act of Sept. 1, 1939, ch. 8, at 359.
27 Tenn. Acts 1949, ch. 208; 24 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §13-1381 (West 2019).
28 1955 Fla. Laws 572; 1955 N.D. Laws, ch. 283; 1955 R.I. Acts & Resolves 548.
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many states were experiencing and why legislators created scholarship programs:
Although the enrollments of the postsecondary institutions of higher learning of this Commonwealth and throughout the nation continue to increase at a rapid pace, and although larger numbers
of the Commonwealth's children graduate from both
the public and nonpublic secondary schools each
year, there continues to be a tragic underdevelopment of the Commonwealth's human talent because
of the inability of many needy students to finance a
postsecondary educational program. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania can achieve its full economic
and social potential only if every individual has the
opportunity to contribute to the full extent of his capabilities and only when the financial barriers to his
economic, social and educational goals are removed.
It is therefore the policy of the Legislature and the
purpose of this act to establish a broad-scale State
scholarship program designed to guarantee that the
most able students from all sectors of the Commonwealth, the most needy students and students with
the capability to successfully complete postsecondary
educational programs, and deserving postsecondary
students are given the opportunity to continue their
program of self-improvement in an institution of
higher learning of their choice.29
Around this time, states commissioned studies of their higher education institutions, the postsecondary educational needs of their residents, and financial aid programs, like those of California in 1947,30
Louisiana in 1948,31 and Illinois in 1957.32 In the 1950s and 1960s, in
part due to these commissioned studies, some of the country’s largest state need-based programs were created, including what are now

29 Pa. Act of Jan. 25, Pub. L. 1546, No. 541, § 1 (1966).
30 Stat. Cal., 1947, ch. 47, at 542. See A Report of a Survey of the Needs of California in
ARCHIVE
OF
CALIFORNIA
(1948),
Higher
Education,
ONLINE
https://oac.cdlib.org/view?docId=hb2p3004kd&brand=oac4&chunk.id=meta.
31 1948 La. Acts. 1078.
32 ILL. HIGHER EDUC. COMM’N, ILL. LOOKS TO THE FUTURE IN HIGHER EDUC. (1957),
https://www.hathitrust.org/.
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the California Cal Grants, Illinois Monetary Award Program, Indiana
Frank O’Bannon Grants, New Jersey Tuition Aid Grant, and Pennsylvania State Grant. Before Congress created the federal Pell Grant
program in 1972,33 these and other state grant programs were critical sources of financial aid to needy college students.
In the early 1990s, the broad-based merit scholarship entered the state financial aid policy scene in Arkansas and Georgia,
quickly spreading throughout the Southeast and beyond.34 Unlike the
need-based scholarships of the preceding decades, these programs
were characterized by their academic requirements, and in many
cases, by their funding from state lottery proceeds. Innovative at the
time, at least 14 states implemented broad-based merit-aid programs by 2004.35 Many scholars have since studied and critiqued
these programs, none more so than the Georgia HOPE Scholarship.36
In recent years, the new state financial aid fad is the so-called
“promise” or “free college” program, which typically incentivizes
middle and high school students to attend in-state colleges by promising them scholarships.37 A recent study identified 150 such statefunded programs, though many are not recent inventions.38 New
promise programs, like Tennessee Promise and New York’s Excelsior
Scholarship, are making headlines as evidence of their effectiveness
becomes available and as politicians latch on to the free college
movement.39 Financial aid scholars and state policy experts are care33 Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235.
34 Donald E. Heller, State Merit Scholarship Programs: An Introduction, in WHO SHOULD
WE HELP? THE NEGATIVE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF MERIT SCHOLARSHIPS 15 (Donald E. Heller & Patricia Marin eds., 2002).
35 William K. Ingle & Jason R. Ratliff, Then and Now: An Analysis of Broad-based Merit
aid Initial Eligibility Policies After Twenty Years, 3 KY. J. OF HIGHER EDUC. POL’Y & PRAC. 1 (2015).
36 Critics of the Georgia HOPE Scholarship primarily point to its funding, the lottery.
Lower income people tend to play the lottery. Lottery proceeds then fund merit-based scholarships for students with the highest academic achievements, who typically come from middle
and higher-income families and better-resourced schools; therein lies the problem. See ERIK C.
NESS, MERIT AID AND THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION (2008); STATE MERIT SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAMS AND
RACIAL INEQUALITY (Donald E. Heller & Patricia Marin eds., 2004); WHO SHOULD WE HELP? THE
NEGATIVE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF MERIT SCHOLARSHIPS (Donald E. Heller & Patricia Marin eds.,
2002).
37 Laura W. Perna & Elaine W. Leigh, Understanding the Promise: A Typology of State
and Local College Promise Programs, 47 EDUC. RESEARCHER 155 (2018).
38 Id.; e.g., Indiana’s 1990 21st Century Scholars, Arkansas’ 1991 Academic Challenge
Scholarship, Florida’s 1997 Bright Futures, and 1998 Kentucky Educational Excellence Scholarship.
39 Tom Hilliard, Excelsior Scholarship Serving Very Few New York Students. CENTER FOR
AN URBAN FUTURE

(Aug. 2018), https://nycfuture.org/research/excelsior-scholarship; Poutre &
Voight, The State of Free College: Tennessee Promise and New York’s Excelsior Scholarship, INST.
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fully watching the free college movement to see if promise programs
will revolutionize higher education finance.
As of the 2016-2017 academic year, the National Association
of State Student Grant and Aid Programs estimated that states spent
$12.8 billion on financial aid directly to students through over 600
different programs, including grants, loans, conditional grants, loan
forgiveness, tuition waivers, and others.40 With college costs on the
rise and the proportion of direct state appropriations to public colleges on the decline,41 state financial aid to students will remain an
important funding source of higher education.
For much of the history of American higher education, state
governments have funded scholarships for college students. Program trends evolved from competitive scholarships, to financial
need-based grants, to merit-aid scholarships, to the newest promise
programs. Throughout this history of state financial aid, as will be
demonstrated in this paper, state legislators put an important caveat
on some of their scholarship applicants: to be of “good moral character.” For context, I next delve into the history of good moral character requirements.
II. GOOD MORAL CHARACTER
The use of good moral character rules in American law is
ubiquitous. For example, a search for the phrase “good moral character” in HeinOnline yields over 17,000 entries dating back to 1782,
and that is not including all the variations of character rules, including “good character,” “high moral character,” or simply “character.”
Because much as already been written about good moral character
requirements, this brief review points readers to seminal articles on
the topic and establishes a foundation for this study of good moral
character requirements in state financial aid programs.42
The study of good moral character rules has focused on at
least three subjects: immigration law, occupational licensing, and the
HIGHER EDUC. POL’Y, (Sept. 2018), http://www.ihep.org/research/publications/state-freecollege-tennessee-promise-and-new-yorks-excelsior-scholarship.
FOR

40 NAT. ASSOCIATION OF STATE STUDENT GRANT AND AID PROGRAMS, 48TH ANNUAL SURVEY
REPORT ON STATE-SPONSORED STUDENT FINANCIAL AID: 2016-2017 A CADEMIC YEAR (2017),
https://www.nassgapsurvey.com/survey_reports.aspx.
41 STATE HIGHER EDUC. EXECUTIVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, STATE OF HIGHER EDUCATION
FINANCE:
FY
2017
(2018),
http://www.sheeo.org/sites/default/files/projectfiles/SHEEO_SHEF_FY2017_FINAL.pdf.
42 See infra this section.
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state bar.43 Of the three, the good moral character requirements in
immigration law are now the best defined. Since the 1790 Naturalization Act, persons seeking to become citizens of the US had to prove
their “good character,” but “for over 150 years, Congress offered no
guidance whatsoever on what constituted good moral character in
the naturalization context.”44 It was not until the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 that Congress delineated a list of crimes that
would disqualify a person from satisfying the good moral character
requirement, which was greatly expanded in the 1980s and 1990s.45
Today, hundreds of criminal charges and non-criminal behaviors
from before and after the five-year statutory review period are permanent or temporary bans on naturalization, including being a “habitual drunkard,” practicing polygamy, being involved in prostitution, and even having convictions that were expunged or pardoned.46
With few legal mechanisms for relief, immigrants with such experiences hesitate to apply for citizenship and are vulnerable to removal.47
State governments also regulate the character of working
professionals. As many occupations were professionalized in the late
19th and early 20th centuries, states exerted control by implementing
licensure systems, including good moral character requirements.48
Rationales for character requirements include professional gatekeeping (keeping undesirables out), protecting the status and reputation of the profession, protecting the public from bad practitioners,
and symbolic reasons.49 Legislators, regulatory agencies, and courts
have struggled – if not refused – to define good moral character.
Criminal convictions are the most common bar, but evidence of other
qualities and behaviors that courts may consider range from honesty
to integrity, fiscal responsibility, mental or emotional instability,
substance abuse, and failure to pay child support.50 Some courts,
however, have established that a person’s misconduct under ques43 Rhode, supra note 1.
44 Kevin Lapp, Reforming the Good Moral Character Requirement for US Citizenship, 87
IND. L. J. 1571, 1572 (2012).
45 Id.
46 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(2)(iv) (1993).
47 Lapp, supra note 44.
48 Rhode, supra note 1.
49 Id.
50 Larry Craddock, Good Moral Character as a Licensing Standard, 28 J. NAT. ASSOC.
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY. 449 (2008).

51

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byu_elj/vol2020/iss1/1

240

Kiracofe: Race-Conscious Admissions Policies in American Institutions of Higher Education

BYU Education & Law Journal

[2020

tion must be reasonably related to the occupation in order to be denied a license.51 Nonetheless, such requirements are serious employment barriers to the millions of Americans with criminal records.52
No application of good moral character rules among the professions has been more scrutinized than that of admission to the
bar.53 Character requirements have been a fixture of the Western law
profession for centuries, but in the United States, they were of little
importance until the late 19th century.54 In the first decades of the
20th century, the law profession began to formalize its entry standards, and character reviews became more systematic after the 1930s
as national and state bar associations garnered prominence.55 Since
then, courts have avoided defining good moral character and have
upheld bar denials for a host of “inconsistent and idiosyncratic” reasons,56 including adultery, public homosexual acts and other sexual
conduct,57 racist beliefs,58 failure to pay back student loans,59 failure
to pay child support or other financial debt,60 lack of candor on the
application, and a wide range of criminal conduct.61 Though denials
overall are relatively infrequent, there seems to have been a stark increase in the number of bar admission denials based on character in
51 Id.
52 Rhode, supra note 1; May, supra note 2.
53 See Tarra Simmons, Transcending the Stigma of a Criminal Record: A Proposal to Reform State Bar Character and Fitness Evaluations. 128 YALE L. J. FORUM 759 (2019); Keith
Swisher, The Troubling Rise of the Legal Profession's Good Moral Character, 82 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 1037 (2008); Theresa Keeley, Good Moral Character: Already an Unconstitutionally Vague
Concept and Now Putting Bar Applicants in a Post-9/11 World on an Elevated Threat Level, 6
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 844 (2004); Marcus Ratcliff, The Good Character Requirement: A Proposal for
a Uniform National Standard, 36 TULSA L. J. 487 (2000); Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a
Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491 (1985);; John R. Starrs, Considerations on Determination of Good Moral Character, 18 U. DETROIT L. J. 195 (1955); George W. Wickersham, The Moral
Character of Candidates for the Bar, 9 A.B.A.J. 617 (1923).
54 Rhode, supra note 53.
55 Id.
56 Rhode, supra note 53; Rhode, supra note 1.
57 Barbara Blackford, Good Moral Character and Homosexuality, 5 J. LEGAL PROF. 139

(1980).
58 Jason O. Billy, Confronting Racists at the Bar: Matthew Hale, Moral Character, and
Regulating the Marketplace of Ideas, 22 HARV. BLACKLETTER L. J. 25 (2006).
59 Tyler R. Martinez, The Effects of Student Loan Debt on State Bar Admission – Recalibrating the Good Moral Character Requirement, 14 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 37 (2011).
60 Aaron M. Clemens, Facing the Klieg Lights: Understanding the Good Moral Character
Examination for Bar Applicants, 40 AKRON L. REV. 255 (2007).
61 Rhode, supra note 53.
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recent decades.62 Perhaps recent newsworthy cases of formerlyincarcerated people defying the odds by being admitted to the bar
are a hopeful foreshadowing of fairer, more merciful character reviews in the modern era.63
Many legal scholars have called for the elimination or reform
of good moral character requirements for a variety of reasons. As a
matter of philosophy and psychology, character remains a contested
issue; a person’s actions are situation-dependent, and making character assessments based on limited information (perhaps a single
bad act) is flawed.64 Similarly, one study found that the personal history information reviewed during character reviews is a poor predictor of future misconduct among lawyers.65 Thus, if the purpose of reviewing character prior to occupational licensure is to protect safety,
some argue that a better strategy would be to discipline more consistently the practicing professionals who commit work-related offenses.66 Historically, character reviews were used to keep out political radicals, women, and ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities,
which may still occur today.67 Similarly, the fear of impending character reviews may dissuade people from seeking mental health support or exercising their free speech rights.68 For people formerly involved in the criminal justice system, denying employment because
of character rules is a perpetual punishment; doing so often ignores
evidence of rehabilitation or how old or unrelated one’s crime is to
an occupation, is often racially discriminatory, and is counterproductive to reducing criminal recidivism.69 Pragmatically, the process or
reviewing character itself is taxing and expensive for applicants and
agency reviewers alike,70 and there is known to be a great deal of
subjectivity and administrative error in making character determi-

62 Rhode, supra note 53; Swisher, supra note 53.
63 Simmons, supra note 53; Susan Svrluga, He Robbed Banks and Went to Prison. His
Time There Put Him on Track for a New Job: Georgetown Law Professor, THE WASHINGTON POST,
Apr. 21, 2017.
64 Rhode, supra note 1.
65 Leslie C. Levin, Christine Zozula & Peter Siegelman, The Questionable Character of the
Bar's Character and Fitness Inquiry, 40 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 51 (2015).
66 Rhode, supra note 53; Rhode, supra note 1.
67 Rhode, supra note 53.
68 Keeley, supra note 53; Rhode, supra note 53; Levin, Zozula & Siegelman, supra note

66.
69 Rhode, supra note 1; May, supra note 2.
70 Lapp, supra note 44; Levin, Zozula & Siegelman, supra note 66.

53

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byu_elj/vol2020/iss1/1

242

Kiracofe: Race-Conscious Admissions Policies in American Institutions of Higher Education

BYU Education & Law Journal

[2020

nations.71 For these reasons and more, scholars and advocates in the
United States have called for reform of moral character reviews in
immigration law, occupational licensing, and bar admissions.
The character of people in the United States has been regulated by governments beyond these three areas. Applicants for state financial aid programs for college have been, and continue to be, subject to character reviews, but legal scholars have not examined this
subject with the same dedication as the others. How many state financial aid programs have character requirements? What does it
mean to be of good moral character as a scholarship applicant? How
have state officials and courts interpreted good moral character requirements in state financial aid programs? The following study was
guided by these questions.
II. THE STUDY
Though scholarship programs and good moral character rules
are both nearly as old as the American states themselves, there has
never been an analysis of their convergence in state higher education law. The purpose of this study is first to identify historical and
current state financial aid programs that contain character requirements and second to analyze how state governments interpreted and
enforced character requirements on scholarship applicants.
A. Methods
I analyzed the content of current state statutes for all 524
grants, conditional grants, and tuition waiver programs identified in
the 2017 National Association of State Student Grant and Aid Programs (NASSGAP) inventory.72 This process identified all the currently-funded scholarship programs with active character requirements.73 Next, I used HeinOnline’s session laws and historic state
statutes databases to find the original session law for each of the 524
programs, which I also analyzed for content. This process further
identified all the currently-active programs that formerly had charac-

71 Lapp, supra note 44.
72 See supra note 40. A grant is a non-repayable scholarship. A conditional grant or loan
is a non-repayable scholarship that becomes a repayable loan if the student does not comply
with the conditions of the program, typically post-graduation in-state work requirements. A
tuition waiver is where colleges do not charge a student for tuition at all, which may or may
not be reimbursed by the state.
73 See infra Table 3.
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ter rules earlier in their history.74 Then, I analyzed 2,170 HeinOnline
search results for “scholarship” between 1800-1950 to identify programs with character rules that are no longer active and thus were
not included in the NASSGAP program database.75 Finally, through a
process analogous to “snowball sampling,” I sometimes found relevant programs in the databases while in the process of searching for
another. These iterative steps add confidence that most programs
with character rules (current or old) were identified.
With the programs identified, I then sought to understand
the meaning of the character rules. I collected statutes, regulations,
court cases, attorney general opinions, government agency reports,
research articles, news reports, and other documents from online
databases, library archives, and state agencies. Because some programs with character rules are still active, I contacted state higher
education agency officials to get official statements on how they currently interpret the existing character rules. At times, when I did not
receive an initial response to my requests for records or explanations, I invoked open records laws to compel a timely response.

A. Limitations
Despite my due diligence, I do not claim to have identified
every program that ever contained a good moral character rule. My
systematic review of HeinOnline records was thorough, but it is possible that some eligible programs were not recorded in the database.
In addition, some programs may contain character rules not in statutes but within state administrative codes or agency regulations,
which I did not systemically review.76 Due to the complexity of the
state financial aid landscape, I did not review state loan programs,
loan forgiveness or repayment programs, savings or prepaid tuition
programs, dual enrollment programs, or work study programs.77
There is much still for higher education historians to learn about
state financial aid programs; perhaps this paper will inspire new inquiries into the topic.
74 See infra Table 2.
75 See infra Table 1.
76 See exception Table 2, Tennessee Student Assistance Award.
77 I point readers to a few examples of state loan programs that contain character rules,
including eight of New Mexico’s loan forgiveness programs: Allied Loan for Service, Health Professions Loan for Service, Health Professions Loan Repayment, Medical Loan for Service, Nurse
Educator Loan for Service, Nursing Loan for Service, Teacher Loan for Service, Western Interstate Commission on Higher Education (WICHE) Loan for Service Programs.
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B. Results

In total, 50 state grant programs with character requirements across 19 states were identified. Table 1 displays the 32 programs that are defunct, meaning they were repealed, reformulated
into new programs, or are no longer funded. Table 2 displays the
seven programs that are still active but whose character rules have
been deleted; states still award these scholarships, but applicants are
no longer reviewed for character. Finally, Table 3 displays the 11
programs that are still active and that still contain character requirements.
Most character rules were original to the authorizing statute,
except in the few cases where noted when character rules were later
added to a program through statutory amendments. The tables display the exact phrases in statute that pertain to a scholarship applicant’s character. There are as many as nine variations of character
rules, though “good moral character” is most common.
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III. BEING A GOOD STUDENT: THE MEANING OF GOOD MORAL
CHARACTER
Most state financial aid programs with character rules are
relics of the past.78 Historically, how did state policymakers, government officials, and university administrators interpret and enforce the character rules in these programs? Programs from Illinois,
Pennsylvania, and Michigan are discussed next as “case studies” because they are insightful for their unique historical circumstances.

A.Illinois
In 1955, Illinois Governor William Stratton created the Illinois Higher Education Commission (IHEC) to study the condition of
higher education in Illinois.79 In 1957, IHEC issued its report, which
included a proposal for a new need- and merit-based scholarship
that would support the training of more Illinois residents.80 The legislature adopted the proposal as the State Scholarship Act of 1957.81
IHEC proposed specific eligibility requirements for the scholarship,
including a “good moral character” requirement. IHEC’s only explanation for the requirement was rather uninformative: “For obvious
reasons, good moral character should be a condition of eligibility.”82
Further, nothing in the report indicated where this “obvious” rule
came from, but a historian of Illinois’ scholarship programs pointed
to one explanation. According to a report of the Illinois State Scholarship Commission, “the IHEC patterned the [State Scholarship Program] after a recently created California program.”83 Indeed, California legislators created the Competitive Scholarship in 1955.84
Applicants had to demonstrate financial need and “high moral char-

78 See Tables 1 & 2.
79 See supra note 32.
80 Id.
81 1957 Ill. Laws 855-861. By 1971, the State Scholarship was defunded, but still today,
the most academically strong students from across Illinois are designated as State Scholars by
the Illinois Student Assistance Commission.
82 See supra note 32, at 158.
83 Paul R. Eber, The ISSC’s Statutory Evolution: Scholarship and Grant Programs 19571982, IL. HIGHER EDUC. STUDENT ASSISTANCE COMM’N, at 27 (1982) (on file with author).
84 1955 Cal. Stat. ch. 1846.
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acter, good citizenship, and dedication to American ideals.”85 If IHEC
did model the State Scholarship off the California Competitive Scholarship, perhaps this is from where the good moral character requirement came.
Regardless of where it came from, the good moral character
requirement was “historically troubling for the [Illinois State Scholarship Commission]” to implement.86 An agency rule adopted prior
to 1973 defined good moral character as:
A student’s personal record of conduct, determined by the
high school to be in keeping with school and community standards.
High schools which withhold their recommendations of students for
reasons of ‘moral character’ shall have the responsibility of explaining their positions, as necessary, to parties having a proper and valid
interest in this information.87
In practice, high school principals determined who had good
moral character. Officials from the scholarship commission had to
clarify parameters for character occasionally, like in the 1960s when
they decided that premarital pregnancy should not disqualify a student on moral grounds.88 According to meeting minutes, commission
officials debated the legal standard of good moral character at least
six times between 1957 and 1973, and the rule was recommended to
be abolished several times between 1972 and 1975.89 It was estimated that six to ten students each year were denied scholarships
for moral reasons, though “no systematic study has been done of the
reasons high schools have withheld moral character certifications to
otherwise qualified State Scholar applicants.”90
In 1967, legislators created what is now called the Monetary
Award Program (MAP), a need-based grant with no initial academic
qualifications.91 They included the character rule in the MAP program, too, which shortly thereafter subsumed and replaced the State
Scholarship. The good moral character requirement continued to be
challenging to interpret after the creation of the MAP grant, especially when it came to the question of whether incarcerated students
should be disqualified on moral grounds. In 1971, the Illinois State
85 Id. at § 21702(e).
86 Eber, supra note 84, at 22.
87 Id at 23.
88 Id at 22.
89 Id at 23.
90 Id.
91 1967 Ill. Laws 2644, 2646.
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Scholarship Commission Executive Director, Joseph Boyd, asked the
Illinois Attorney General to issue an opinion on the matter. Mr. Boyd
asked:
Is there a legal definition of good moral character? Does a
person assigned by the courts to any institution of correction automatically disqualify himself for an award as long as he is serving out
his/her sentence? This matter has become an issue since a considerable number of public and private institutions in Illinois are now offering credit courses to those persons in Illinois institutions of correction.92
In March 1972, the Illinois Attorney General William Scott
responded with a 12-page, unpublished opinion.93 On the first question, the attorney general stated there was no consistent legal definition of good moral character and that each case needed to be decided
on the facts: “It is the applicant’s actual conduct that is at issue, not
the reputation of the applicant.”94 His best advice was that officials
“must objectively determine whether an applicant is of good moral
character by determining whether he measures up to the generally
accepted moral standards currently prevalent within the State of Illinois.”95
On the second question, the attorney general opined: “the
fact than an applicant for a scholarship is incarcerated in a correctional institution does not automatically disqualify him for a scholarship.” Though a person who commits a felony was, at the time, not of
good moral character, he suggested, other factors must be weighed
when evaluating the character of a person after the fact, such as evidence of rehabilitation.
According to the ISSC historian, the opinion was not particularly helpful to the agency, and it is not clear how officials handled
the good moral character requirement in its wake.96 However, when
ISSC issued its first program regulations in the new 1986 Illinois
Administrative Code, a person was said to be of good moral character “if the applicant will benefit from postsecondary instruction and
is allowed to enroll at an approved postsecondary institution.”97 This
92 1972 Ill. Att’y Gen. Op. 434 (NP) at 1-2.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 5.
95 Id. at 6.
96 Eber, supra note 84, at 31.
97 23 Ill. Admin. Code pt. 1700.20 (1986).
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definition left open the possibility that incarcerated students enrolled in prison higher education programs could receive state
grants, which indeed happened so frequently that it caught the attention of state legislators. After a lively debate on the merits of funding
scholarships for incarcerated students, legislators eliminated their
eligibility through statutory amendment in 1989.98 Then, they eliminated the good moral character rule from the MAP statute in 1992
amidst a broad reorganization of the Higher Education Assistance
Act.99 Nonetheless, the 1986 definition of good moral character remains today in the definitions section of the Illinois Student Assistance Commission regulations that apply to all grant programs.100
However, there is no good moral character requirement listed in the
regulations’ section on general applicant eligibility requirements,
nor is it listed on the commission’s official website,101 which seems
to indicate that the good moral character rule no longer applies to
grant applicants in Illinois.102

B.Pennsylvania
In 1966, the Pennsylvania legislature created the State Scholarship Program to be administered by the recently created Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Authority (PHEAA). An original
statutory rule stated that scholarship applicants “shall satisfactorily
meet the qualifications of ‘financial need,’ character and academic
promise, as well as academic achievement, as established by the
agency,”103 which remains in statute today.104 In 1969, the legislature
left the character rule in place but added requirements related to
criminal history:
(a) The agency may deny all forms of financial assistance to
any student:

98 1989 Ill. Laws 6809, 6820.
99 1992 Ill. Laws 2128, 2137.
100 Formerly the Illinois State Scholarship Commission; 23 Ill. Admin. Code pt. 2700.20

(2018).
101 Illinois Student Assistance Commission, Monetary Award Program, Eligibility
(2019),
https://www.isac.org/students/during-college/types-of-financialaid/grants/monetary-award-program/#Eligibility.
102 23 Ill. Admin. Code pt. 2700.40 (2018).
103 Emphasis added; Pa. Act of Jan. 25, P.L. 1546, No. 541 (1966).
104 24 Pa. Stat. § 5154 (a)(5).
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(1) Who is convicted by any court of record of a criminal offense which was committed after the effective date of
this act which, under the laws of the United States or Pennsylvania, would constitute a misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude or a felony; or
(2) Who has been expelled, dismissed or denied enrollment by an approved institution of higher learning for refusal to obey, after the effective date of this act, a lawful regulation or order of any institution of higher education, which
refusal, in the opinion of the institution, contributed to a disruption of the activities, administration or classes of such institution; or
(3) Who has been convicted in any court of record of
any offense committed in the course of disturbing, interfering with or preventing, or in an attempt to disturb, interfere
with or prevent the orderly conduct of the activities, administration or classes of an institution of higher education.105

Punishing college students for campus unrest saw brief popularity in
the late 1960s, spurred on by Congress’ decision in the 1968 Higher
Education Amendments to block students convicted of similar disruptive behaviors from receiving federal financial aid.106 By 1971, at
least eleven states passed laws to prohibit scholarship eligibility to
students convicted of similar offenses (Keeney, 1971),107 but these
rules did not last long,108 including in Pennsylvania.
In Corporation of Haverford College v. Reeher (1971), students
and colleges sued PHEAA over the new rules.109 A majority of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
struck down the “misdemeanor involving moral turpitude” rule as
unconstitutionally vague and struck down the two rules pertaining
to students who were disciplined or convicted for campus disruptions as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.110 The court left in
105 Pa. Act of Dec. 18, 1969 (P.L. 171, No. 169) § 2.
106 Higher Education Amendments of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-575, § 504, 82 Stat. 1062.
107 Gregory D. Keeney, Aid to Education, Student Unrest, and Cutoff Legislation: An
Overview, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 1003 (1971).
108 The campus disruption rules were repealed from the Higher Education Act in 1980;
Education Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-374, 94 Stat. 1367.
109 Corporation of Haverford College v. Reeher, 329 F. Supp. 1196 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
110 The legislature never corrected the statute, so the unconstitutional provisions remain. See 24 Pa. Stat. § 5158.2.
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tact the state’s ability to deny state financial aid to felons. The plaintiffs did not ask the court to rule on the constitutionality of the
“character” requirement, though a dissenting judge commented on it.
Judge John William Ditter Jr., citing language from the 1966 statute,111 argued that the state should be allowed to deny aid to people
convicted of the prescribed crimes for fiscal reasons under the authority of the statutory character rule:
PHEAA must dispense millions of dollars of taxpayer's money and choose which among thousands of
applicants are "deserving" and which are most likely
to help the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania "achieve
its full economic and social potential" because they
are persons of "character". Viewed as a part of a legislative plan to allocate state money, the subsections in
question do not offend the requirements of due process.112
After winning another lawsuit in which PHEAA’s ability to withhold
aid from scholarship applicants who had pending felony charges was
upheld,113 PHEAA issued new regulations to correct the unconstitutional provisions. Relying on the character rule, it created new restrictions for people convicted of felonies and other specified crimes:
In order to be eligible for financial assistance a student applicant or recipient shall have and maintain
satisfactory character. A student applicant or recipient who is convicted of any of the following offenses
may be deemed to lack satisfactory character and be
denied any or all forms of financial assistance by the
Agency:
(1) A criminal offense which under the laws of the
United States or Pennsylvania constitutes a felony.
(2) Adultery. (3) Arson of personal property. (4) Assault and battery. (5) Pointing deadly weapons. (6)
Bribery. (7) Fornication and bastardy. (8) Prostitution and assignation. (9) Bigamy. (10 Blackmail. (11)
111 See supra p. 6; Pa. Act of Jan. 25, 1966 (P.L. 1546, No. 541) § 1.
112 Reeher, 329 F. Supp. at [PINCITE NEEDED].
113 Corporation of Haverford College v. Reeher, 53 F.R.D. 374 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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Abandoning an infant. (12) Corrupting the morals of
children. (13) Neglect to maintain child. (14) Use of
drugs. (15) Extortion. (16) False pretense. (17)
Fraud. (18) Desecrating flag of United States or Pennsylvania. (19) Forcible entry and detainer. (20) Indecent assault. (21) Libel. (22) Perjury. (23) Driving
under the influence of liquor or drugs or permitting
same.114

With the “misdemeanor involving moral turpitude” rule struck
down, PHEAA relied on the statutory character rule to delineate
these crimes as eligibility requirements. Dissatisfied with the new
regulations, convicted students returned to the same federal court to
sue PHEAA again.
In Carbonaro v. Reeher (1975), students who were convicted
of felonies and who lost aid eligibility under PHEAA’s new satisfactory character regulations sued PHEAA on the grounds that discriminating against people with felony convictions violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection under the law.115 The
court analyzed the extent to which denying financial aid to felons
had a legitimate state purpose. The state made a fiscal argument
with which the court agreed, much like Ditter’s dissent in Corporation of Haverford College v. Reeher (1971): “The state contends that
the classification is reasonable because the state has only finite resources and wishes to maximize the potential gain from the available
funds by providing assistance only to those students with ‘satisfactory character.’”116 The court returned to the original language of the
1966 statute, which states that only “deserving” students should be
given the aid and that students must “satisfactorily meet the qualifications of ‘financial need,’ character and academic promise.” Character, according to the court, was distinct from the other academic and
financial requirements, and a felony conviction may be indicative of
unsatisfactory character. The state, the court concluded, was justified in requiring felons to prove their satisfactory character to
PHEAA:

114 Emphasis added; 2 Pa. B. 506 (March 25, 1972).
115 Carbonaro v. Reeher, 392 F. Supp. 753, 755 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
116 Id. at 757.
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To reiterate, we hold that the statutory and administrative program whereby Pennsylvania places the
burden on former felons to prove that they are of satisfactory character in order to receive state financial
assistance for postsecondary education does not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The felon classification bears a rational
relationship to the legitimate state purpose of assuring that only responsible citizens receive state aid.117
PHEAA prevailed in this case, but the agency grew weary of defending itself in court. Seeking the most stable legal footing possible to
avoid future litigation, PHEAA made regulatory changes by loosening
its requirements on convicted students. In the months after the 1975
lawsuit, PHEAA began approving all applicants with misdemeanors
and first-degree felonies for aid “based on (1) the experience of [the
Administrative Review Committee] approving such cases [on appeal]
and (2) a question as to whether courts would uphold our denial of
aid based on a misdemeanor conviction.”118 In 1978, PHEAA eliminated the character test in the loan program so that any felon denied
grant aid could at least get a loan.119
In the 1980s, PHEAA further narrowed how it defined unsatisfactory character. In 1980, the Administrative Review Committee
began automatically reviewing any felon applicants that initial staff
could not agree on, and in 1985, staff were permitted to approve
nearly all felons so long as they paid for their first term of college out
pocket, which apparently was a demonstration of deservingness for
future aid.120 By 1988, data showed that almost all students with felony convictions were eventually approved for aid after exhausting
their appeal options.121 From then on, including still today, PHEAA
assumes “that once an applicant is released from incarceration, he
will be presumed to be of satisfactory character and eligible for aid.
Therefore, only currently incarcerated applicants are now denied
grant aid under the satisfactory character provision of the law.”122 It
117 Id. at 760.
118 Gary D. Smith, BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SATISFACTORY CHARACTER/CRIME POLICY, PA. HIGHER
EDUC. ASSISTANCE AUTHORITY, at 2 (1990) (on file with author).
119 8 Pa. B. 3085 (November 11, 1985).
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
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took nearly twenty years, but Pennsylvania finally came to an interpretation of good character that it could maintain and justify, which
remains in force today.

C.Michigan
By 1979, the state of Michigan administered four grant programs for college students. That year, the auditor general conducted
an audit of the four programs, finding many inconsistencies in their
eligibility requirements.123 One such inconsistency was that two of
the programs – the 1964 Competitive Scholarship and the 1966 Tuition Grant program – contained “good moral character” rules but the
other two did not. State legislators authored bills to correct the inconsistencies.124 In the first drafts of Senate Bills 1275 and 1276 introduced on September 23, 1980, the legislators proposed to strike
the good moral character rules from both scholarship programs, but
two weeks later, they added a rule making incarcerated students ineligible for the Competitive Scholarship in Bill 1276. According to a
senate analysis summary from November 10, 1980, this amendment
was thought to “sharpen the original intent of the ‘good moral character’ provision.”125 For consistency, they then added the incarceration rule to Bill 1275 to replace the character rule in the Tuition
Grant program, which senate analyses again suggested would sharpen the original intent of the character rule.126 When Senate Bills 1275
and 1276 passed in 1981, the character rules were indeed replaced
with prohibitions on aid to incarcerated students,127 as remains the
case today.128 Thus, legislators apparently believed that incarcerated
people were not of good moral character and were therefore undeserving of scholarships for college. Today, only the incarceration re-

123 STATE OF MICH. OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GEN., AUDIT REPORT: STUDENT FIN. ASSISTANCE
SERVS., ET AL., DEP’T OF EDUC. (1979) (on file with author).
124 Mich. 1980 SB 1275 (Michigan Tuition Grants); Mich. 1980 SB 1276 (Michigan Competitive Scholarship); Mich. 1980 SB 1277 (Differential Grants Program); Mich. 1980 SB 1278
(Legislative Merit Awards Program).
125 MICH. S. ANALYSIS SECTION, S.B. 1275, 1276, 1277, & 1278: FIRST ANALYSIS, at 3 (Nov. 10,
1980) (on file with author).
126 MICH. S. ANALYSIS SECTION, S.B. 1275, 1276, 1277, & 1278: SECOND ANALYSIS, at 3 (Dec.
22, 1980) (on file with author).
127 Mich. 1981 P.A. 500 § 4; Mich. 1981 P.A. 503 § 3.
128 Mich. Compiled Laws 390.974 (2017); MCL 390.993 (2017).
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quirements remain in both programs, freeing state officials from
having to define good moral character.

D.Active Programs
The three state case studies presented above demonstrate
how state lawmakers, government officials, and courts interpreted
good moral character rules in financial aid programs between the
1960s and 1980s. But Table 3 shows that there are at least 11 active
programs that still contain character rules, suggesting that student
applicants must continue to meet character requirements. How do
officials currently interpret and enforce the character rules in these
programs? This section discusses the six states shown in Table 3.
In Pennsylvania, the original “character” rule from 1966 remains in statute, and a state regulation still stipulates “a student applicant or recipient shall have and maintain satisfactory character.”129 As described above, court decisions and regulatory actions of
the 1970s and 1980s yielded what is still today the interpretation of
satisfactory character for the Pennsylvania State Grant.130 Though
there is no statute or regulation that says so, the only condition that
triggers the satisfactory character clause is incarceration, even
though other conditions are still listed as possibilities in the Pennsylvania Code.131 In the eyes of the Pennsylvania Higher Education
Assistance Authority, to be of unsatisfactory character is to be incarcerated. This interpretation is made clear in the 2017 Pennsylvania
State Grant Program Policy Manual in a section titled “Satisfactory
Character,” which states: “State Grant eligibility is not impacted by a
felony conviction unless the student is also currently incarcerated.
All incarcerated students are ineligible for State Grant awards.”132 As
Pennsylvania added new scholarship programs over the years,
PHEAA tied their eligibility requirements to that of the State Grant,
rendering incarcerated students in Pennsylvania ineligible for all
state-funded grant programs.
There is one remaining Illinois scholarship statute that still
contains a character rule. The present-day University of Illinois Children of Veterans Tuition Waiver has its roots in one of the oldest
129 22 Pa. Code § 121.6(a).
130 See discussion supra Part IV.B.
131 22 Pa. Code § 121.6(a)(1-3).
132 PA HIGHER EDUC. ASSISTANCE AUTHORITY, PA STATE GRANT PROGRAM POL’Y MANUAL, at 23
(2017), https://www.pheaa.org/documents/grants/ph/2017-18-policy-manual.pdf.
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scholarship programs in the study sample: the 1867 Illinois Industrial University scholarship: “for the benefit of the descendants of the
soldiers and seamen who served in the armies and navies of the
United States during the late rebellion.”133 Though amended many
times, the program is still active, and the state administers this program directly through the University of Illinois, rather than through
the state’s financial aid agency. However, the University of Illinois
application for the program conspicuously omits any mention of the
character requirement, despite an otherwise detailed accounting of
the eligibility requirements.134 It seems the old character rule is
simply ignored in practice, and an official from the University of Illinois did not respond to my request for more information about how
they evaluate character.
Virginia funds three programs that contain character rules.
The Virginia State Board of Health administers four scholarships for
undergraduate and graduate students under the 1950 Nurse Scholarship program. Regarding character, the Board checks all applicants’ nursing licenses for disciplinary issues, and on the application
forms, college nursing faculty must attest to a scholarship applicant’s
character.135 Officials from Virginia Tech did not respond to my
emails about how they administer the 1970 Soil Scientist Scholarship. Each institution in Virginia administers the 1936 “unfunded
scholarship,” and I did not attempt to learn from each institution
how they define character.
Similarly, three entities administer scholarship programs in
Alabama with character rules. The Alabama Board of Nursing administers the 1977 Graduate Nursing Scholarship, but a Board official
reported that there is no single definition of “good character” for the
purpose of the scholarship.136 Instead, several sections of the administrative code outline the standards of practice, conduct, and accountability that would be referenced when selecting scholarship
applicants.137 Officials from the Alabama Optometric Association and
the Alabama Board of Dental Scholarship Awards did not respond to
133 1867 Ill. Pub. L. 123.
134
See
application
form,
available
content/uploads/2018/11/1920_COV_App.pdf.

at

https://osfa.illinois.edu/wp-

135
See
application
forms,
VA
DEPT.
OF
HEALTH,
available
at
http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/health-equity/forms-and-applications/; Personal Communication, Mar. 21, 2019 (notes on file with author).
136 Personal Communication, Feb. 20, 2019 (e-mail on file with author).
137 Ala. Admin. Code Rules 610-X-6; 610-X-6-.03; 610-X-8; 610-X-8-.03.
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my requests for information about the scholarship programs that
they administer.
In South Carolina, two grant programs still have character
rules, which are administered by separate state agencies. An official
from the South Carolina Higher Education Tuition Grants Commission informed me that they do not interpret or define the “good moral character” requirement in the 1970 Tuition Grant program, nor
would they deny an applicant based on moral reasons, alone.138 Any
denials would be based on other existing requirements. An official
from the South Carolina Commission on Higher Education did not respond to my email about the 1996 Need-based Grant program.
Finally, regarding the 1971 Oklahoma Tuition Grant Program, an official from the Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education was not able to clarify the state’s position on enforcing the “high
moral character” requirement.139 Since higher education institutions
share responsibility for eligibility requirement enforcement, it is
possible that a student may be denied eligibility under the character
rule following an incident of campus misconduct, the official suggested. What is more likely is that the 1995 amendment to the Tuition Grant program statute that made incarcerated students ineligible for aid rendered the character rule itself moot.140
V. ELIMINATING CHARACTER REQUIREMENTS
Good moral character rules in state financial aid programs
are mostly relics of the past. Of the 50 programs identified with such
rules since 1850, just 11 (22%) are active today with their character
rules still intact. In the historical cases of Pennsylvania, Illinois, and
Michigan, the character rules were eventually converted into bans on
financial aid to incarcerated students, which may represent contemporary beliefs about what it meant to be of good moral character. In
the six states where financial aid programs still contain character
rules, the rules are largely ignored, as best illustrated by the requirement being left off the Illinois Children of Veterans Tuition
Waiver application. In others, explicit eligibility requirements pertaining to criminal history, financial standing (e.g., not being in default on loans or owing child support), or other misconduct are enforced in lieu of any behavior that otherwise might be representative
138 Personal Communication, Apr. 12, 2018 (e-mail on file with author).
139 Personal Communication, Mar. 23, 2018 (e-mail on file with author).
140 1995 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 247.
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of unsatisfactory character. In other words, character rules are
meaningless or redundant as applied in most of today’s state financial aid programs.
At least six states have stripped their current financial aid
programs of old character rules.141 There are good reasons for policymakers to continue this trend by deleting the last remaining good
character rules from financial aid program statutes and regulations.
First, despite one court’s assertion that it is in the state’s interest to
award scholarships only to deserving applicants with satisfactory
character,142 character requirements contradict the policy goals of
modern state financial aid programs. The broad need-based programs are intended to make college affordable so that all residents
can gain new knowledge and skills, get higher paying jobs, and bolster the American economy.143 Thus, denying any academicallyqualified state resident the benefits of college scholarships because
of character or criminal history works against the public interests of
a well-educated society. Access to and completion of higher education is more dependent now than ever on the ability to pay for college,144 and denying aid to applicants based on character is an arcane
way to save the state a small amount of money. Any state resident
who has been admitted to a recognized college should be considered
to meet the baseline qualifications for a grant.145
Second, the inconsistency of program rules is cumbersome.
Of the six states that still have character requirements, only Pennsylvania’s character statute applies to all programs. In the other states,
it is a fluke of history that just one or two programs still have character requirements. For example, Virginia currently funds 38 grants,
conditional grants or loans, and tuition waiver programs to undergraduate, graduate, and professional students, just three of which
have character requirements.146 Like Michigan did in 1981, states
should eliminate their remaining character requirements for the
sake of simplicity and consistency across programs.

141 See supra Table 2.
142 Carbonaro v. Reeher, 392 F. Supp. 753, 759 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
143 Supra notes 25 & 27.
144 See SARA GOLDRICK-RAB, PAYING THE PRICE: COLLEGE COSTS, FINANCIAL AID, AND THE
BETRAYAL OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (2016).
145 For example, see Illinois’ definition of good moral character: 23 Ill. Admin. Code pt.
2700.20 (2018).
146 See supra note 40.
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Third, the rules themselves are burdensome to administer.
State officials, program administrators, and college financial aid officers would not have to field questions from students, parents, and
the rare researcher about the meaning of good moral character if
they deleted them. Perhaps the reason that six state officials – even
after making open records requests in some cases – did not respond
to my request for clarification on the character rules is evidence they
did not have an answer or were too busy. Either way, governmental
efficiency would be improved ever so slightly by striking these burdensome rules.
Fourth, though likely infrequent, there still may be colleges
or state agencies that deny eligibility to students for ill-defined reasons of unsatisfactory character. This is especially possible where
individual institutions make character determinations for scholarship programs based on their knowledge of an applicant’s prior behavior (e.g., criminal convictions or discipline at previous educational institutions) or an applicant’s behavior on campus (e.g., academic
or behavioral misconduct violations). Eliminating character requirements may restore scholarship eligibility to some students.
Finally, confusion around what constitutes good moral character may be a deterrent to qualified applicants. In a U.S. Department
of Education survey of college students who did not apply for federal
financial aid, 18.9% said the forms were too much work and 60.7%
thought they would be ineligible, though over half of them were in
fact eligible for a Pell Grant.147 Combine that with evidence that formerly-convicted students were deterred from applying to college
when they knew they faced criminal history questions on the application.148 It stands to reason that an otherwise qualified student with
a criminal conviction, for example, may be deterred from applying
for a state scholarship with a nebulous character requirement out of
stigma, fear of rejection, or confusion over the requirement. Eliminating character rules helps to ensure that students will not be deterred from applying because of confusing requirements.
For these reasons, the current practice of ignoring or haphazardly enforcing good moral character rules is unsatisfactory.
State policymakers should delete the few remaining good moral
character requirements from financial aid programs.

147 Mark Kantrowitz, Reasons Why Students Do Not File the FAFSA, STUDENT FINANCIAL
AID POL’Y ANALYSIS, (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.finaid.org/educators/studentaidpolicy.phtml.
148 Center for Community Alternatives, Boxed Out: Criminal History Screening and College Application Attrition (2015), http://www.communityalternatives.org/fb/boxed-out.html.
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VI. CONCLUSION
For nearly a century, legal scholars have lamented good moral character rules in immigration law, occupational licensing, and bar
admissions; yet during that period and prior, good moral character
rules also existed in state financial aid programs for college students.
For the first time, this paper offered an accounting of state scholarship programs with good moral character rules and an analysis of
what they mean and how they are enforced. Most of the 50 identified
programs with character rules are now defunct, but applicants for at
least 11 programs in six states still must contend with character requirements, to varying degrees. I join the chorus of other scholars in
advocating that good moral character requirements should be deleted.
The identification of character requirements in financial aid
programs raises the question as to what other previouslyunidentified subjects are affected by good moral character rules, especially within education law. For example, in my review of historical state statutes, I found laws that listed good character as a requirement for admission to college, not just for scholarships. Today,
most colleges require students to disclose criminal history on college
applications,149 but do any still evaluate character? Law schools, for
example, certainly ask applicants “character and fitness” questions,
ranging from criminal history, educational discipline, military discipline, substance abuse history, to involvement in civil litigation.150
Future research might pursue a review of good moral character requirements in college admissions policies and in other higher education laws.

149 See Bradley D. Custer, College Admission Policies for Ex-Offender Students: A Literature Review, 67 J. CORRECTIONAL EDUC. 35 (2016); Douglas N. Evans, Jason Szkola & Victor St.
John, Going Back to College? Criminal Stigma in Higher Education Admissions in Northeastern
US, CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2019) (advance online publication); Robert Stewart & Christopher
Uggen, Criminal Records and College Admissions: A National Experimental Audit (Sept. 10,
2018) (unpublished working paper).
150 John S. Dzienkowski, Character and Fitness Inquiries in Law School Admissions, 45
S. TEX. L. REV. 921 (2004).
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